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THREE ESSAYS ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REALIZING WOMEN’S
“COLLECTIVE INTERESTS”
Leslie Raye Marshall, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2019
Despite growing attention to the need to increase women’s equity in political decision-making
worldwide, widespread gains have not always followed from policies or efforts designed to
increase women’s political representation and participation as expected. One reason this
expectation exists is because of essentialist notions of women as generally inclined to work
together to represent their “collective interests.” This dissertation consists of three essays
that evaluate the extent to which those collective interests exist. In the first two essays I
examine whether ethnic and socio-economic class differences present obstacles to coopera-
tion among women using a public goods experiment in Lebanon. In the third essay, I look
at how differences among women in terms of their political connectedness affect their like-
lihood of prioritizing women’s interests in the context of reserved quota seats for women in
political office. Overall, these essays highlight the importance of understanding how differ-
ences amongst women, particularly differences between elite and non-elite women, affect the
advancement of women’s collective interests. I also contribute by demonstrating the impor-
tance of taking intersectionality seriously in order to develop policies that more effectively
address the problem of gender inequality worldwide.
Keywords: gender, representation, women and politics, gender quotas, intersectionality,
ethnic politics, socio-economic class, identity politics, collective action, cooperation, pub-
lic goods experiment, Lebanon, Uganda.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PROJECT MOTIVATION
Recent years have witnessed growing attention to the need to increase gender equity in
political decision-making worldwide. To this end, a range of policies and interventions have
been implemented to help promote women’s political participation and representation. For
example, quotas for women’s representation in political decision-making have exploded on
a global scale, with more than 130 countries adopting some form of gender-based quota
or otherwise altering their rules for candidate selection to enhance electoral prospects for
women (Hughes, Krook and Paxton, 2015). Many studies show that these kinds of policies are
effective at increasing the number of women in politics (Paxton and Hughes, 2015; Schwindt-
Bayer, 2009). While a wealth of empirical evidence points to the positive impact of policies
designed to increase women’s political participation (e.g. Beaman, Pande and Cirone (2012);
Burnet (2012); Zetterberg (2012)), other evidence suggests that widespread gains in gender
equality have not always followed as expected (e.g. Franceschet and Piscopo (2008); Eagly
and Karau (2002); Duflo and Topalova (2004); Eckel and Grossman (1998)).
I argue that a plausible explanation for the persistence of women’s political inequality de-
rives from the fact that many of these policies proceed from an essentialist view of women as
generally inclined to work together on behalf of their “collective interests.” Indeed, many ar-
guments in favor of quotas for group-based representation begin from the conceptual starting
point that descriptive representation of groups (the degree to which political representatives
‘look like’ the people they represent) is related to the substantive representation of groups
1
(the extent to which policy-making in political institutions benefits specific groups) (Pitkin,
1967). An assumption implicit in this view is that individuals who belong to certain social
groups will do a better job of working to advance the interests of their fellow group mem-
bers. Yet, the extent to which women as a social group have a coherent set of “women’s
interests” that they all share is hotly debated (see, e.g. Bunch (1990)). Instead, it may be
more productive to think of gender group membership as one of many overlapping social
identities with the potential to influence individuals’ behavior in group settings.
From this perspective, it is critical to investigate the conditions under which differences
among women are more or less likely to become salient and affect women’s ability to cooperate
on issues of shared interest. This is the task I take on in this dissertation. In focusing on
differences among women, my work is heavily influenced by the insights of intersectional
scholarship. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I summarize all three essays
before framing my contribution in light of the implications of interpreting my results from
the perspective of theories of intersectionality.
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE ESSAYS
Over the course of three essays, I evaluate the extent to which “collective interests” exist
and lead to cooperation among women across other salient social divides. Each of the
three essays seeks to understand how social group membership relates to the possibilities for
effectively ensuring the inclusion of groups in decision-making by examining the conditions
under which women are more or less likely to work together in the interest of advancing the
welfare of women as a group. In the first two essays I examine whether ethnic and socio-
economic class differences among women present obstacles to cooperation using a public
goods experiment in Lebanon. In the third essay, I look at how differences among women
moderate the effectiveness of quotas designed to enhance women’s representation in Uganda.
I briefly summarize each essay below.
2
1.2.1 Essay 1: Gender, coethnic favoritism, and cooperation in groups
The first essay demonstrates why it is important to consider how differences among women
could become more or less salient within group settings depending on other individual-
level factors that interact with gender to influence behavior. I do this by contrasting how
expectations of individual behavior in groups could differ for men and women even in the
same institutional context because of the way that gender interacts with access to political
power. Specifically, I investigate how ethnic group cleavages affect cooperation in single-
gender groups of men and women in Lebanon, a country context where ethnic (i.e. sectarian)
group membership is often thought to be the most salient aspect of social identity.
The literature on cooperation in ethnically divided societies generally anticipates that
individuals will cooperate more in homogeneous than in heterogeneous ethnic groups because
of the link between coethnic favoritism and access to material benefits. In societies like
Lebanon where the distribution of goods and services generally takes place along ethnic lines,
ethnic groups are believed to evolve strong norms of cooperation with in-group members.
The existence of these strong norms of cooperation within ethnic groups leads to greater trust
in coethnics and higher expectations of cooperation within homogeneous ethnic settings. In
societies where there is inter-group competition over scarce resources, those groups that are
better able to cooperate internally are more likely to out-compete others for control over
resources (Raihani and Bshary, 2015). As such, groups tend to evolve psychological benefits
in addition to material benefits for abiding by in-group norms of cooperation.
Yet, there is reason to believe this might not be as true for women as it is for men.
In many places where distributive politics overlap with ethnic group membership, women
are known to benefit less from access to goods and services through the kinds of clientelistic
networks that tend to dominate ethnic political systems (Benstead, 2016; Wantchekon, 2003).
In the absence of clear material rewards for cooperating more within ethnic groups than
across them, it is unclear that women would develop the same norms of coethnic favoritism
believed to evolve among men. In the absence of clear norms to guide behavior that would
favor coethnics over non-coethnics, it may be that women are not less likely to cooperate in
mixed-ethnic than in same-ethnic social settings. Alternatively, it is possible that coethnic
3
favoritism exist among women, but only for the (limited) subset of women with access
to material benefits through coethnic networks or who are strongly attached to their ethnic
group identity. At the same time, women’s systematic exclusion from participation in politics
in ethnic political systems could create a situation where women’s shared gender group
identity is more salient than it would be if gender identity did not automatically shift their
experience of access to the political, social, and economic system in which they reside. Since
women’s gender identity is associated with strong norms of cooperation and prosociality
in social psychology (particularly relative to men) (Eagly and Wood, 1991), this suggests
that not only could gender identity be more salient for women than men in Lebanon, but it
could also be more likely to prime norms of cooperation with other women in single-gender
social settings. This norm of cooperation linked to women’s gender identity could plausibly
be expected to work against norms of cooperation with coethnics over non-coethnics in
all-women group settings.
I evaluate these possibilities using data from a public goods experiment implemented
with 120 single-gender groups in Lebanon. Individuals were randomly assigned to partici-
pate in either a homogeneous or a heterogeneous sectarian group. I then examine whether
the average level of cooperation varies depending on the ethnic and/or gender composition
of the group (all-men versus all-women). I find weak but suggestive evidence that men co-
operate less in mixed-ethnic than in same-ethnic groups, but no evidence that women are
less cooperative in mixed-ethnic compared to same-ethnic groups. I further examine the
heterogeneous treatment effects for those with strong versus weak access to benefits through
politicians, those with strong versus weak sectarian identity, and those with strong versus
weak gender identity. In line with my expectations, I find that women and men differ in
how the strength of their attachment to their sectarian identity affects their willingness to
cooperate in mixed-ethnic groups compared to homogeneous ethnic groups: strong sectarian
men cooperate less in mixed-groups (consistent with the literature), while strong sectarian
women do not cooperate at a significantly different level in mixed-sect compared to same-
sect groups. However, I also find that while strong gender identity reduces cooperation in
same-sect groups for women, it is associated with higher levels of cooperation with coeth-
nics for men. This suggests that gender-based norms may prescribe different behaviors in
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mixed-ethnic and same-ethnic group settings.
Most interestingly, I find that both men and women with access to benefits through
politicians show more coethnic favoritism in cooperation. This is important, since it suggests
that there could be keys differences among women in terms of how they cooperate within
ethnic political systems. Rather than being unconditionally cooperative with each other, it
suggests that one potential barrier to cooperation among women could reside in the extent
to which there are divisions among women in access to benefits through elite networks. I
build on this result in developing the next two essays where I focus more exclusively on
differences among women given the considerable heterogeneity in terms of their willingness
to cooperate with one another, a finding that is largely unanticipated in the political science
literature to date.
1.2.2 Essay 2: Women, socio-economic status, and cooperation in groups
In the second essay, I pick up on this question of differences among women in terms of access
to the distribution of benefits through elite networks by evaluating the extent to which socio-
economic class cleavages constitute a potential barrier to collective action among women.
This connects to the previous paper in that I only observed reduced willingness to cooperate
with women from other sectarian backgrounds among those women who have access to
benefits through political elites. To the extent that women with access are more likely to be
elites themselves, this could point to class divisions as a potential source of conflict among
women or be a signal of strong norms of solidarity among women with similar socio-economic
backgrounds.
I again draw on the public goods experiment data from Lebanon, taking advantage of
the fact that men and women in that study also participated in groups that were either ho-
mogeneous or heterogeneous in their socio-economic class composition. I focus on evaluating
cooperation by rich and poor women in mixed-class versus same-class group settings and
contrast these results with the findings for all-male groups to highlight the uniqueness of the
results for women. Given the evidence in the first essay, I anticipate that socio-economic class
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cleavages between women represent one type of socially salient cross-cutting group identity
that could impact the level of cooperation between women. Consistent with the results from
the first essay, I find that women are not unconditional cooperators: the mixed-class group
setting has a large and significant negative effect on cooperation among women. This result
is contrasted with evidence of a positive effect of the mixed-class group setting on cooper-
ation among men, confirming that gender intersects with class cleavages to affect behavior
differently for men and women in the same social setting. The results contribute to a growing
literature on within-gender group differences in cooperation and confirm that class cleavages
can constitute a significant barrier to cooperation among women in some social settings.
1.2.3 Essay 3: Women candidates, electoral competition, and the incentive to
prioritize women constituents
In the first two essays I show how social differences among women may inhibit cooperation
between women, as well as why it is important to think about why these results could be
expected to differ for men and for women in the same setting. The main take-away in both
of the first two essays is that cooperation between women to advance collective gains for
women is conditional: it depends on the presence (or absence) of other meaningful social
differences in group settings.
In the third essay, I consider how differences among women could moderate the effect
of policies or institutions designed to improve outcomes for women as a whole. To this
end, I focus on differences among women candidates competing for quota seats in Uganda.
Frequently cited as a success story in terms of setting gender-based quota goals and actually
reaching them, Uganda first established reserved seats for women in government in 1995.
Yet, gains in gender equality have largely failed to live up to expectations. Despite the
positive impact of increased descriptive representation for women on the adoption of gender-
sensitive and gender-focused legislation, many researchers and activists recognize that the
standards enumerated in these laws have yet to be fully realized (Center for Women in
Government and Civil Society Rockefeller et al., 2014). After more than two decades of
quota-driven representation for women in government, women’s political empowerment has
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improved while women’s level of economic participation, rate of educational attainment, and
key measures of health and survival have all declined relative to men (The World Economic
Forum, 2015). Some argue that the lack of improvement is due to the cooptation of women’s
quota seats by political elites seeking to perpetuate a status quo system of client-patronage
networks (Tamale, 1999; Ahikire, 2009; Tripp, 2006). This suggests that women candidates
elected under this system may have interests that are more aligned with a largely male
political elite than with women in the general population overall.
At the same time, politicians in Uganda face different degrees of electoral accountability
depending on the extent to which political party leaders can effectively control the outcome of
the electoral process. In less competitive party strongholds, party leaders may be more likely
to support the candidacy of well-connected women who intend to uphold the political status
quo. This creates strategic incentives for these women to cater to constituent groups linked to
status quo distributions of access to political power, such as co-partisans, coethnics, or close
friends and family. Greater competition for seats makes it harder for any one constituent
group – such as political party elites – to control the outcome of the candidate selection
process, creating different strategic incentives for women candidates to appeal to a broader
range of constituents for the support needed to win election. This means that politically well-
connected women candidates might differ in the electoral strategies they adopt depending on
the level of electoral competition they face. To the extent that women candidates for quota
reserved seats prioritize a more narrow set of clientelistic interest groups in their policy-
making aspirations, this suggests that the introduction of quotas alone may not be sufficient
to enhance the inclusion of historically marginalized groups in political decision-making on
a broad scale.
I evaluate the extent to which the constituent groups women candidates plan to prioritize
if elected varies with the competitiveness of the electoral environment using data from a non-
random sample of 157 women candidates for office in 27 constituencies in Western Uganda.
I find that women in non-competitive, party stronghold environments are significantly more
likely to prioritize the needs and interests of more narrowly defined in-groups – such as
political party agents, family and friends, and members of the same clan and same religion
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– than are women in competitive areas. At the same time, the likelihood of intending
to represent all members of the community significantly increases as competition increases,
while the level of support for prioritizing women constituents remains fairly consistent across
electoral settings. Importantly, I observe these differences even among women who are
all generally well-connected to existing political networks. This suggests that institutional
conditions can moderate the behavior of women candidates and alter the likelihood that elite
women politicians will plan to act on behalf of the interests of a wider range of constituents.
1.3 CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD
On the whole, these essays seek to understand the conditions under which women can work
together to realize the substantive outcomes that they care about. I show that social differ-
ences among women – especially differences between elite and non-elite women – affect the
possibilities for the effective advancement of any collective interests held by women as mem-
bers of the same gender group. In adopting this view, I am heavily influenced by research
on intersectionality. In particular, I follow Hancock (2007, 250) in defining intersectionality
as “a body of normative theory and empirical research that proceeds under six key assump-
tions.” For my purposes, I find the first four of these most relevant to my efforts in this
dissertation, paraphrased as follows from Hancock (2007, 250): (1) multiple categories of
difference have to be considered (e.g. gender and socio-economic class background); (2) the
relationship among these categories is “an open empirical question” subject to investigation
in every study context; (3) these categories are dynamic: mutable and malleable, constructed
rather than given; and, (4) “each category of difference has within-group diversity that sheds
light on the way we think of groups as actors in politics and on the potential outcomes of any
particular political intervention.” My work reflects this emphasis on the importance of con-
sidering how multiple categories of difference can affect expectations of individual behavior
depending on the broader institutional context in which these group categorizations take on
meaning and impact behavior. As well, my attention specifically to how differences among
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women affect behavior in groups and the prospects for collective action is related to the de-
scription of “intersectional knowledge projects” provided by Collins (2015, 14): “Individuals
and groups differentially placed within intersecting systems of power have different points of
view on their own and others’ experiences with complex social inequalities, typically advanc-
ing knowledge projects that reflect their social locations within power relations.” This is to
say that my empirical investigation of cooperation among women is grounded in a desire to
understand how differently situated women may be affected by the salience of these social
differences with important implications for the outcomes of women’s engagement with one
another across these divides.
While intersectionality has permeated the discourse in many social science disciplines, it
has not yet reached in the mainstream in political science.1 Still, there are a few examples of
recent work on gender and identity politics that speak to the importance of how overlapping
group memberships may intersect with one another in ways that influence behavior and
alter expectations. The assumption that women will be united by their shared gender group
membership is undermined by evidence that this may not always be the case given the
presence of other, cross-cutting social differences. For example, in her work on identity
and political behavior in the United States, Klar (2018) demonstrates that women vary
considerably in how they interpret the norms of appropriate social behavior linked to their
gender identity depending on their membership in different partisan groups. Rather than
increasing willingness to work together, raising the salience of a common gender identity
among women who perceive that identity as proscribing very different values and norms of
behavior can serve to deepen divisions among women rather than bring them closer together.
Despite these recent efforts, we still do not know enough about how within-group dif-
ferences can affect behavior and cooperative behavior in particular. In their review, Balliet
et al. (2011) find very few studies that present results for in-group versus out-group cooper-
ation outcomes by gender, calling for more experimental work that explores this relationship
in social dilemma settings. Balliet et al. (2011) point out that existing theoretical work inte-
grating evolutionary and socio-cultural perspectives predicts sex differences in cooperation
1Ange-Marie Hancock, cited above, is one of a few notable exceptions. Also see Hughes (2011) for an example
of cross-national empirical work in political science that draws on theories of intersectionality.
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in these settings (Van Vugt, Cremer and Janssen, 2007), but little empirical work exists
evaluating these existing expectations. In her ground-breaking work on gender similarities
(as opposed to differences), Hyde (2014) echoes Balliet et al. (2011) in noting that very few
meta-analyses consider gender differences in light of other moderating factors, in particular
ethnicity or social class. She acknowledges the difficulties associated with making broad
generalizations based on evidence from these kinds of studies, but argues that there is po-
tentially much more to learn from taking an intersectional approach where the effects of the
interaction between gender and ethnicity as well as gender and social class are also evaluated
(Hyde, 2014, 392-393).
My research aims to address this gap in the empirical literature in political science
and showcase the importance of taking seriously the insights of theories of intersectionality.
Overall, my work highlights the importance of understanding how differences among women
– particularly differences between elite and non-elite women – affect the advancement of
women’s “collective interests.” In the concluding chapter, I elaborate on the implications of
my findings for the development of policies that can more effectively address the problem of
persistent gender inequality in political participation worldwide.
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2.0 GENDER, COETHNIC FAVORITISM, AND COOPERATION IN
GROUPS: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENT IN
LEBANON
2.1 INTRODUCTION
It is widely believed that individuals cooperate less in mixed-ethnic than in homogeneous
ethnic group settings.1 In fact, relative to more homogeneous ethnic environments, het-
erogeneous ethnic environments are associated with a host of suboptimal outcomes due to
the lack of cooperation across ethnic lines, including the under-provision of public goods
(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007), inefficient public spending
(Salti and Chaaban, 2010), clientelism (Wantchekon, 2003), weak accountability (Pande,
2011), and political instability (Easterly and Levine, 1997). In the literature on ethnic pol-
itics, a prominent explanation for this preference for cooperating with coethnics is rooted
in the politicization of ethnic identity, whereby the distribution of access to resources and
services generally takes place along ethnic lines. The distributive context within groups rein-
forces the link between ethnic in-group membership and access to material benefits. In turn,
more cohesive ethnic groups can better perform and out-compete less cohesive groups, lead-
ing to the development of stronger norms of cooperation within ethnic groups than across
them. Association with more powerful social groups leads to additional psychological bene-
fits for those who adhere to group norms and enjoy group membership, thereby reinforcing
1I am indebted to Sami Atallah, Joanna Fayad, Zeina Hawa, and Zeina Helou for their tireless help with
implementation. This project was made possible by funding that the Lebanese Center for Policy Stud-
ies (LCPS) received from the Embassy of Norway. It is covered under University of Pittsburgh IRB
PRO15060167; the procedures for data collection and select portions of the analysis were pre-registered
at egap.org/registration/2208.
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patterns of behavior consistent with in-group favoritism.2
Yet, recent studies that use public goods experiments to evaluate the individual-level pref-
erences for cooperating with coethnics over non-coethnics find mixed evidence of in-group
favoritism. Where some public goods games implemented in ethnically divided societies
find evidence of ethnic in-group favoritism in cooperation (Habyarimana et al., 2007; Hjort,
2014), others do not find clear evidence of coethnic bias in group settings (Berge et al., 2016;
Greig and Bohnet, 2009). These mixed findings call into question the individual-level moti-
vations for cooperating more with coethnics than non-coethnics, and suggest there could be
important heterogeneous effects that merit further investigation. This is important to exam-
ine, since understanding how ethnic group membership intersects with other group identities
to inform behavior could provide valuable insights into the conditions under which policies
designed to enhance collective action across group lines will be most (or least) effective.
In this paper, we argue that there are good reasons to think that the material and
psychological benefits explanations for ethnic in-group favoritism in cooperation could vary
along gender lines. On the one hand, we expect patterns of cooperation along ethnic lines
to be more pronounced for men because the material and psychological benefits for in-
group cooperation are likely to be more pronounced for them. Research shows that in highly
clientelistic societies where resources are distributed along ethnic lines, women are more likely
than men to be denied access to these networks (Benstead, 2016; Beall, 2005; Wantchekon,
2003). Men are also more likely than women to be associated with strong norms of within-
group cooperation in response to the presence of inter-group competition (Van Vugt, Cremer
and Janssen, 2007). Thus, we largely expect men to cooperate less in mixed-ethnic than in
same-ethnic groups in societies where ethnicity is a highly politicized group identity.
On the other hand, the expected patterns of cooperation among women are much less
clear. Women may also cooperate less in mixed-ethnic groups owing to strong identification
with their ethnic identity or in the event that they do have access to benefits through
2The data for this essay comes from a coauthored project so I adopt the use of ‘we’ throughout. The design of
the experiment was a collaborative effort between this author, Laura Paler (University of Pittsburgh), and
Sami Atallah (Lebanese Center for Policy Studies). See Paler, Marshall and Atallah (2018) for an example
of co-authored work that draws on other data collected during the experiment. The writing and analysis
presented here is original and solo-authored in fulfillment of the requirements for the dissertation.
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coethnic elites, mirroring what we expect to observe for men. Alternatively, women may,
on average, respond less negatively to the mixed-ethnic group context when it comes to
cooperation because fewer women (relative to men) have experience benefiting from coethnic
networks when it comes to accessing the material benefits of in-group favoritism in social
settings. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that women (unlike men) may be subject to
the cross-cutting influence of gender group membership, which could introduce norms of
cooperation in single-gender group settings with the potential to counteract norms of ethnic
in-group favoritism. In fact, several recent experiments involving public goods provision
and group-based problem-solving in ethnically divided societies (including Liberia, Kenya,
and Tanzania) find that women are more cooperative and better able to address shared
challenges in single-gender groups (rather than mixed-gender groups) (Greig and Bohnet,
2009; Berge, Juniwaty and Sekei, 2016). Moreover, Fearon and Humphreys (2017) find that
women (unlike men) tend to be unconditionally cooperative in single-gender group settings
(Fearon and Humphreys, 2017), choosing to contribute to the provision of public goods
without regard for the individual costs or benefits of doing so (or failing to do so). In other
words, we find there are reasons to suspect that women may not respond negatively to the
mixed-ethnic group setting when it comes to cooperation with other women, though this
could depend on several factors.
We evaluate whether ethnic in-group favoritism varies among men and women and
whether this depends on access to benefits through coethnic elites, attachment to sectar-
ian identity, or attachment to gender identity. We test our expectations using data collected
during a public goods experiment implemented with 120 single-gender groups in Lebanon
where individuals were randomly assigned to participate in either a homogeneous (same-sect)
or a heterogeneous (mixed-sect) group. We find that, on average, women do not respond
as negatively to the mixed-ethnic group treatment as men do, though this result is not sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels. However, we do find that women with access
to material benefits through coethnic elites are more likely to demonstrate coethnic bias in
cooperation than women without access, paralleling the behavior of men in our sample. At
the same time, strong attachment to ethnic identity does not explain coethnic bias among
women in the same way that it does for men. Among men, strong ethnic identification rein-
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forces coethnic bias in cooperation, whereas we observe no evidence of the same effect among
women in single-gender group settings. Finally, we examine how strength of attachment to
gender identity influences cooperation. We find some evidence that weak attachment to gen-
der identity among women is associated with greater willingness to cooperate in same-ethnic
social settings, while women more attached to their gender identity are not negatively af-
fected by the presence of non-coethnics in mixed-ethnic settings in the same way that women
who weakly identify with their gender seem to be.
Our results point to the importance of considering how gender and ethnic identity inter-
sect to inform behavior differently for women relative to men. The same underlying identity
mechanism may operate very differently in each case with important implications for under-
standing the potential for relying on shared membership in cross-cutting groups – such as
shared gender identity – as a way to build bridges and generate collective action across ethnic
lines. Shared gender group membership may be more effective for building women’s collective
action capacity among women who feel disadvantaged by the system of ethnic parties than
among women who benefit from the ethnic status quo. On the whole, our findings suggest
that future research needs to consider within-group differences in preferences for coethnic
politics and coethnic bias in collective action since it may be that coethnic favoritism is more
entrenched only among those elite women with access to benefits, and not necessarily among
women without access to similar resources through coethnic elite channels. We return to
this discussion in the conclusion.
2.2 COOPERATION IN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES
2.2.1 Explaining ethnic in-group favoritism in cooperation
Broadly speaking, cooperation dilemmas refer to social scenarios in which individuals rec-
ognize that some jointly beneficial outcome exists that can only be achieved through costly
coordination of effort whereby each person has to decide whether to pay some individual cost
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in order to help achieve a larger benefit that will then be enjoyed by all (Everett, Faber and
Crockett, 2015). In societies where ethnicity is particularly salient, cooperation is thought
to be more difficult because of a tendency toward in-group favoritism, or “the tendency to
favor members of one’s own group over those in other groups” (Everett, Faber and Crockett,
2015, 1). However, there is still some ambiguity regarding the extent to which in-group
favoritism is driven more by concern for the well-being of in-group members (Koopmans and
Rebers, 2009; Balliet, Wu and Dreu, 2014), or more variation in the expectations individuals
have of in-group and out-group members’ behavior in social settings (Everett, Faber and
Crockett, 2015). Nonetheless, it is widely believed that – in ethnically divided societies –
people cooperate less in mixed-ethnic than in same-ethnic groups.
Yet, while there is ample empirical evidence of comparatively better outcomes in eth-
nically homogeneous environments than in ethnically heterogeneous ones, the experimental
evidence of individual-level preferences for cooperating in mixed-ethnic versus same-ethnic
group settings is somewhat mixed. While some findings support the belief that individuals
prefer cooperating with coethnics over non-coethnics (Hjort, 2014; Habyarimana et al., 2007),
other experiments fail to find support for this expectation (Berge et al., 2016; Fearon and
Humphreys, 2017). Despite the lack of consensus in the results, several prominent strands
of literature speak to the mechanisms thought to drive individuals to cooperate more when
grouped with coethnics, namely: (1) concerns about access to material benefits through co-
ethnic networks, and (2) expectations of psychological benefits associated with adhering to
ethnic in-group norms.
Distributive conflict in divided societies is often based on ethnicity, so coethnics have
evolved norms and expectations of behavior that facilitate cooperation among coethnics and
reduce the incentives for cooperation with non-coethnics. For instance, in societies where
ethnicity is highly politicized, politicians are known to target investment in public goods
to places where their coethnics are more concentrated (more ethnically homogeneous areas)
rather than mixed-ethnic areas (Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson, 2018). By invoking shared
ethnic group identity, coethnic elites can build larger coalitions uniting otherwise diverse
individual interests; in turn, this larger network can be leveraged to press for a greater share
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of control over resources where in-group members stand to gain from the success of the
group as a whole (Posner, 2017, 2004). As more resources are made available to coethnic
political elites, this means more goods are potentially available for redistribution to coethnic
constituents. In some cases, political elites reinforce this link by distributing material benefits
directly to their coethnic supporters (e.g. in the form of cash handouts or local community
improvements) (Corstange, 2016). In others, political elites use access to political institutions
to redirect the flow of state resources towards coethnic beneficiaries (Burgess et al., 2015;
Franck and Rainer, 2012). Research on elections in mixed-ethnic settings shows that some
people support coethnic candidates precisely because they believe those candidates represent
their best chance to gain access to direct material benefits (Wantchekon, 2003). Elite-driven
distributive politics along ethnic lines thus provides a plausible explanation for why some
individuals may be more likely to show coethnic favoritism under certain conditions. Indeed,
recent experimental evidence from a study of inter-ethnic group cooperation in Lebanon
indicates that the persistence of clientelistic vote-buying by political elites reinforces norms
of in-group favoritism in cooperation for instrumental reasons (Chang and Peisakhin, 2019).
In other words, greater cooperation in same-ethnic than in mixed-ethnic groups could be
motivated by a desire to benefit from the distribution of material resources along ethnic
lines.
At the same time, the material benefits logic of ethnic in-group favoritism is not only
about access to resources through coethnic elites; it is also about trust and expectations
of others’ willingness to cooperate. Research on human evolution shows that group-based
competition over resources creates incentives for cooperative norms to be rewarded within
groups more so than across groups, since more cooperative groups are better able to compete
against and out-perform others (Raihani and Bshary, 2015). These norms may be fostered
by the development of stronger mechanisms for identifying and rewarding cooperators while
locating and punishing non-cooperators (Koopmans and Rebers, 2009), as well as by the ex-
istence of shared technologies of communication within ethnic groups that propagate norms
of cooperation and make it easier to coordinate efforts within groups than across them (Berge
et al., 2016). The emergence of strong norms of cooperation within ethnic groups may con-
tribute to the development of more positive beliefs that others in same-ethnic group settings
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will cooperate, while increasing the relative uncertainty surrounding others’ willingness to
cooperate in mixed-ethnic settings where the same norms and expectations of behavior do
not necessarily exist.
Given the vast array of evidence that people tend to cooperate based on expectations
that others will do so (Fischbacher, Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2001), this introduces the possibility
that mixed-ethnic settings will be more likely to trigger uncertainty and distrust compared to
same-ethnic settings. In fact, this is largely what Tusicisny (2017) shows in his study of reci-
procity and discrimination across ethnic lines in India. His experimental results suggest that
it is uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of non-coethnics that inhibits interactions in
mixed-group settings; given similar expectations of coethnic and non-coethnic contributions
to a public good, individuals cooperate at similar levels in mixed-ethnic settings as they do
in homogeneous ethnic settings (Tusicisny, 2017). Similarly, recent evidence from a series
of experiments in Kenya suggests that lower levels of cooperation in mixed-ethnic compared
to same-ethnic group settings could be driven more by uncertainty in the heterogeneous
setting than by an explicit preference for cooperating with coethnics over non-coethnics
(Berge et al., 2016). It is more likely that individuals with heterogeneous backgrounds face
greater uncertainty regarding the norms and values that govern other individuals’ decision-
making processes (Fehr and Hoff, 2011). At the same time, the dense structure of coethnic
networks makes it easier to monitor and enforce these norms (Habyarimana et al., 2009;
Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), and raise the cost of shirking the responsibility to contribute
to public goods that will benefit other in-group members (Galbraith, Rodriguez and Stiles,
2007). This heightened threat of sanctioning for failure to cooperate reduces the probability
that non-cooperators will emerge in coethnic interactions, as shown by Habyarimana et al.
(2007) in a series of public goods experiments implemented in Uganda. This makes it easier
for individuals to choose cooperation in coethnic settings than in mixed-ethnic settings be-
cause shared in-group norms of cooperation reduce uncertainty regarding the contributions
of others.
Moreover, conditional cooperation and trust are positively correlated, where individuals
are more likely to cooperate when they trust in others and have positive expectations that
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others will also cooperate (Kocher et al., 2015). In fact, Chang and Peisakhin (2019) demon-
strate that more positive expectations of the willingness of non-coethnics to cooperate likely
depends on increasing the level of inter-ethnic group trust. This is important since research
shows that in situations where the outcome of cooperation is interdependent – as in a public
goods experiment – then the salience of differences among group members could heighten
awareness about the relative absence of mutual trust that would be present if all shared
membership in the same socially salient group (Brewer, 2000). In other words, perceptions
of trust and expectations that others will cooperate are thought to be higher in same-ethnic
compared to mixed-ethnic group settings. This is all the more important in a competitive
context where access to resources puts groups in conflict with one another and heightens
awareness of the incentives that reward in-group cooperation over out-group cooperation.
Distributive conflict is also linked to in-group favoritism and out-group prejudice such
that there are psychological benefits when one’s own group does better and non-coethnics do
worse. One prominent set of explanations for this emerges from the literature on evolutionary
social psychology. In this view, strong norms within socially salient groups develop over time
to favor cooperation with in-group members over out-group members since more cooperative
groups stand to be better able to compete against less cohesive groups for control over the
distribution of valuable resources (Boyd and Richerson, 2009). Increased norms of prosocial
cooperation within groups can be magnified by a recent history of conflict between groups in
society (Raihani and Bshary, 2015). In fact, other evidence demonstrates that ethnocentrism
– defined as in-group favoritism rather than out-group hostility – is useful for sustaining
cooperation even in the absence of “continuing interactions, well-developed institutions, and
strong social norms” because of the utility of cooperating with similar others in competitive
environments (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006). To the extent that ethnic groups are one
potentially socially salient group type that can be politicized and used to mobilize individuals
in pursuit of group gains, then we should expect strong norms of in-group favoritism to
emerge in ethnically divided societies. Much of the research in social psychology shows
that discrimination against out-groups may be driven more by positive feelings of favoritism
towards fellow in-group members than by a desire to harm members of other groups Brewer
(2000). Indeed, a wealth of evidence in the field of social identity theory demonstrates
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that individuals can experience very real psychological benefits – such as enhanced self-
esteem – from prioritizing fellow in-group members over out-group members (Tajfel, 1982;
Hewstone, Rubin and Willis, 2002). One important modifier in the literature on intergroup
bias stipulates that these psychological benefits of in-group bias may only apply to those
individuals who strongly identify as a member of the social group in question (Hewstone,
Rubin and Willis, 2002). This suggests that we should expect the negative effect of the
mixed-sect group on cooperation to be strongest for those who more strongly identify with
their ethnic identity than for those who do not identify as strongly with their ethnic identity.
2.2.2 Gender as a potential intervening factor
On the whole then, the literature suggests that cooperation will be higher in mixed-ethnic
than in same-ethnic groups owing to the greater material and psychological benefits associ-
ated with cooperating in coethnic settings relative to mixed-ethnic settings. Yet, the litera-
ture on cooperation in ethnically divided societies raises important questions about whether
both men and women will necessarily cooperate less in mixed-ethnic groups (compared to
homogeneous ethnic groups). This is important to investigate because research shows that
men and women may be subject to different norms of cooperation within group settings.
Some research employing public goods experiments to study cooperation in groups shows
that all-male groups tend to be more cooperative than all-women groups (Brown-Kruse and
Hummels, 1993), while other evidence shows women are more cooperative than men in group
settings (Nowell and Tinkler, 1994). More recent efforts to investigate gender differences in
group-based cooperation find that men and women do respond differently to features of the
cooperation environment, such as the framing of the decision to cooperate (Fujimoto and
Park, 2010; Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2010), the composition of the group (Balliet, Wu and Dreu,
2014; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2009), and whether cooperation decisions are observable to
other in-group members (Charness and Rustichini, 2011). This lack of consensus indicates
that there may be important heterogeneity in how individuals respond to the cooperative
context. Yet, the intersection of gender and ethnicity remains a relatively understudied area
of individual behavior in group settings (Hyde, 2014). We follow Hyde (2014) and Balliet
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et al. (2011) in investigating whether men and women differ in their willingness to cooperate
in mixed-ethnic compared to same-ethnic group environments and find that there are good
reasons to anticipate gender-based variation in response to the mixed-ethnic group setting
given the literature on in-group favoritism reviewed above.
First, we anticipate that men will cooperate less in mixed-ethnic settings because the
material and psychological benefits of coethnic cooperation are most acute for them, in
line with what much of the literature on ethnic in-group favoritism predicts. In terms of
material rewards associated with cooperation in coethnic settings, there is ample empirical
evidence that in ethnically divided societies men (more so than women) tend to favor coethnic
political candidates who offer access to clientelistic benefits in exchange for political support
(Wantchekon, 2003). In terms of the psychological benefits of adhering to in-group norms
of cooperation with coethnics, there is some evidence in the literature on social dominance
theory that men (more so than women) tend to hold attitudes that correlate with a social
dominance orientation – that is “a strong desire to promote intergroup hierarchies and for
their in-groups to dominate their out-groups” – such as “nonegalitarian political and social
attitudes, including sexism, racism, chauvinism, patriotism, and nationalism” (Hewstone,
Rubin and Willis, 2002, 583). In other words, norms of inter-group bias could differ between
men and women, with men perceiving a stronger pull toward norms of in-group favoritism
in group settings than women, and perhaps especially so in the case of ethnic group identity
which can be highly politicized.
In contrast, it is much less clear how women will react given the same scenario. In terms
of showing ethnic in-group favoritism due to an underlying material benefits motivation, it
is not obvious that as many women as men would be influenced by such a factor given the
extensive empirical evidence of women’s systematic exclusion from clientelistic networks in
highly patriarchal societies (Benstead, 2016; Tripp, 2001; Goetz, 2007). Clientelism, or the
practice of selectively distributing benefits in exchange for political support, is frequently
associated with ethnic politics and gender disparity in access to these networks is well-
documented.3 In many cases, women are systematically excluded from accessing political
3Clientelism can take place in any political system where elites reward their supporters in a selective fashion.
This could take the form of political party favoritism, union favoritism, religious group favoritism, or any
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networks and decision-making regarding public resources because the behavior necessary to
penetrate these networks would be socially unacceptable for women (Goetz, 2007). Not only
are women frequently denied opportunities to benefit from coethnic political networks in the
same material sense as men, additional evidence suggests that women may have different
political preferences as a result. For example, in his study of clientelism and voting in
Benin, Wantchekon (2003) finds that women are more likely than men to vote for candidates
who represent programmatic policy platforms (often specifying community-level reforms)
than candidates who promise to provide direct individual benefits in exchange for support.
Wantchekon (2003) suggests this could reflect the reality that redistribution of resources
to supporters is less likely to benefit women than it is to benefit men. To the extent that
women, in general, benefit less than men from coethnic clientelistic networks for access
to goods and benefits, there is less reason to anticipate that women would more strongly
associate coethnic favoritism with access to material rewards (at least when compared with
non-coethnic settings). At the same time, this also implies that, conditional on having access
to benefits through coethnic elites, women could behave more like men and cooperate less in
mixed-ethnic group scenarios. In other words, we might observe a relatively smaller negative
effect of the mixed-ethnic group setting on cooperation among women than among men
because a relatively smaller proportion of women actually benefit from access to resources
through coethnic elites compared to men. If we examine the subgroups of women and men
with access versus those without, we might observe similar patterns of behavior among
politically well-connected men and women.
In terms of the psychological benefits associated with in-group favoritism in group set-
tings, important research in social psychology and political economy leads us to anticipate
that women may behave differently in mixed-ethnic settings that consist of all women owing
to the increased salience of shared gender group membership. According to social psychol-
ogy theories of social roles, women face strong norms of pro-sociality and interdependence
in group settings that differ from the norms of independence and competition linked to men
(Eagly and Wood, 1999). This means that, by virtue of the role they play in many societies,
other practice where elites selectively provide benefits to particular individuals or communities on the basis
of their political alignment rather than on the basis of need.
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women are conditioned to favor cooperation with similar others. Recent empirical evidence
substantiates this argument, as several studies find that women tend to cooperate more
in single-gender groups than mixed-gender groups and more so than men in single-gender
groups (Fearon and Humphreys, 2017; Berge, Juniwaty and Sekei, 2016; Greig and Bohnet,
2009). Moreover, Fearon and Humphreys (2017) find that women cooperate with one an-
other regardless of the anticipated material costs or benefits associated with doing so. This
suggests that there could be an underlying norm of cooperation among women rooted in
shared gender identity.
This is important because it suggests that stronger attachment to gender identity among
women could counteract any psychological benefits associated with in-group cooperation on
the basis of shared ethnic group identity. This would be consistent with evidence that per-
ceiving members of social out-groups – such as non-coethnics – as sharing membership with
the individual in another salient social group – such as gender – could reduce bias in behavior
by activating norms of in-group favoritism linked to shared membership in a cross-cutting
group, or by increasing perceptions of shared trust on the basis of shared group membership
(Brewer, 2000; Mutz, 2002; Brewer, 1996). To the extent that shared gender identity is
magnified in all-women groups, we might expect this to raise expectations that others in the
group will cooperate despite the presence of ethnic cleavages in mixed-ethnic contexts. Some
evidence from ethnically mixed societies shows that given similar expectations of coethnics’
and non-coethnics’ willingness to cooperate, the existence of coethnic bias in cooperation
is far less assured (Tusicisny, 2017). If shared gender group membership enhances positive
expectations of non-coethnics, then we should observe a smaller negative effect of the mixed-
sect treatment on cooperation among women than we observe among men, though this could
depend on both strength of attachment to gender identity and strength of attachment to
ethnic identity. Women with a strong attachment to their ethnic group may behave similarly
to men in terms of showing in-group favoritism in cooperation, while it may be that only
women with a strong sense of attachment to their gender identity are willing to cooperate
across ethnic lines.
To shed light on these differences, we investigate the effects of mixed-ethnic cooperation
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separately for women and for men. Moreover, we seek to understand how the effects of
group composition vary for different subsets of the population, such as among those who are
more/less connected to coethnic elites, more/less attached to their ethnic group identity, and
more/less attached to their gender identity. We predict that men overall will cooperate less in
mixed-ethnic than in same-ethnic groups, consistent with the literature on the material and
psychological benefits of ethnic in-group favoritism. In contrast, we expect that the negative
effect of the mixed-ethnic group setting on cooperation among women could depend on having
access to material benefits through coethnic elites, feeling a relatively strong attachment to
sectarian identity, or feeling a relatively weak attachment to gender identity. Given that we
predict women, on average, are less likely to have access to benefits through coethnic networks
than men and are relatively more likely than men to face strong norms of cooperation on
the based of shared gender group identity, we expect the mixed-ethnic group setting to have
either no effect or a smaller negative effect on cooperation among women than it will on
men.
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
We evaluate these expectations using data collected for a larger project in Lebanon that
examines how discussion across sectarian lines influences support for interest-based politics
as opposed to the sectarian-based political status quo. Through this project, we have access
to unique data on cooperation in single-gender groups where participants were randomly
assigned to participate in a public goods game exercise with individuals from their same
ethnic background or from different ethnic backgrounds. Our pre-registered study design
called for all single-gender groups which allows us to look specifically at how cooperation
among women and men varies in the presence of socially salient ethnic cleavages compared
to when all individuals come from the same ethnic group. Data collected via pre-treatment
survey instruments allow us to investigate whether in-group favoritism in cooperation is
more likely for particular subgroups, including those with access to material benefits through
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coethnic elites and those more strongly attached to their ethnic identity. We also evaluate
the influence of strong attachment to gender identity on cooperation among women and
compare this to what we observe for men, adding context to how we interpret our results.
While we did not pre-register our intention to analyze the data by disaggregating it into
women’s groups and men’s groups for separate consideration, we believe there are important
outstanding questions in the literature on ethnic politics and critical assumptions about the
underlying motivation for coethnic favoritism in cooperation that justify the use of our data
for exploratory analysis in these areas. In this section, we describe the Lebanese context with
respect to the literature we seek to address, our procedures for recruitment into the study
and random assignment to treatment groups, various instruments used for data collection,
the results of a randomization check, important descriptive evidence of differences between
the women and men in our study sample, the procedure for exposing participants to the
group composition treatment, and the design of the public goods game.
2.3.1 The Lebanese context
Lebanon is an excellent country case for testing how gender intersects with ethnic group
cleavages to influence collective action capacity for at least three main reasons: (1) the
salience of highly politicized ethnic identities; (2) the pervasive and strong link between
ethnic group membership and access to clientelistic benefits through coethnic elites; and,
(3) the relatively high levels of inequality between men and women in the society that
negatively impact women’s political, economic, and social autonomy regardless of ethnic
group membership.
Apart from national identity, sectarian identity (or, ethnicity) is arguably the most salient
group identity category in Lebanon.4 As a consociational democracy with political power
distributed evenly across the three major sects in Lebanon (Christians, Sunnis, and Shia), all
4We use the terms ‘ethnic group’ and ‘sectarian group’ and all of their derivatives as interchangeable through-
out, though we acknowledge that there are distinctions between the terms outside of the Lebanese context.
For our purposes, ethnic group membership and sectarian group membership are synonymous in a context
where cosectarian networks dominate social life and influence behavior in group settings in much the same
way that coethnic ties do in other settings where goods and services are distributed along ethnic lines by
coethnic leaders.
24
political decision-making and political participation in the country flows through membership
in sectarian political groups. The Ta’if Agreement of 1989 that ended Lebanon’s 25-year long
civil war effectively entrenched the politics of ethnic group membership by creating sectarian
quotas for top civil service positions and for seats in the legislature, in addition to mandating
that the office of President be held by a Christian, the office of Prime Minister by a Sunni,
and the position of Speaker by a Shia.5
In practice, this means that access to resources often flows through membership in sec-
tarian political groups, where access to resources and economic opportunities often depends
on the strength of coethnic networks (Corstange, 2016). It is not uncommon for individu-
als to promise votes to cosectarian politicians in exchange for material benefits (Corstange,
2016). In-group bias in hiring practices is also rampant, with economic opportunities some-
times dependent on high-level connections within sectarian political groups. At the same
time, politicians count on the support of their coethnics to maintain their position within
the broader political system, not infrequently prioritizing the delivery of public goods and
services to areas more densely populated by cosectarians.
However, these gains from participation in cosectarian networks within an ethnic political
system are not obviously shared by men and women to the same extent. For one thing, direct
access to political decision-making as an elected sectarian representative with influence over
the distribution of state resources is highly gendered. Men dominate the upper ranks of
political and religious leadership in Lebanon, with women holding just 4 out of 128 seats in
the National Assembly and less than 5 percent of the seats in local assemblies (Hussein, 2017).
The sectarian quota system of representation does not include any provisions to guarantee
the representation of women and efforts to introduce a quota for women’s representation
at the national level, though ongoing, have been unsuccessful (Aziz, 2017). If anything,
the overlapping norms of religious and political practice make it more difficult for women
to participate in the sectarian political system. Of the four women currently serving in
Parliament, three are from Christian sects and one is Sunni. All four women come from
5Lebanon has 18 officially recognized sects. While no census has been conducted since 1932, a recent study
suggests that 27 percent of the population is Sunni, 27 percent is Shia, and 21 percent is Maronite Christian,
with the rest of the population belonging to smaller groups ( http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/lebanon/religious-sects.htm).
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highly influential political families with male relatives who previously served in national
office. This suggests that while sectarian power-sharing ensures that men from all major
sects have representation and an opportunity to influence the distribution of Lebanon’s
material goods and services through cosectarian networks, women participate in this system
largely indirectly.
Not only are women largely excluded from direct access to political decision-making,
available evidence suggests that women do not benefit from coethnic networks or links to
coethnic elites to the same extent that men do. For example, evidence shows that cosectarian
bias exists in workplace opportunities and business transactions in Lebanon, yet institutional
barriers may prevent women from accessing these material benefits in the same way as men
(Akeel, 2009). In effect, this limits the availability of economic opportunities as material
benefits for women, potentially making it less likely that women will associate coethnic
favoritism with access to material incentives. Given that this is one of the most frequently
cited and tangible benefits cosectarians receive in exchange for their allegiance to in-group
elites (Corstange, 2016), this difference between men and women is especially notable.
Moreover, there may be additional costs to maintaining the sectarian status quo that
are disproportionately visited on women. In many ways, gender inequality in Lebanon is
thought to persist in part as a byproduct of the sectarian division of power. There is no
civil code allowing for personal status recognition before the law that is independent of
religious affiliation. The lack of a civil code means that all political, social, and economic
rights are funneled through various interpretations of the legal system depending on sectarian
group membership, amounting to 15 different personal status laws active across 18 religious
communities operating under parallel systems of religious courts (Geagea and Fakih, 2015,
116): “This multiplicity of laws means that Lebanese citizens are treated differently when
it comes to key aspects of their lives, such as marriage, divorce, and children.” The effect
of this sectarian legal structure is much more limiting for women than it is for men. In
interviews and surveys conducted by Human Rights Watch, it is clear that men have much
greater flexibility within the sectarian system. For example, men can change their sectarian
affiliation to facilitate remarriage without first securing a divorce, or manipulate religious
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norms to avoid making economic concessions to ex-wives (Geagea and Fakih, 2015). The
freedom women have to initiate divorce proceedings, claim marital assets, or secure custody
of children varies by sect along with the associated sectarian personal status laws. This
means that the sectarian political system creates an environment where women’s access to
legal rights varies widely by sectarian group membership, a condition that is not as severe
for men.
In other words, not only does sectarian politics translate to greater material gains for men
than for women, the cost of maintaining the system visits unique burdens on women across
sectarian groups. This suggests that there are few reasons to suspect women would associate
coethnic favoritism in cooperation with access to greater material or psychological benefits.
This is the reality for women from all sectarian groups, which suggests that Lebanon could be
an excellent case for understanding the trade-off between the strength of ethnic identification
(as it is connected to material benefits through coethnic cooperation) and the strength of
identification with other women on the basis of shared gender identity (which puts women
in a unique situation relative to men). On the whole, this creates an ideal setting in which
to evaluate gender-based variation in coethnic bias as a function of the underlying influence
of access to material benefits through coethnic elites, but also as a function of the mediating
effects of attachment to ethnic identity and gender identity. These factors could reinforce
coethnic bias in cooperation (as we expect with strength of attachment to sectarian identity),
or create bridges across ethnic groups that facilitate cooperation in mixed-ethnic settings (as
we expect in the case of attachment to gender identity).
2.3.2 Recruitment and random assignment to treatment groups
To examine how cooperation among women varies in different ethnic settings, we draw on
data that we collected during 120 group interactions among strangers organized in Beirut
between February and April 2016. These 120 groups consisted of participants who were
recruited by a professional Lebanese firm and randomly assigned by us to participate in
either homogeneous or heterogeneous small group discussions. In accordance with our pre-
registered design, these 120 groups were all single-gender and consisted of 48 all-women
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groups and 72 all-men groups. Prior to the start of these discussions, participants completed
a screening survey (to facilitate recruitment), a pre-treatment survey, and one round of a
public goods game designed to measure willingness to cooperate with each other knowing
only the sect and gender composition of the group.6 We take advantage of the data collected
during this public goods game exercise to explore cooperation among women across ethnic
lines, comparing our findings to what we observe for men subjected to the same group
composition treatment.
We worked with a professional Lebanese firm to develop a protocol for recruiting subjects
into our experiment who varied in terms of their gender, socio-economic class background,
neighborhood, and sectarian group (i.e. ethnic background). The firm hired 27 professional
recruiters from various neighborhoods and demographic profiles to locate individuals for the
study that varied in their socio-economic and sectarian background. The recruiters were
not aware that eligible participants would be randomly assigned to participate in discussion
groups that systematically varied in their sectarian composition. They had no knowledge of
the study procedures or motivation beyond the desire to understand how people feel about
economic, political, and social issues in Lebanon. After approaching a prospective study
participant, each recruiter would go through an informed consent script before completing
a screening survey questionnaire with the individual. These surveys were compiled into a
dataset where we identified eligible individuals according to the targets needed to achieve a
study sample that would be balanced across Christian, Shia, and Sunni sectarian profiles.
All participants were recruited from the Beirut and Mount Lebanon areas and randomly
assigned to participate in either homogeneous groups (all six participants shared the same
sectarian background) or heterogeneous groups (two Christians, two Shia, and two Sunnis).
Overall, our randomization resulted in 60 homogeneous and 60 heterogeneous ethnic groups
involving a total of 720 participants, of which 713 completed the study. This included 285
women and 428 men.7
The 120 groups were organized in five blocks of 24 group sessions, with 12 homogeneous
6In addition to the the ethnic composition of the group, participants were made aware of the socio-economic
class composition of the group. We explore the impact of this economic class cleavage in the next dissertation
essay.
7Additional details on the recruitment procedures can be located in Appendix D.
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and 12 heterogeneous ethnic groups per block. Participants were recruited by the professional
firm for one discussion block at a time with recruiters using screening surveys to identify
eligible participants. Once eligibility and willingness to participate were confirmed, each
recruit was randomly assigned to a discussion group type, further blocking on sect and class.
One set of discussions was completed every 2-3 weeks between February and April 2016.
We completed two sets (48 groups) with women and three sets (72 groups) with men. This
allows us to look specifically at how cooperation varies among women and among men in
group settings. The sets were implemented in alternating fashion between all-men and all-
women groups to help minimize the possibility that any observational differences between
men and women (or within either group) in the results could be driven by the intervention
of a particular event in time.8
2.3.3 Potential selection issues and randomization checks
To meet the target of 720 participants in 120 groups, we recruited a total of 1200 individuals
(720 participants and 480 back-ups). To obtain the goal of 1200 individuals, we recruited
40 individuals for each set of the five blocks. We block randomized individuals by profile
type and discussion block with the goal of obtaining 24 participants and 16 extras for each
discussion block.9 For each group session, we over-recruited by 50 percent for each profile
to make sure that we would have the correct group composition for the scheduled session.
Upon arrival at their scheduled discussion session, participants were checked in by staff and
informed consent was administered. Participants were not designated as ‘main’ or ‘backup’ in
advance. If extra participants arrived, those that were asked to stay were randomly selected.
This was essential to ensure that those who participated in each discussion were a random
sample of those who were assigned to that treatment condition. We asked our implementing
partner to schedule the discussions such that every person in the pool would show up at
one discussion in accordance with their treatment assignment, ensuring that we always had
8Additional details on our design and randomization are provided in Appendix D.
9Additional information on the six profile types needed for each set of discussion groups is provided in
Appendix D, along with a more detailed description of the potential for selection into participation to bias
our estimates of cooperation.
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more individuals than necessary of each profile type at each session. The implementing
partner was then supposed to randomly select (for each profile type) who would actually
stay to participate and who would be asked to go home (after receiving compensation) or be
invited to a different session. In actuality, however, the partner typically ended up getting
only the target number of participants to show up for each discussion, which introduced the
possibility that there was some differential selection into who ended up participating in the
public goods game.
The main concern here is that selection into participation could have introduced imbal-
ances in pre-treatment characteristics for individuals in treatment (mixed-ethnic) and control
(same-ethnic) groups. To help address this potential issue, we draw on data collected from
a pre-treatment survey that participants filled out after arriving to the study site and be-
fore learning the composition of their group and playing the public goods game. Alongside
the data from the screening survey, this pre-survey allows us to evaluate the effectiveness
of our randomization protocol, as well as test for significant differences in our sample on
key covariates, such as gender. Table 9 (Appendix A) shows that random assignment to
mixed-ethnic and same-ethnic treatment groups was effective, as nearly all of the potential
confounding characteristics of individuals are distributed evenly across treatment conditions
within the full sample (713 observations) as well as within the women’s subsample (285
observations, see Table 10) and within the men’s subsample (428 observations, see Table
11). This increases our confidence that any cause for concern is negligible. We nevertheless
include control variables in our main analysis to correct for any imbalances in observable
pre-treatment covariates.
2.3.4 Descriptive evidence of gender differences in the sample
Since participant gender is obviously not randomly assigned, our estimation strategy relies on
using controls for any potential confounding variables to prevent omitted variable bias from
affecting our inferences.10 At the same time, our exploratory analysis of the available data
10We discuss this more in describing our estimation strategy in Section 2.4.2 below. Summary statistics for
all individuals in our sample, disaggregated by gender, are available in Appendix B.
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is motivated by the belief that certain factors correlated with gender may help explain why
women and men could differ in their proclivity for demonstrating coethnic bias in cooperation
in ethnically divided societies. To further ground this initial assumption, we briefly review
the summary statistics for our sample, drawing on pre-treatment survey data collected from
the women and men who participated in our study. In general, this data shows that there
are trends in access to coethnic elites, attachment to sectarian identity, the relative salience
of other social identities, and other additional factors that would be expected to vary by
gender in a society where men and women are as unequal as they are in Lebanon.
First, we do observe significant differences between the men and women in our sample
in terms of accessibility and connectedness to sectarian leaders. Women in our sample
are significantly less likely than men to report having access to benefits through either
politicians/Za’im (mean of 1.69 versus 2.00) or religious leaders (mean of 1.98 versus 2.20).
Second, we see suggestive evidence of gender differences in the salience of sectarian identity.
The index for strength of attachment to sectarian identity reveals that women in our sample
are more strongly sectarian than men (mean of 0.09 versus -0.07). This could be driven
predominantly by women being less willing to change their sectarian affiliation (mean of 3.52
versus 3.34), a prominent component of the sectarian identity index measure.11 However, we
also note that women express significantly more discomfort than men with marrying someone
from another sect (2.52 versus 2.08), discussing political issues with people from other sects
(2.18 versus 1.93), and discussing social or economic issues with people from other sects
(1.70 versus 1.57). These differences contribute to the significant gender gap in prejudice
against members of other sectarian groups which is stronger for women than men in our
sample (0.15 versus -0.11). These descriptive statistics suggest that attachment to sectarian
identity is quite strong among women despite the relative lack of evidence that women have
access to material benefits through coethnic elites. Third, in terms of strength of attachment
to other social identities, women more strongly identify with their gender identity than men
in our sample (5.38 versus 4.88). This supports our contention that gender identity may
be more salient for women than for men because of the additional layer of social exclusion
11It is possible that this is related to the fact that while it is relatively easy for men to change their sectarian
affiliation, the process is much more complicated for women since their legal standing varies more than men’s
as a function of their sectarian group membership, as noted in Section 2.3.1.
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experienced by women on the basis of their gender group membership.
We also note that this observation coincides with differences between men and women
that speak to the existence of gender inequality in Lebanese society more broadly. For
instance, women in our sample more weakly identify with their occupational identity than
men (4.26 versus 4.88), but this makes sense given that the majority of women in our
sample work in the home (56%), while nearly all of the men are employed at least part-time
outside of the home. The relatively high share of women engaged full-time in domestic labor
may also help explain why women report more homogeneous social networks than men,
with fewer family, friends, and acquaintances from other sectarian backgrounds (2.81 versus
2.56). Other significant differences between the men and women in our sample relate to
educational attainment, which is also consistent with indicators of gender inequality overall.
For instance, the men in our sample are more educated than the women, on average: 71% of
men have completed some kind of post-secondary education compared to just 61% of women.
Coupled with the observation that women in our sample are also significantly less po-
litically active than men, with fewer women than men having ever signed a petition (4%
compared to 8%) or participated in a protest or demonstration (27% compared to 43%),
these descriptive survey results reinforce the importance of understanding whether shared
gender identity can be a force for cross-sectarian organizing among women. Given that we
observe relatively low levels of political action among women but a shared sense of attach-
ment to gender identity coupled with a strong evidence of attachment to sectarian identity,
it remains to be seen whether ethnic cleavages are making it difficult for women to cooperate
across ethnic lines in the pursuit of collective gains. On the whole, the data for our sample
aligns well with our understanding of the broader societal context depicted in Section 2.3.1.
2.3.5 Treatment exposure
Upon arrival at the study site, participants were asked to provide informed consent and fill
out the self-administered pre-survey questionnaire. After filling out the survey, participants
were invited to sit together at a table where everyone could see one another, as well as the
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trained session Moderator.12 Most importantly, to ensure that participants were aware of
their group composition before playing the public goods game, the Moderator provided this
information during her introductory remarks using the following script13:
We are meeting today to discuss the recent developments in the country, mainly the
protests that recently began in Lebanon. Many persons consider that these protests
may present an important moment to reflect about the future of this country regard-
less of their outcome.
We have invited you here today to engage in a discussion with members from
[SAME/ DIFFERENT] sectarian groups and [SAME/DIFFERENT] economic
classes so that you can share with each other your thoughts and feelings about your
economic and political hopes and concerns. Some of what we discuss today could
be sensitive and at times people might disagree—that is ok. We just ask that you
engage with one another with honesty and respect so that we can all learn more
about how people who we do not know personally are thinking and feeling on the
issues that we all face.
Participants were then asked to introduce themselves and offer basic personal information
(e.g. on their jobs or neighborhoods) that would confirm their profiles to all other members
of the group.14 We took precautions to ensure that the public goods game was administered
by a separate member of the moderation team who was trained to lead the exercise. This
12All 120 sessions were led by one of two (women) moderators, who themselves belonged to different sectarian
groups (our main analysis includes moderator fixed effects, as described in Section 2.4.2). The moderators
took care not to reveal their sectarian affiliations, their names are common to all sectarian groups in Lebanon,
and they displayed no outward signs of religiosity in their language or dress.
13We note that our public goods experiment was implemented in the months following mass cross-sectarian and
cross-class protests over the government’s failure to manage trash collection (see e.g. https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/08/30/world/middleeast/lebanon-protests-garbage-government-corruption.html).
These protests demonstrate that, while Lebanon’s institutions and political elites remain divided on the
basis of sect, many ordinary Lebanese are in fact willing to engage and cooperate across sectarian lines.
This increases the importance of understanding how intersecting social identities among women and among
men could still impede cooperation even in a time of heightened recognition of the need to take collective
action across sectarian lines.
14Participants were then led in a moderated, structured discussion. The structure was the same for all groups.
In other work, we analyze the impact of group composition on the outcomes of political discussion. Here,
we focus only on the impact of group composition on cooperation prior to discussion.
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was to offset the potential for social desirability bias to affect the contribution decision
since participants knew the main moderator would be leading them through an hour-long
discussion after the first round of the public goods game was completed.
2.3.6 The public goods game
We evaluate the potential for coethnic favoritism in cooperation to vary by group gender
using a public goods game. In general, the public goods game is designed to test the belief
that when goods are non-excludable (meaning everyone can benefit from them regardless of
whether they contribute to their production) goods will be under-provided because of the
free-rider problem. In this sense, the public goods game represents a classic social dilemma
where there is a trade-off between behavior that will maximize individual gains and behavior
that will maximize the gains of all members of the group as a whole (i.e. the most efficient
outcome). We designed a unique variation of the public goods game to investigate how group
composition affects willingness to cooperate with fellow group members.15 We interpret
contributing to the public good as an indicator of an individual’s willingness to cooperate
with fellow group members (at cost to the individual) so that all can achieve the best possible
outcome (and not only a single individual). Contributing to the group pot (public good)
requires the individual to pay a cost in order to help other members of the group, sacrificing
the best possible individual outcome so that all members of the group can be better off
overall. We evaluate whether there is a clear preference for cooperative behavior with in-
group as opposed to out-group members and to what extent this result differs for women’s
and men’s groups.
Because we want to isolate preferences for cooperation based solely on knowledge of
the group’s composition, we employ a linear one-shot voluntary contribution mechanism
design. Many studies show that the likelihood of cooperation increases when there is a threat
of punishment in later rounds or when players expect to interact with the same partners
over time (Axelrod, 1984; Kurzban, Burton-Chellew and West, 2015). To make sure the
15Our design featured a two-stage public goods game without learning in between rounds, but the focus in
this paper is on the results from the first round of the game only.
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contributions we observe are a function of preferences given only information about group
composition (and not fears of peer sanctioning or reputational impacts in later rounds), we
informed our participants that there would be no opportunity for punishment in the context
of our experiment and that individual contribution amounts would never be made public
to the other participants in the session.16 While some argue that one-shot designs are not
sufficient for participants to understand the payoff structure and play the game with any kind
of coherent strategy or purpose (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1996), the significance of this critique
has largely been invalidated through a number of studies that locate stronger predictors of
cooperation than decision error, including altruistic motivations (Andreoni and Vesterlund,
2001) and reciprocity motivations (Croson, 2007, 2008). In other words, people are capable
of making strategic decisions in one-shot public goods games. Moreover, these designs are
particularly useful for reducing the noise introduced by iterated designs which bring a greater
possibility for results to be driven by reputational concerns, social learning, group solidarity,
or punishment, all of which could obscure our understanding of the independent effect of
ethnic group composition on willingness to cooperate in social settings.
Participants played with 10,000 Lebanese pounds (LL) that they earned for completing
a pre-treatment survey upon arrival at the site. At each session, all six participants filled
out the pre-survey before joining the other group members in a room. A trained Moderator
then framed the context for the game by describing the group’s composition in terms of
sectarian affiliation and economic class status before inviting the assistant into the room to
lead the public goods game. Participants were allowed to contribute any amount in 1,000
LL increments to the group pot. To indicate their choice, participants circled a contribution
amount on a slip of paper,17 inserted the paper into an envelope labeled with their participant
identification number, and then passed the envelope back to the assistant moderator. Payoffs
were determined as follows: the total amount contributed to the group pot was multiplied
16It is possible that fear of punishment or a motivation to punish could still be a factor since studies show
that single-shot interactions can still reflect punishment mechanisms (see Kurzban, Burton-Chellew and
West (2015) for a review). Importantly, even if a punishment motivations still exists, these motivations
in one-shot public goods games are typically stronger for in-group members than for out-group members
(Carpenter and Matthews, 2012), implying this would only serve to reinforce the anticipated negative effect
of the mixed-ethnic setting on cooperation, making any results to the contrary even more surprising.
17All participants had the option to contribute from 0 to 10,000 LL in increments of 1,000.
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by 1.5 and divided evenly among all six participants, regardless of whether they contributed
or not. Thus, the payoff function for each subject i was:




where ci is the contribution to the public account of subject i, in any group whose 6 members
are indexed by j. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the public good was 0.25.
Participants were not informed of the final results of the game until just prior to exiting the
facility and only after completing a post-treatment survey questionnaire and signing receipts
for payment. A total of 713 subjects participated in the experiment.18 The average amount
earned in the public goods game was $7.85 USD.19 The maximum amount earned in the
public goods game was $14.00 USD while the minimum amount earned in the public goods
game was $2.50 USD.20 For women, the average total payoff from the public goods game
was $7.78 USD, with a minimum earned of $2.67 USD and a maximum of $12.17 USD. For
men, the average total payoff from the game was about $7.89 USD, with a minimum of $2.50
USD and a maximum of $14.00 USD.
2.4 MAIN RESULTS: COOPERATION IN MIXED-ETHNIC GROUPS
2.4.1 Preliminary descriptive evidence
Our initial interest is in evaluating whether there is any evidence of coethnic favoritism in
cooperation as the ethnic politics literature predicts, or whether we see evidence of gender-
based variation in preferences for cooperating with coethnics over non-coethnics. Before pro-
18The average group size of six participants in our study is in line with standard public goods game designs
where groups typically include 3-6 participants (Kurzban, Burton-Chellew and West, 2015, 585).
19For reference, the hourly minimum wage in Lebanon is about $3.78 USD.
20In Lebanese currency: the average amount earned in the public goods game was 11,769 LL, with a minimum
of 3,750 LL and a maximum of 21,000 LL earned for the full sample of participants. The amount earned
in the game was combined with a $20 USD show-up fee for participation in all activities involved in the
experiment, including the discussion portion not analyzed here, to yield each individual’s total compensation
for participation in the approximately 90-minute study.
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ceeding to the full estimation and analysis, we review the descriptive statistics for our main
dependent variable: contributions to the group pot (public good) by gender and treatment
group type. The results presented in Figure 1 give us a sense of the range of contributions
to the public good as well as how the average contribution differs among women’s groups
compared to men’s groups. Where the full estimation reduces this variation to a set of aver-
age contributions by group type and group gender, the descriptives shown here allow us to
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Men in Mixed Sect Groups
Contributions to the Public Good
Figure 1: Distribution of contributions to the public good by gender and ethnic group
composition.
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The preliminary results suggest that, on average, women cooperate at similar levels in
same-sect and mixed-sect groups. As shown in Row 1 of Figure 1, women contribute an
average of 3,471 LL in same-sect groups, which is nearly identical to the mean contribution
by women in mixed-sect groups of 3,460 LL.21 By contrast, the mixed-sect group setting does
seem to have a negative effect on cooperation among men. In Row 2 of Figure 1, we observe
that, unlike women, men give noticeably more on average in same-sect (3,762 LL) compared
to mixed-sect groups (3,364 LL). We also note that the distribution of results suggests more
variation among women in response to the mixed-sect treatment than among men, while
there is more variation among men in response to the same-sect group treatment. In neither
case do we observe clear evidence of a strong preference for cooperating with coethnics over
non-coethnics, further reinforcing the need to look at heterogeneous effects within gender
groups in the main statistical analysis.
2.4.2 Estimation strategy
The descriptive evidence suggests that cooperation among women is not necessarily nega-
tively affected by the presence of cross-cutting ethnic group cleavages, though cooperation
among men does seem to be lower in mixed-ethnic compared to same-ethnic settings. To
confirm this relationship, we examine our data using statistical models to see how well these
results perform when we account for other factors that could have influenced the results. To
estimate the effect on cooperation of mixed (versus homogeneous) ethnic group composition,
we employ a weighted least squares regression of the following form:
Yij = α + βTi +X
′
iγ + i (2.2)
where Yij is the outcome (i.e. contribution to the Group Pot) for individual i in group
session j. Ti is the treatment indicator for whether an individual is in a mixed-sect group.
The key coefficient of interest is β, which gives the effect of being in a mixed-sect versus
21It is worth noting that the average contribution to the group pot across all participants in the sample
approaches the average contribution of about 40% of the initial endowment that is typical of public goods
game designs (Ledyard, 1995). This provides confidence in the external validity of our results since they are
similar in magnitude to much of the empirical literature.
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same-sect group on the level of cooperation. X ′iγ is a vector of individual-level controls
included to improve efficiency and control for any imbalance, and i is the individual level
error term.22 All analysis is performed using weights to account for unequal treatment
assignment probabilities across blocks (Gerber and Green, 2012).23
We run the analysis for the subsample of 285 women participants in women-only groups
to arrive at the average treatment effect (ATE) of the mixed-sect group for women overall
(n = 285). We perform the same analysis on our data from men’s groups (n = 428) for
comparison. Because all participants were assigned to single-gender groups, we are able
to differentiate between the effects of sectarian group composition for men and for women
separately.24 We present the average treatment effect without controls (Model 1) as well as
the main estimation (Model 2) which includes a battery of pre-treatment covariates plus an
additional indicator for the number of participants in the session25 and a dummy variable
indicating which of the two possible moderators led the discussion portion of the session
(moderator fixed effects).26 We also included a count variable of the number of days until
the next election relative to when the session was implemented to control for the influence
of sectarian electoral politics over decision-making in the context of the game.27
Our data preparation closely followed our pre-analysis plan for the larger pre-registered
design. We implemented 10 rounds of predictive mean-matching imputation to address a
small amount of item-level missingness in pre-treatment covariates. Where measures capture
one latent trait of interest, we aggregate them into indices using inverse covariance weighting,
which creates an optimal weighted average by weighting-up index components that provide
more ‘new’ information (Anderson, 2008). All indices, unless noted, were pre-registered.28
22We do not cluster standard errors because treatment was assigned at the individual level (Abadie et al.,
2017).
23See Appendix D.4 for more on how the weights were constructed.
24This approach is similar to the gender-differentiated analysis of average treatment effects that Espinosa and
Kova´rˇ´ık (2015) adopt in their public goods experiment on framing effects in cooperation.
25Out of 120 groups, seven completed the experiment with only five participants instead of the required six.
26Both Moderators and the Assistant Moderator (responsible for implementing the public goods game) had
sect-neutral first names, abstained from wearing any religious clothing or symbols, and never revealed their
sectarian affiliation to study participants. All three members of the Moderation Team were women.
27This is consistent with our review of the literature in Section 2.2 highlighting the importance of politicized
ethnic identities for electing politicians in ethnically divided societies.
28Summary statistics for all variables are in Appendix B.1.
39
All models incorporate robust standard errors. In Appendix C, we show that our main results
are robust to a number of different estimation strategies, including additional controls for
comprehension of the payoff structure in the public goods game and whether any of the
participants claimed to know one another prior to meeting at the study site, as well as
specifications that include strata fixed effects.29
2.4.3 Regression results
The main results are presented below in Table 1. Model 1 presents the results without in-
cluding any controls, while Model 2 includes the full battery of pre-treatment covariates and
moderator fixed effects. We present the average treatment effect of the mixed-sect group
setting for women alongside the average treatment effect for men’s groups to bring compar-
ative perspective to the results.30 Overall, the statistical evidence largely substantiates the
patterns we observe in Figure 1. In Row 1 of Table 1, we see that there is no statistically
significant effect of the mixed-sect treatment group on cooperation among women overall.
Moreover, the coefficients in both model specifications are too small to even be suggestive
of a general direction of the effect. This is consistent with our expectation that there are
good reasons to suspect that the logic of coethnic bias in cooperation is unlikely to operate
through the same mechanisms for women that it does for men.
However, we do not find clear evidence that men, overall, have a strong preference for
cooperating with coethnics over non-coethnics as much of the literature on ethnic politics
would predict. In Row 2 of Table 1, we can see that the direction of the coefficients for the
effect of the mixed-sect group treatment on cooperation among men are negative, consistent
with what we would expect, yet neither Model 1 nor Model 2 reach conventional levels of
statistical significance. The size of the coefficients for the mixed-sect treatment, however, are
noticeably larger than we observe for women. We interpret this as generally weak evidence of
29For each of the five recruitment cycles, we block randomly assigned participants to treatment groups within
strata defined by gender, sect, economic class, and neighborhood, additionally blocking on recruiter where
possible.
30To be clear, while these results for the experimental treatment effect are not directly comparable across gender
groups, they are worth considering as observational evidence indicative of gender-differentiated responses to
the mixed-ethnic group composition treatment.
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Table 1: Main results.
Same Sect
Mean
Model 1 Model 2 N
Women’s Groups




Mixed sect 3762 -398 -465 428
(343) (343)
0.247 0.175
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models
incorporate weights that correct for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across
strata. Model 1 has no controls; Model 2 includes controls and moderator fixed effects.
coethnic favoritism in cooperation among men, which is a surprising result given the wealth
of empirical work purporting to demonstrate that coethnic bias in collective action exists.
In the next section, we unpack these unexpected results by focusing on how ethnic in-group
favoritism may be more acute for particular types of individuals.
2.5 COETHNIC FAVORITISM AMONG SPECIFIC SUBGROUPS
In Section 2.2, we proposed there could be gender-differentiated effects of ethnic group com-
position due to the potential for variation by gender along three key dimensions: (1) access
to material benefits through coethnic elites; (2) strength of attachment to sectarian identity;
and, (3) strength of attachment to gender identity. In particular, we proposed that women
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may be less prone to show coethnic bias in cooperation because of limited access to material
benefits through coethnic elites, reduced salience of the link between ethnic identification
and access to resources, and the countervailing influence of strong attachment to gender
identity that coincides with norms of pro-sociality and cooperation linked to women’s so-
cial role within Lebanese society. In this section, we use pre-treatment survey data to
evaluate whether heterogeneity in response to the mixed-ethnic group treatment owing to
membership in these different subgroups could help explain variation in coethnic favoritism
in cooperation. Drawing on measures developed from questions in our pre-treatment survey
instruments, we introduce an interaction term into the main equation presented in Section
2.4.2 and evaluate the treatment effects for different subgroups of women and men. First,
we consider the material and psychological benefits explanations for coethnic favoritism in
cooperation. The results from this analysis are surprising and vary along gender lines. As
a result, we also investigate the potential for strength of attachment to gender identity to
influence cooperation in mixed-ethnic (versus same-ethnic) group settings.
2.5.1 Connections to coethnic elites and sectarian identification
We first evaluate coethnic favoritism in cooperation among individuals in our sample who
are more/less connected to benefits through sectarian political elites. To measure access to
benefits through sectarian leaders, we asked participants: “Q11: Let’s say that you needed
help getting access to benefits, such as health care or schooling or jobs. How easy or difficult
would it be for you or someone in your household to get help on this matter from...(a)
Za’im/politician...” The answer options were: “(1) Very difficult, (2) Somewhat difficult,
(3) Not too difficult, or (4) Not difficult at all.” To facilitate comparisons in the statistical
analysis, we code all respondents with answers of “Not too difficult” or “Not difficult at all”
as Strongly Connected (which takes the value of ‘1’) and all those with answers of “Somewhat
difficult” or “Very difficult” as Weakly Connected (which takes the value of ‘0’). This yields
a binary indicator of access to benefits through coethnic political elites that allows us to
evaluate how much coethnic favoritism in cooperation may depend on individuals having
access to material benefits through coethnic elites.
42
We then consider how attachment to sectarian identity could proxy for the psychological
benefits associated with coethnic favoritism. Individuals who are more attached to their
sectarian identity could reasonably be expected to derive greater psychological benefits from
belonging to that group than those who feel weakly attached to their sectarian group. To
evaluate the extent to which attachment to sectarian identity influences preferences and
behavior, we asked participants: “Q14: People in Lebanon often have different identities.
Some people identify themselves in terms of their confession, gender, region, or age. Others
identify themselves in economic terms, such as lower/working class or upper class or by their
profession. Looking at the list below, please rank in order from 1-7 the identities that you
feel from strongest to weakest (where 1 is strongest and 7 is weakest).” One of the identity
categories was “your confession,” meaning participants were required to rank the relative
importance of their sectarian social identity. To facilitate our estimation of the effect of
the mixed-sect treatment on cooperation conditional on strength of attachment to sectarian
identity, we create a binary version of relative strength of attachment to sectarian identity
that takes the value of ‘1’ for all respondents who ranked sectarian identity as the identity
they feel most attached to (Strong Identifiers) and ‘0’ for all respondents who rated sectarian
identity as something other than their strongest identity (Weak Identifiers).31 This yields
a binary indicator of relative strength of attachment to sectarian identity that allows us to
evaluate how much coethnic favoritism in cooperation may depend on how much women and
men value their sectarian identity relative to other social groups to which they belong.
For the estimation, we analyze contributions to the public good conditional on whether
individuals are (1) ‘strongly connected’ or ‘weakly connected’ and (2) ‘strong sectarians’
or ‘weak sectarians.’ We present the results as conditional average marginal effects for
women’s and men’s groups estimated separately. We check the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of the same control variable specifications included in the main results
presented in Section 2.4.32 The results for the conditional marginal effect of the mixed-sect
31In Appendix C.2, we include additional results from estimations that use a measure where we code those
naming sectarian identity in their top three social identities as Strong Identifiers and all others as Weak
Identifiers. The results are generally robust to both specifications.
32The only changes we make to the covariates included in the analysis are to remove the index of ‘connectedness’
from our list of controls for the estimation by connectedness to sectarian political leaders and the index of
‘sectarian identity’ from our list of controls for the estimation by strength of attachment to sectarian identity.
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group treatment on contributions to the group pot for different subgroups of participants are
presented in Table 2. In Panel A, we present the conditional average marginal effect of the
mixed-sect group treatment depending on access to material benefits through political elites,
while Panel B reports the conditional average marginal effect of the mixed-sect treatment
on cooperation given weak versus strong attachment to sectarian identity.
We turn first to the results for women in Panel A. In terms of access to benefits through
politicians or Za’im, we note that our summary statistics show that only 46 women in our
sample (out of 285 total) indicated that they can access benefits through coethnic elites,
while 203 women declared this to be either ‘somewhat difficult’ or ‘very difficult.’ The same-
sect mean contribution presented in the first column of Panel A represents the first point of
difference between strongly connected women and those who are weakly connected: women
with strong connections to benefits through politicians contribute almost 700 LL more on
average in same-sect groups than women with weak connections (4,084 versus 3,347). This
could indicate that norms of cooperation within same-sect group settings are strongly for
more connected women. Moreover, we observe clear evidence that women in our sample who
lack access to benefits through coethnic political elites show no statistically significant differ-
ence in their willingness to cooperate in mixed-sect compared to same-sect groups. In stark
contrast, we find that women with strong connections (Row 2, Panel A) are significantly less
cooperative in mixed-sect compared to same-sect groups. In our main specification (Model
2), the coefficient for the mixed-sect treatment indicates that connected women contribute
more than 1,400 LL less in heterogeneous ethnic settings compared to homogeneous ethnic
settings, a difference that corresponds to connected women cooperating at about half the
level in mixed-ethnic environments that they would in same-ethnic environments. This result
is significant at the 0.10 level, which is fairly strong considering the relatively small sample
size of just 46 strongly connected women.
Importantly, the negative effect of the mixed-sect group setting on cooperation among
strongly connected women is very similar to what we observe for well connected men. Men
with access to benefits through political elites contribute more than 1,000 LL less in mixed-
sect groups than they do in same-sect groups, on average. Notably, we do not observe the
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Table 2: Conditional marginal effect by access to elites and sectarian identification.









Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Panel A: Access to benefits through politicians
Weakly Connected 3347 249 54 3479 -43 -188
(Very or somewhat difficult) (426) (450) (433) (438)
0.560 0.905 0.922 0.668
Strongly Connected 4084 -1143 -1430* 4356 -1138* -1048*
(Not too difficult or not difficult at all) (842) (829) (622) (618)
0.176 0.086 0.068 0.091
Panel B: Strength of attachment to Sectarian ID
Weak Sectarian ID 3360 -18 -246 3615 -163 -179
(Sectarian ID is not #1) (436) (455) (387) (393)
0.967 0.589 0.673 0.650
Strong Sectarian ID 3910 -136 -252 4364 -1317 -1552*
(Sectarian ID is #1) (853) (853) (828) (819)
0.874 0.768 0.113 0.059
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models incorporate weights that
correct for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across strata. Model 1 has no controls; Model 2 includes
controls and moderator fixed effects.
same negative reaction to the mixed-sect group among weakly connected men in our sample.
Instead, we detect no evidence of a statistically significant difference in contributions by
less-connected men in mixed-sect compared to same-sect groups. Also similar to what we
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observe for women when disaggregating by connectedness, strongly connected men contribute
noticeably more in same-sect groups than weakly connected men (4,356 versus 3,479). On the
whole then, we find support for the argument that those who benefit from the distribution
of material benefits through coethnic channels are more likely to display coethnic favoritism
when it comes to cooperating in group settings, a result that holds for single-gender groups
of both men and women.
In contrast to the similarities witnessed in Panel A, we observe clear differences in co-
operation between women and men in single-gender groups in the results conditional on
strength of attachment to sectarian identity, shown in Panel B. First, we observe a robust
null effect of the mixed-sect group treatment on cooperation among women for both women
who are strongly sectarian and for women who are weakly sectarian.33 In neither case do we
see any significant difference in contributions to the group pot in mixed-sect versus same-sect
groups. At the same time, we note that women who identify as strong sectarians contribute
about 600 LL more in same-sect group, on average, than women who more weakly identify
with their sectarian identity (3,910 versus 3,360). This is consistent with expectations that
individuals who strongly identify with their sectarian identity may cooperate at higher levels
in coethnic environments. However, the null effect of the mixed-sect group setting on coop-
eration by strong sectarians is surprising in light of the supposed link between attachment
to sectarian identity and the psychological benefits attributed to abiding by stronger norms
of cooperation within ethnic groups than across them.
This surprising effect of the mixed-sect treatment among strong sectarian women is
magnified by the fact that we do not observe the same null result among strong sectarian
men. Instead, among men, strong attachment to sectarian identity is associated with a large
and statistically significant negative effect of the mixed-ethnic group setting on cooperation
(p-value = 0.059). In the main specification (Model 2), strong sectarian men contributed, on
average, 1,152 LL less in mixed-ethnic groups than in same-ethnic groups. On the whole, this
suggests that strong attachment to sectarian identity reinforces coethnic bias in cooperation
for men, but not necessarily for women. This lends support to our expectation that the
33Note that 59 women in our sample self-identified as feeling most attached to their sectarian identity, while
186 women ranked some other social identity higher than sectarian identity in relative importance.
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logic of coethnic bias in cooperation may vary within ethnic groups along gender lines and
introduces additional questions pertaining to why sectarian identification may not operate
the same way for men and women in a given societal context.
2.5.2 Gender identity and cooperation across ethnic lines
Our finding that strong sectarian women are not less cooperative in mixed-ethnic compared
to same-ethnic group settings is particularly surprising. Where psychological attachment to
sectarian identity clearly reinforces coethnic bias in cooperation among men, we do not see
the same relationship for women. Since we observe this phenomenon in the same context
where access to benefits through coethnic elites exerts a similar influence on cooperation in
mixed-ethnic settings for both men and women, this raises the possibility that the differen-
tiating factor in terms of how men and women respond to ethnic cleavages in group settings
has to do with how gender intersects with different norms linked to membership in various
social groups.
In line with social psychological theories of gendered social roles, we anticipated in Section
2.2 that variation in attachment to gender identity could help explain any observed lack of
coethnic favoritism in cooperation among women that we might encounter in our analysis.
This literature broadly argues that women are more prone to abide by pro-social norms of
interdependence and cooperation in group settings than men are, owing to the social roles
attributed to women in many societies which evolved to reward women for cooperation but
tend to reward men for competition and independence (Eagly and Wood, 1991). Applying
this logic to our study, we expect that women who more strongly identify with their gender
identity may be more likely to abide by strong norms of cooperation with other women,
regardless of the sectarian composition of the group, than women who feel less attached to
their gender identity.
In the pre-treatment survey, we also asked participants to rank the relative importance
of their gender identity (relative to six other categories of social identities that also included
sectarian identity). To facilitate our estimation of the effect of the mixed-sect treatment
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on cooperation conditional on strength of attachment to gender identity, we create a binary
version of relative strength of attachment to gender identity that takes the value of ‘1’ for all
respondents who ranked gender identity as the identity they feel most attached to (Strong
Identifiers) and ‘0’ for all respondents who rated gender identity as something other than
their strongest identity (Weak Identifiers).34 We code respondents in line with this scheme
and compare treatment effects within women’s groups by strength of identification. As in the
analysis of attachment to sectarian identity, we examine the conditional average marginal
effect of the mixed-sect group treatment on cooperation for ‘weak identifiers’ and ‘strong
identifiers.’ The results are presented in Table 3.
We find suggestive evidence that attachment to gender identity has a different effect on
cooperation in mixed-sect groups for women compared to men. Among all-women groups,
we note that relatively weak attachment to gender identity is associated with a much higher
average level of cooperation in same-sect groups compared to what we observe among women
who most strongly identify with their gender group identity (3,918 versus 2,916). On the one
hand, this is notable because it suggests that norms of within ethnic group cooperation may
be stronger for women who are less attached to their gender identity, since they cooperate
at a higher level in same-sect groups than strong gender identifiers. On the other hand, it
is worth noting that these average levels of cooperation in same-sect groups differ as well
from what we observe for men. Most especially, while weak attachment to gender identity
is associated with similar levels of contribution in same-sect groups (3,918 for women and
3,668 for men), strong attachment among women is associated with noticeably lower levels
of cooperation in coethnic settings than what we observe for strong gender identification
among men (2,916 for women versus 4,004 for men). This is important, since it suggests
that strong attachment to gender identity could trigger different norms of cooperation in
same-sect settings for men and women, leading men to cooperate more with coethnics while
leading women to cooperate less.
Moreover, while we note that none of the coefficients in this part of the analysis are
34In Appendix C.2, we include additional results from estimations that use a measure where we code those
naming gender identity in their top three social identities as “Strong Identifiers” and all others as “Weak
Identifiers.” The results are generally robust to both specifications.
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Table 3: Conditional marginal effect by attachment to gender identity.









Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Strength of attachment to Gender ID
Weak Gender ID 3918 -428 -765 3668 -345 -314
(Gender ID is not #1) (516) (511) (424) (425)
0.408 0.136 0.417 0.460
Strong Gender ID 2916 492 535 4004 -545 -774
(Gender ID is #1) (561) (569) (635) (653)
0.381 0.348 0.392 0.237
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models incorporate
weights that correct for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across strata. Model 1 has
no controls; Model 2 includes controls and moderator fixed effects.
significant at conventional levels, the magnitude and change in direction of the coefficients is
notable and worthy of a brief discussion. First, we see that the mixed-sect group treatment
has a negative effect on the level of cooperation by men regardless of their attachment to
their gender identity. This negative effect of the mixed-sect treatment on cooperation is
greatest for men who are strongly attached to their gender identity. Most importantly, we
observe a different pattern in cooperation in mixed-sect groups for women, conditional on
attachment to gender identity. Where weak attachment to gender identity is associated
with lower average levels of cooperation in mixed-sect than in same-sect groups of women,
strong attachment to gender identity is associated with exactly the opposite. Again, while
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these coefficients are not statistically significant, the magnitude of the positive coefficient
for cooperation in mixed-sect groups for strongly identified women is important given the
difference between this positive coefficient (535 LL) and the negative coefficient we see for
weakly identified women in mixed-sect groups (-765 LL). On the whole, this suggests that
weak attachment to gender identity is associated with a reduced willingness to cooperate with
women from other sectarian backgrounds (relative to co-sectarians), while strong attachment
to gender identity is associated with greater willingness to cooperate across sectarian divides.
This result is clearly unique to women in our sample and does not exist in the same way for
men.
2.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
To summarize our results, we find that the material and psychological benefits explanations
for coethnic favoritism in cooperation in groups does not apply universally to single-gender
groups of men and of women. Instead, we find that while both men and women with access
to benefits through coethnic political elites are less cooperative in mixed-ethnic settings than
in homogeneous ethnic settings (indicative of support for the material benefits motivation
for coethnic favoritism in collective action), strong attachment to sectarian identity does not
reinforce norms of coethnic bias in cooperation for women in the same way that it does for
men. Strong sectarian women do not cooperate at significantly lower levels in mixed-sect
compared to same-sect groups, while strong sectarian men do cooperate significantly less
in mixed-sect than in same-sect groups. This is inconsistent with prevailing accounts of
the psychological benefits linked to coethnic solidarity and suggests that other factors may
influence cooperative behavior for women. We speculate that women’s shared gender group
membership could influence their willingness to cooperate with one another regardless of sec-
tarian background. We evaluate this prediction and find suggestive evidence that stronger
attachment to gender identity is associated with greater willingness to cooperate with other
women from different ethnic backgrounds, while relatively weak attachment to gender iden-
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tity is linked to greater cooperation within same-sect groups and a reduced willingness to
cooperate in mixed-sect groups, though the coefficients in our analysis are not significant at
conventional levels.
Plausible explanations for the difference in the effect of the mixed-sect context conditional
on attachment to gender identity can be found in the literature on gender differences in
cooperation in the context of inter-group competition over resources. To the extent that
masculinity is linked to the ability to provide for one’s immediate family or peer network,
men who feel strongly attached to their gender identity may be motivated to demonstrate
their capabilities in a display of ‘competitive altruism’ in same-sect social settings where
men cooperate regardless of personal cost to gain status in the eyes of similar (coethnic)
others (Hardy and Vugt, 2006). This may be more salient for men because evidence suggests
that men are more amenable than women to competitive group environments (Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2007; Lee, Kesebir and Pillutla, 2016). Research on the ‘warrior-male hypothesis’
posits that men have developed a stronger propensity for cooperation in coalitions through
the necessity of group-based warfare over scarce resources (Van Vugt, Cremer and Janssen,
2007), which could also help explain why masculinity may be tied to stronger norms of
within-ethnic group cooperation among men than among women.
The finding that stronger attachment to gender identity is associated with an increased
willingness to cooperate with other women in heterogeneous ethnic settings suggests a path
forward for policymakers and movement activists seeking to unite women across salient
ethnic divides. Our results indicate that reinforcing the relative salience of gender identity
among women may lead to stronger preferences for working across ethnic divides on shared
issues. In fact, the relatively low level of cooperation by women who strongly identify
with their gender identity could even suggest a tendency to reject norms of cooperation that
prioritize coethnics over the needs of women in general. In other words, we could be observing
evidence that women, more so than men, may be inclined to reject the ethnic political status
quo in favor of working across sectarian lines for mutual gain, but only if they perceive
their gender identity as their most important social group membership. In the absence of
a strong attachment to gender identity, women may cooperate less in mixed-ethnic group
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settings. On the whole, this suggests that programs or interventions designed to elevate
the salience of shared interests owing to shared gender identity among women in Lebanon
could improve prospects for collective organizing in pursuit of policies with the potential
to positively impact all women, regardless of sect. This interpretation of the results would
be consistent with existing evidence from research conducted with women representatives
in Afghanistan, where Larson (2012) shows that women are unlikely to cooperate with one
another on issues of interest to women more broadly in the absence of a clear sense of shared
gender group membership.
Importantly, we do not interpret these results as evidence that women are inherently
less biased against members of other sectarian groups than men are. Rather, we believe
they suggest that willingness to cooperate with members of other ethnic groups depends
on the extent to which individuals benefit from access to coethnic elites within their own
group. Since men are more likely than women to benefit from coethnic elite networks within
society overall, cooperating with coethnics is more likely to resonate with higher numbers
of men as a way to gain access to resources. It is possible that since relatively fewer women
have similar access to resources through coethnic political elites, we do not observe the same
negative effect of the mixed-sect group treatment on cooperation among women overall that
we do among men. As more women find themselves with access to benefits through coethnic
political elites, we could expect to observe similar levels of coethnic favoritism in cooperation
among women as we do among men. This interpretation of our findings parallels arguments
from Goetz (2007) and others who refute essentialist explanations for gender differences in
behavior and instead focus on the gendered structural and institutional barriers to partici-
pation in political activities. Critiquing research on gender gaps in corruption among public
officials, Goetz (2007) argues that it is not necessarily that women are inherently less cor-
ruptible than men, it is just that they have fewer opportunities to participate in corrupt
activities than their male counterparts.
Yet, our results may also signal that there are limits to the potential for women’s shared
gender group solidarity to unite women to take collective action under all conditions. In par-
ticular, we note that women with access to benefits through coethnic elites are probably more
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likely to be elites themselves. This suggests that there may be another dimension at play in
terms of how the ethnic composition of the social environment influences women’s willingness
to work together. While we control for the socio-economic background of all participants
in our study, we also recommend that future research consider the intersection of gender
and elite economic status and how these social identities intersect to influence cooperation
among women. Our findings do not clearly point towards ethnic group membership as the
key driver of cooperation among women which suggests that it is possible that class-based
differences in access to material resources could be driving preferences more so than other
cross-cutting cleavages. If this is true, it would suggest that socio-economic divisions among
women are the greater barrier to collective action, not ethnic cleavages. On the whole, our
findings underscore the need to consider how social identities intersect to inform cooperative
behavior in groups, as well as the need to be attuned to the potential for conflicting norms
linked to various group memberships to complicate expectations of behavior on the basis of
any single identity group category.
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3.0 WOMEN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, AND COOPERATION IN
GROUPS: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENT IN
LEBANON
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, numerous studies have documented the incredible surge in women’s
political representation worldwide.1 Explanations for this dramatic shift have ranged from
international to national-level factors. For example, Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) argue
that the increase in women holding elected office is related to the transnational diffusion of
norms that encourage the adoption of gender-based quotas for women’s representation in pol-
itics. In fact, the evidence suggests that the norm of women’s inclusion rather than exclusion
in politics is now stronger than ever before (Paxton, Hughes and Green, 2006). However,
despite the introduction of these electoral rules intended to help “jumpstart” women’s in-
volvement in political decision-making (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2009; Krook, 2009), some
evidence suggests these efforts to mobilize for women’s representation are not always in-
clusive of all women. For instance, the women’s movement in Uganda is largely credited
with successfully winning quotas for women’s representation in government in the 1990s
(Tripp, 2000). Yet, the same movement is often criticized as elitist and lacking in the po-
litical will needed to initiate changes that would benefit all women in the population more
broadly (Tamale, 1999, 2003). Relatedly, in Lebanon, efforts to mobilize women in support
1I am indebted to Sami Atallah, Joanna Fayad, Zeina Hawa, and Zeina Helou for their tireless help with
implementation. This project was made possible by funding that the Lebanese Center for Policy Stud-
ies (LCPS) received from the Embassy of Norway. It is covered under University of Pittsburgh IRB
PRO15060167; the procedures for data collection and select portions of the analysis were pre-registered
at egap.org/registration/2208.
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of gender-based quotas for representation in politics have been hampered by deep divisions
among women over the need for such a policy change (Helou, 2009). In other words, despite
evidence of a global rise in norms promoting the inclusion of women in politics, these norms
do not necessarily inspire widespread collective action by women as a group on the basis of
their shared gender identity.2
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. On the one hand, it is
possible that women may want to organize on the basis of shared gender identity for group-
level gains for women, but institutional or structural obstacles persist that impede mass
mobilization (Kangas and Rostgaard, 2007). Alternatively, it could be that women do not
tend to mobilize on the basis of their shared gender identity because women as a group
do not have a coherent set of interests (Beckwith, 2011; Celis et al., 2014). In this case,
shared gender group identity may not be as informative of the potential benefits to be had
by taking collective action as perhaps another social identity that implies a more specific set
of shared policy goals. A third possibility is that shared gender identity alone does not cue
women to the presence of strong norms of cooperation in group settings. For example, Klar
(2018) demonstrates that the potential for shared gender identity to unite women across
salient political divides depends on the extent to which gender identity entails the same set
of values and expectations of behavior for women on opposite ends of that divide. To the
extent that these norms differ across social groups within society, highlighting shared gender
identity could reinforce social cleavages that divide women rather than unite them.
This paper examines women’s ability to cooperate with one another across socio-economic
class lines. This is an important topic to address because building widespread support for
political action among women could require cooperation across class lines. Research shows
that socio-economic class identity may be at least as important to people as their racial or
gender identity (Easterbrook, Kuppens and Manstead (2018) cited in Manstead (2018)). This
may be especially true for behavior linked to political action, as Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg
2The data for this essay comes from a coauthored project so I adopt the use of ‘we’ throughout. The design of
the experiment was a collaborative effort between this author, Laura Paler (University of Pittsburgh), and
Sami Atallah (Lebanese Center for Policy Studies). See Paler, Marshall and Atallah (2018) for an example
of co-authored work that draws on other data collected during the experiment. The writing and analysis
presented here is original and solo-authored in fulfillment of the requirements for the dissertation.
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and McKee (2017) show that class context is linked to patterns of preferences for various
forms of collective action. Yet, despite the fact that socio-economic status and class identity
have been the topic of political, economic, philosophical, and sociological study for centuries,
very little experimental evidence exists that links socio-economic identity to patterns of
collective action.
On the one hand, we might expect women to cooperate across socio-economic class lines.
The norms of appropriate behavior attributed to women are synonymous with characteristics
in the literature from experimental economics and social psychology shown to correlate with
cooperation in same-group social settings (Eagly and Wood, 1991; Hyde, 2014). Moreover,
results from a number of recent experiments suggest a strong norm of cooperation exists
among women in single-gender group settings (Greig and Bohnet, 2009; Berge, Juniwaty
and Sekei, 2016; Fearon and Humphreys, 2017). This result is unique to groups composed
only of women, indicating there may be some effect of women’s shared gender identity on
willingness to cooperate.
On the other hand, we might expect women to cooperate less across socio-economic class
lines. Recent evidence suggests a strong link between socio-economic status and variation in
patterns of behavior. Where low socio-economic status is often associated with helping be-
haviors, empathy, and pro-social norms of cooperation in groups, high socio-economic status
is typically linked to independence and self-interest in interpersonal interactions (Manstead,
2018). This suggests that variation in socio-economic class status could influence the norms
of cooperation that exist among women in group settings because class-based norms pre-
scribe different behaviors for women in group settings compared to gender-based norms.
This raises an important question: Do socio-economic class cleavages influence the level of
cooperation between women?
To examine this, we test preferences for cooperation among women in mixed-class versus
same-class group settings using a public goods game experiment implemented in Lebanon, a
country characterized by strong norms of behavior linked to gender identity and rising socio-
economic inequality that cuts across gender groups. We randomly assigned respondents
to participate in single-gender, six-person group settings where all subjects came from the
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same socio-economic class background (same-class), or where three participants were upper-
class and three were lower-class (mixed-class). After a trained moderator informed all group
members of the group’s composition, participants played a public goods game designed
to measure their preferences for cooperating with one another knowing only their group’s
composition in terms of gender, class, and ethnicity. One advantage of this design is that
it requires individuals to face a trade-off between maximizing their individual payoff from
the game, and maximizing the outcome that would be best for all members of the group
as a whole. This makes the public goods game a good test of preferences for group-level
outcomes over individual-level gains. In terms of building coalitions and taking collective
action for group-level gains, this is analogous to an individual foregoing incentives that would
benefit them at the cost of other group members in order to support behavior that would
lead to better outcomes for all members of the group as a whole. Another key advantage of
our approach is that we use natural identities that incorporate measures of subjective and
objective socio-economic class collected during a screening survey exercise used to identify
participants for the experiment. To our knowledge, this is the first study of this size to
experimentally evaluate the impact of socio-economic class group composition on cooperation
among women.
We find that women are not unconditional cooperators. Socio-economic class cleavages in
the mixed-group environment are associated with lower average contributions to the public
good. Additionally, we find that the magnitude of this negative effect of the mixed-class
setting on cooperation differs across class groups: rich women have a more negative reaction
to the mixed-class setting than do poor women. Moreover, we compare these results for
women to cooperative outcomes in all-male group sessions conducted around the same time.
We find that the mixed-class group treatment has the opposite effect on cooperation for men,
suggesting that the effect we observe for women is unique.
In effect, this paper represents an effort to take seriously the implications of intersec-
tionality for interpreting the effects of shared group membership on cooperation (Crenshaw,
1991). Understanding the extent to which the influence of shared gender identity on cooper-
ation is shaped by the existence of cross-cutting socio-economic cleavages has wide-ranging
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implications for academics and policymakers alike, including those interested in gender-based
representation in political decision-making, strategies for political mobilization along gender
lines, and how political institutions can reinforce social inequalities and strengthen barriers
to entry for members of marginalized groups. We elaborate more on these in the conclusion.
3.2 SOCIOECONOMIC CLASS AND COOPERATION AMONG WOMEN
Many scholars argue that women are guided by behavioral norms that prescribe cooperation
in group settings. This is most profound in the social psychology literature on social-role
theory which “emphasizes the causal effect of gender roles – that is, of people’s beliefs about
the behavior that is appropriate for each sex” (Eagly and Wood, 1991, 309). In this context,
gender roles are defined as “those shared expectations about appropriate conduct that apply
to individuals solely on the basis of their socially identified sex” (Eagly and Wood, 1991,
309). More specifically, Eagly and Wood (1991, 309) identify a set of social norms that
apply to men and women in various cultural contexts: “Women are expected to possess high
levels of communal attributes, including being friendly, unselfish, concerned with others, and
emotionally expressive. Men are expected to possess high levels of agentic qualities, including
being independent, masterful, assertive, and instrumentally competent.” In general, these
norms encourage women to display more communal behaviors linked to pro-sociality and
contrast sharply with the agentic portrayal of the norms associated with men (Eagly and
Wood, 1991). This depiction of women as unconditional cooperators is supported by recent
empirical evidence from experiments involving public goods games (Greig and Bohnet, 2009;
Berge, Juniwaty and Sekei, 2016). In fact, Fearon and Humphreys (2017) demonstrate that
higher levels of cooperation between women (rather than in mixed-gender groups) cannot be
attributed to expectations of other women’s giving, any perceived threat of punishment for
not contributing, or concern about how the funds will be spent. This arguably lends further
support to the idea that women prefer cooperating with one another on the basis of some
underlying norm rooted in shared gender group membership.
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However, there are good reasons to believe that women’s cooperation varies by socioe-
conomic class group membership. Socioeconomic class is important to consider because it
represents another critical cleavage that could affect women’s ability to work together to
achieve collective aims on the basis of their shared gender identity as women. For instance,
the type of political action an individual is most likely to engage in is linked to their so-
cioeconomic background: higher socio-economic status is associated with public displays
of political activity (e.g. voting, writing to representatives, signing petitions), while lower
socio-economic status is associated with more private forms of engagement (e.g. listening
to radio programs or watching television shows about politics, talking to friends or family
about issues) (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg and McKee, 2017). Moreover, there is also some
evidence that lower-class and upper-class individuals face different norms of cooperation in
group settings as a consequence of their differing material conditions (Manstead, 2018). In
general, upper-class individuals see life as full of choices and opportunities over which they
exercise some degree of control, translating into norms of behavior that prioritize and value
independence, self-orientation, prejudice in response to threat, and a disinclination to help
others in distress (Manstead, 2018). In contrast, lower-class individuals are more likely to
perceive constraints on their ability to move through society, are more sensitive to threats,
perceive themselves as having little control over outcomes, and generally process the so-
cial world as interdependent, leading to social norms of appropriate behavior that are more
other-regarding and empathetic (Manstead, 2018). In other words, socioeconomic status in
general is linked to different patterns of behavior. Where women in general are thought
to abide by norms of cooperation in group settings, class-based norms of behavior suggest
that we might expect to observe variation among women along class lines, since the rich,
in general, are portrayed as more agentic (and thus less other-regarding) while the poor, in
general, are portrayed as more communal (and thus more concerned about the welfare of
interdependent others).
This makes it important to consider how women cooperate in lower-class groups, in
upper-class groups, and in mixed-class group settings since socioeconomic class status could
influence the capacity for women to take collective action and realize substantive gains for
women as a social group. Specifically, we consider whether poor women and rich women
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cooperate more, less, or the same in mixed-class relative to same-class groups. This helps
shed light on how women’s collective action capacity might vary by socioeconomic status,
but it also helps us understand whether horizontal class cleavages among women undermine
broader efforts to mobilize women on the basis of their shared experience as women in society.
In the remainder of this section, we review the competing expectations of women’s behavior
in heterogeneous class settings that emerge from recent literature.
3.2.1 Women and cooperation in homogeneous class settings
Most of the available evidence suggests that we should expect lower-class women in same-
class groups to cooperate at relatively high levels. For example, Markus and Kitayama
(1991) argue that lower-class individuals are more likely to see themselves as interdependent
and relying on social connections with others who, like them, face resource constraints.
In turn, Kraus et al. (2012) and Kraus and Stephens (2012) argue that this also means
lower-class individuals face greater exposure to threat in their immediate social environment
which leads them to be more attuned to the social context. Relatedly, this concern for
context, socialization toward interdependence, and familiarity with threat leads lower-status
individuals to adopt more other-regarding behaviors, to demonstrate empathy, and to be
more likely to help and to seek help from similar others in times of need (Kraus et al.,
2012; Manstead, 2018). This prediction is supported by empirical evidence that lower socio-
economic status (relative to higher socio-economic status) is associated with more generosity
in laboratory settings (Piff et al., 2010, 2012), as well as higher trust and a greater willingness
to help others (Piff et al., 2012). In the context of all-women group settings, this expectation
could be reinforced by women’s shared gender group identity, since some evidence suggests
that low gender status in society (e.g. being a woman rather than a man in a patriarchal
system) is associated with stronger norms of interdependence in interpersonal interactions
(Cross and Madson, 1997).
In contrast, the literature is somewhat less clear on what we should expect from upper-
class women in same-class group settings. On the one hand, Kraus, Tan and Tannenbaum
(2013) anticipate that upper-class individuals are more likely to pursue self-interested be-
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haviors because of their comparatively high level of access to resources and opportunities
affords them greater room for independent (rather than interdependent) action. This could
suggest we should expect low levels of cooperation in upper-class groups of women. On the
other hand, some evidence suggests that upper-class individuals may cooperate at relatively
higher levels in same-class compared to mixed-class social settings (Coˆte´, House and Willer,
2015). This could mean that we will not necessarily see low levels of cooperation by rich
women in same-class groups. This might be especially likely if the social norms of coopera-
tion attributed women by social role theories of gender exert a more powerful influence on
behavior.
3.2.2 Women and cooperation in heterogeneous class settings
There are two major reasons to expect that lower-class women may cooperate less in mixed-
class compared to same-class groups. First, the mixed-class nature of the group may raise
the salience of poor3 women’s relatively lower social status, thereby triggering perceptions
of social exclusion. Candelo, Croson and Li (2017) show that strong identification with a
salient social group can increase cooperation, but only when individuals do not perceive
their group as socially excluded. Feelings of social exclusion are known to be associated with
lower levels of empathy and interpersonal trust (Twenge et al., 2007), both of which are
key determinants of cooperation in group settings. To the extent that poor women perceive
themselves as socially excluded on the basis of their socioeconomic status, this may prevent
them from cooperating with rich women (who do not perceive the same degree of social
exclusion) on the basis of shared gender group membership.
Second, poor women may cooperate less in mixed-class settings due to concerns about
fairness or due to a desire to correct perceived injustices in the distribution of resources in
mixed-class settings. Empirical evidence shows that lower socio-economic status is associated
3We use the terms ‘lower-class’ and ‘poor’ interchangeably alongside ‘upper-class’ and ‘rich’ while recognizing
that both sets of terms may be problematic for normative reasons. In particular, we want to be clear that
we do not use these terms to indicate any measure of social value or worth attributed to either group by the
use of the label; we use these terms only to distinguish between the difference in access to material resources
and material conditions of the context in which these individuals are situated.
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with a stronger commitment to egalitarian values (Piff et al., 2012). Since women (more so
than men) are known to be sensitive to egalitarian norms in group settings (Andreoni and
Vesterlund, 2001), this effect could be magnified for lower-class women in single-gender
groups. At the same time, people may be influenced by a ‘fairness perspective’ that leads
them to perceive upper class individuals as “self-sufficient or having overbenefited from
pooled resources” (Van Doesum, Tybur and Lange, 2017, 12). This evidence parallels two
branches of research in social psychology. On the one hand, relative deprivation theory
anticipates that perceptions of being disadvantaged relative to others can lead to feelings
of anger and resentment (Gurr, 2011, 1993). On the other, perceptions of personal relative
deprivation are associated with a decrease in pro-social behavior (Callan et al., 2017). Thus,
to the extent that poor women in mixed-class settings are more likely to perceive themselves
as disadvantaged relative to the wealthier women in their group or to the extent that they
perceive this inequality as unfair, they may be less likely to cooperate than they would be
in homogeneous class settings.
However, there is at least one good reason to expect that poor women may cooperate
more in mixed-class compared to same-class groups: the demonstrated link between higher
socio-economic status and trustworthiness. For example, Qi, Li and Du (2018) find that
strangers with higher monthly incomes are perceived as more trustworthy than lower-income
individuals and that this perception of trustworthiness has a causal effect on behavior in
interpersonal interactions. Given the demonstrated link between trust and cooperation in
group settings (Kocher et al., 2015), this suggests we might observe more cooperation by poor
women in groups where rich women are present. Relatedly, to the extent that poor women
in mixed-class groups perceive rich women as more trustworthy and thus ‘safe’ cooperation
partners (i.e. lower risk), then we might expect high levels of cooperation by poor women
in mixed-class groups. Given that women (more so than men) are thought to be risk averse
(Eckel and Grossman, 2008b), it could be that this increased perception of trust by lower-class
women in mixed-class groups has an influence on reducing uncertainty over the willingness
of others to contribute and thus lowering the risk involved in cooperating.
In the case of rich women, there are good reasons to anticipate less cooperation in
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mixed-class groups compared to same-class groups. First, as a consequence of the negative
association between low socio-economic status and trustworthiness, rich women could expe-
rience increased perceptions of risk involved in cooperating in mixed-class groups where poor
women are present. This is consistent with evidence that the association between high socio-
economic status and decreased pro-sociality may depend on the presence of other mediating
factors. For instance, Coˆte´, House and Willer (2015) find that wealthier individuals are only
less likely to behave pro-socially in the context of higher levels of economic inequality; they
do not demonstrate the same lack of pro-sociality in more equal contexts. This could be due
to feelings of entitlement by higher status individuals which are magnified in the presence of
lower status individuals (Coˆte´, House and Willer, 2015). In other words, the same relative
status difference that triggers less cooperation by poor women in mixed-class settings could
have a similarly negative effect on cooperation for rich women who are primed to act on
self-interest (and therefore choose not to cooperate).
On the other hand, there are also some good reasons to expect that rich women will
cooperate more in mixed-class groups than in same-class group settings. For example, Hays
and Blader (2017) find a link between the perceived legitimacy of the social hierarchy and
how individuals behave in unequal social settings. To the extent that wealthy women per-
ceive their elevated socio-economic status as illegitimate, they may be more generous and
cooperative in mixed-class settings in an effort to correct the imbalance and restore equity.
It is possible that this mediator could magnify the effect of the link between gender and
equity concerns, since other research suggests women are more sensitive than men to equity
in group interactions (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001, 306). In this case, we might observe
more cooperation by rich women in mixed-class settings than in same-class settings owing
to a stronger preference for equity in group settings.
Finally, we note that there is good reason to believe that women might behave differently
from men in cooperative settings. While empirical evidence of sex differences in cooperation
is mixed, a considerable body of work suggests that men and women respond differently to
the context in which cooperation takes place (Balliet et al., 2011). For instance, research
shows that men are more likely to take risks than women are (Eckel and Grossman, 2008b)
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and more amenable to competitive group environments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Lee,
Kesebir and Pillutla, 2016). To the extent that class cleavages within the group trigger
uncertainty surrounding expectations that others will cooperate, this could raise the risk
involved in cooperating, which could more readily be born by men than women. Similarly,
to the extent that class cleavages encourage competition in the group setting, we might
expect this to impact cooperation differently for men relative to women, who may favor
strong equity norms more so than men (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001). The composition
of the group – in terms of socio-economic class background – represents one feature of the
cooperative context which could trigger different patterns of behavior for men and women
that are linked to differences in gender-based norms of social interaction. As such, we
focus specifically on how the intersection between class and gender matters for women’s
cooperation, but also briefly investigate whether this differs observationally from what we
see in terms of cooperation between men.
3.2.3 Summarizing our contribution
On the whole, then, there are good reasons to suspect class group heterogeneity could have
no effect, a positive effect, or a negative effect on cooperation and that this effect is condi-
tional on the socioeconomic class background of the individual in question. It is important
to investigate this empirically in the context of cooperation among women because of its po-
tential to inform our understanding of women’s capacity to take collective action on the basis
of shared gender identity. Moreover, this is an interesting question because the literature
largely predicts different cooperative norms for women on the basis of their gender identity
(as women) than it does on the basis of their class identity (rich versus poor). This also
differentiates them from men in a substantively important way. By examining cooperation
among women in all lower-class, all upper-class, and mixed-class groups composed of both
upper- and lower-class women, we can empirically evaluate how the class composition of the
group setting impacts cooperative outcomes for women. This helps us understand whether
class cleavages are a potential barrier to cooperation among women for group-level gains for
women more broadly, as well as whether any observed effect is driven by changes in behavior
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for one class group more so than the other.
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
Despite these conflicting predictions, no existing study (to our knowledge) experimentally
evaluates how cooperation between women might vary as a function of class heterogeneity
in group settings. We contribute to the field by testing these social dynamics using data
collected during a public goods game exercise implemented in Lebanon in the spring of 2016.
Public goods games are commonly used to model cooperation in group settings where there
is some trade-off between behavior that would maximize the payoff for an individual and
behavior that would result in the best payoff accruing to all members of the group as a whole
(Ledyard, 1995; Balliet, Wu and Dreu, 2014). This makes it a good choice for measuring
whether shared group membership (e.g. along gender or class lines) influences willingness
to cooperate with others regardless of the individual cost of doing so. We draw on data
from Lebanon because it is an excellent case for exploring how within-gender group inequal-
ity creates challenges for collective action across class lines. In this section, we describe
the Lebanese context where we implemented our data collection, review our procedures for
recruiting participants and randomly assigning them to different group composition treat-
ments, highlight the novel aspects of our public goods game design, explain how we identified
participants by socio-economic class status, and describe the protocol for treatment exposure
and the administration of the public goods game itself.
Importantly, in the interest of full transparency, we want to be clear that this analysis
is exploratory. While our public goods game design was pre-registered as part of a larger
research project examining the impact of discussion across ethnic and class lines on a variety
of political outcomes, our analysis here – focusing on how cooperation in mixed-class versus
same-class groups varies by gender (with an emphasis on women) – was not pre-registered
as part of the larger project. However, given the novelty of our public goods game data
and the opportunity to use it to examine how intersecting gender and class identities im-
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pact cooperation in natural groups, we believe this exploratory analysis warrants special
attention despite the lack of pre-registration. As such, when we present our procedures for
recruitment, random assignment, screening, and the play of the public goods game, we want
to be very clear that the pre-registered research design was based on an analysis plan that
did not involve disaggregating our results by group gender. For this reason, we describe the
experimental design overall and indicate where our analysis deviates from the pre-registered
version and proceeds into new territory.
3.3.1 Women and class cleavages in Lebanon
Our data comes from Lebanon, a country that is deeply divided along ethnic and class lines
and where gender identity is a socially salient feature of nearly all group settings. It is also
a context in which women have struggled to build large coalitions across class lines in favor
of critical policy changes, such as the introduction of gender-based quotas for representation
in politics or the passage of a unified personal status law that would protect the rights of
women regardless of their sectarian background.4 This makes Lebanon an excellent choice
for examining the potential for cross-cutting socio-economic cleavages to impact the level of
cooperation among women, with clear implications for understanding women’s capacity for
collection action on the basis of shared gender group identity.
The history of collective organizing among women in Lebanon is replete with examples
of how socio-economic class relates to collective action in group settings. In the pre- and
early-civil war years (from 1968-1982), intense fracturing along sectarian lines within the
country at large contributed to the siloing of women’s groups within each sect (Peteet, 2001,
142). In the context of increasingly heated debates between sectarian groups over control
of the state, women’s organizations were left with few formal resources to organize or act
for women’s issues in the public sphere (Peteet, 2001, 142). In this environment, women’s
4Among other things, personal status laws regulate property ownership connected to marriage and inheritance.
Under current law, women’s access to economic, political, and society equality under the law varies depending
on which of the various religious sects they belong to, since this determines which of the many religious courts
they must enter for disputes related to marriage or family law. There is far more variation in the regulations
across religious courts for women compared to men, which makes them doubly-disadvantaged by the current
arrangement.
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informal networks became increasingly salient as a means to access the goods and services
needed for survival, elevating the importance of individual accountability to these peer social
networks and the norms associated with cooperation within them (Graham-Brown, 2001;
Joseph, 2001).5
This means that women’s organizing in Lebanon emerged within communities facing
similar economic and social issues and bound by socio-economic ties. At the same time, the
historical record suggests that this was not a norm of cooperation among women as much
as it was a norm of cooperation among women within different socio-economic class ranks.
For instance, evidence of class bias in collective organizing among women in Lebanon dates
back to at least the 1920s, when women’s organizations were viewed as elitist and lacking in
grassroots support at the lower socio-economic levels of society (Kingston, 2013, 86). Over
the last decade, backlash against some women’s organizations uses similar rhetoric, with
one blogger declaring one of the more prominent women’s movement organizations to be an
“elitist club for ladies who lunch” (Mahdawi, 2010). Recent trends in development fund-
ing and project-based aid may also contribute to the perception of a widening gap between
formal, highly professionalized women’s organizations and individuals based in particular
communities (Khattab, 2010). The formal organizational structure and capacity of larger
women’s organizations makes them more attractive to donors, which frustrates the efforts of
smaller groups to gain attention. This is important because the informal spaces of women’s
political participation are linked to both gender and class with clear implications for move-
ment organizational strategy (Joseph, 2001, 38): “middle or upper class women may be less
likely than working class women to act politically in the street, neighborhood or square.
They may, on the other hand, be more likely to act through formal organizations: politi-
cal parties, women’s associations, philanthropic organizations, religious institutions, social
agencies, and the like.” This polarization is documented elsewhere in focus groups and in-
terviews with members of these different organizational types who express frustration and
concern over cooperating with groups perceived as ‘elitist’ in the context of mobilizing and
5A similar dynamic has been located by researchers in Iran. For example, Bahramitash (2014) shows that
there is a dense network of low-income Islamic women who work together in an informal “solidarity” economy
to alleviate poverty in their communities; through collective efforts, these lower and lower-middle income
women distribute resources primarily toward their families and larger communities.
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organizing for women’s rights (UN Women, 2017). These class rifts are important because
they speak to the challenges for mobilizing women across class lines.
Moreover, recent events suggest that many women’s movement organizers are aware of the
barrier that in-group class bias presents to achieving widespread policy change. In fact, recent
developments suggest the tide may be turning under pressure from movement organizers in
favor of more inclusive and collaborative efforts across class lines. On International Women’s
Day on March 11, 2017, organizers brought together almost 2,000 activists from a wide
variety of university clubs, NGOs, feminist initiatives, and cooperatives to march and show
solidarity with one another in the fight for women’s rights in Lebanon. The march organizers
were explicit about their desire to include participants in the movement from a wide variety
of socio-economic backgrounds (Issa, 2017): “Our approach is mainly about going beyond an
elitist feminism that ignores the 99 percent of women and limits the action against patriarchy
into NGOs.” Still, some researchers argue that the women’s movement in Lebanon continues
to struggle even with the new influx of radical organizations because older organizations are
deeply entrenched and maintain affiliations with powerful sectarian groups (Salameh, 2014).
While this suggests that historic patterns of collective organizing between women in Lebanon
could change in the near future, it also underscores the existence of class bias and class-related
challenges in cooperation between women.
These social norms of cooperation among similarly situated women coincide with highly
gendered norms of social behavior in the society at large. Despite being regularly identified as
an outlier in terms of inclusion and progress in the region, Lebanon lags behind its neighbors
considerably on measures of gender parity. The Global Gender Gap Report (2017) ranked
Lebanon 13th out of 17 countries in the Middle East and North Africa – ahead of only
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Yemen – in its ‘Global Gender Gap Index,’ which aggregates
scores from four sub-indexes that compare men and women within the same country on a
range of indicators.6 In particular, Lebanon continues to face challenges in making progress
on women’s political empowerment, with just 3 percent of the seats in Parliament and 4
6The four sub-indexes are: ‘Economic Participation and Opportunity,’ ‘Educational Attainment,’ ‘Health and
Survival,’ and ‘Political Empowerment.’ For more information, see World Economic Forum (2017). In terms
of the overall gender gap across these four spheres, Lebanon ranked 137th out of the 144 countries measured
in the index.
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percent of the ministerial positions held by women (World Economic Forum, 2017, 208).
This could be considered surprising given that women in Lebanon have had the right to vote
since 1953 and the women’s movement has been active since the early 20th century. Yet,
while Lebanon’s consociational democracy dictates that power be shared roughly equally
across political parties representing the three major religious sects in the country, there are
no special requirements that women be included as representatives in political processes.7
These political inequalities are linked to differences in social norms; there is little doubt
that Lebanon is a highly unequal society in which men and women are confronted with
very different expectations of behavior. Men face social pressures to marry and support
their family financially, while women (particularly married ones) face social pressure to take
on the majority of the domestic labor and raise children (Hammoud, 2014). Within this
context, women – as a whole – face considerable challenges to participating in political
and economic decision-making. For example, gendered social norms regarding property
ownership and control over household finances means it is less likely that women (compared
to men) own assets that are registered in their name (Akeel, 2009). Without personal assets,
it is harder for women to borrow money within the Lebanese banking system (Akeel, 2009),
which could limit their economic opportunities and financial independence regardless of class
group membership.
On the whole, this makes Lebanon an ideal case for examining the cross-cutting influence
of class identity on cooperation between women. Women, regardless of class background,
have strong incentives to organize for changes that would benefit women as a group. Yet,
there is considerable evidence suggesting that class-based cleavages may be impeding coop-
eration among women on key issues. The presence of gendered social norms of behavior, a
history of class bias in cooperation, rising economic inequality, and persistent challenges to
building widespread support for policy change on the basis of women’s shared gender iden-
tity mean that our public goods game data presents us with an important opportunity to
7Lebanon has 18 officially recognized sects, including 12 Christian sects, four Muslim sects, Druze and Jewish
populations. The most recent demographic study conducted in 2011 by Statistics Lebanon, a Beirut-based
research firm, indicated that 27 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, 27 percent Shi’a Muslim, 21
percent Maronite Christian, 8 percent Greek Orthodox, 5 percent Druze, and 4 percent Greek Catholic, with
the remaining 7 percent belonging to smaller Christian denominations, see http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/lebanon/religious-sects.htm.
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empirically evaluate whether class cleavages do impact cooperation among women in group
settings.
3.3.2 Recruitment and random assignment to treatment group types
To examine how cooperation among women varies in different class contexts, we draw on data
that we collected during 120 group interactions among strangers organized in Beirut between
February and April 2016. These 120 groups consisted of participants who were recruited by a
professional Lebanese firm and randomly assigned by us to participate in either homogeneous
or heterogeneous small group discussions. In accordance with our pre-registered design,
these 120 groups were all single-gender and consisted of 48 all-women groups and 72 all-male
groups. Prior to the start of these discussions, participants completed a screening survey
(to facilitate recruitment and proper identification of socio-economic class background), a
pre-treatment survey, and one round of a public goods game designed to measure willingness
to cooperate with each other knowing only the class and gender composition of the group.8
We take advantage of the data collected during this public goods game exercise to explore
cooperation among women across class lines.
We worked with a professional Lebanese firm to develop a protocol for recruiting subjects
into our experiment who varied in terms of their gender, socio-economic class background,
neighborhood, and sectarian group (i.e. ethnic background). Individuals with upper and
lower socio-economic class profiles were recruited from the Beirut and Mount Lebanon areas
and randomly assigned to participate in either homogeneous groups (all six participants
shared the same class background) or heterogeneous groups (three were upper-class and
three were lower-class). Overall, our randomization resulted in 60 homogeneous and 60
heterogeneous class groups involving a total of 720 participants, of which 713 completed the
study. This included 285 women and 428 men.
The 120 groups were organized in five blocks of 24 group sessions, with 12 homogeneous
8Participants were also aware of the sectarian composition of the group. We explored this cleavage in the
first essay of the dissertation, but also take steps in this essay to show that it is the class cleavage – not the
ethnic cleavage – that most influences cooperation among women in Lebanon.
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and 12 heterogeneous class groups per block. Participants were recruited by a professional
firm for one discussion block at a time with recruiters using screening surveys to identify
eligible participants (discussed in detail below). Once eligibility and willingness to participate
were confirmed, each recruit was randomly assigned to a discussion group type, further
blocking on sect and class. One set of discussions was completed every 2-3 weeks between
February and April 2016. We completed two sets (48 groups) with women and three sets
(72 groups) with men. This allows us to look specifically at how cooperation varies among
women in group settings. In Section 3.4.4, we also present the results for all-male groups
for comparison. The sets were implemented in alternating fashion between all-men and all-
women groups to help minimize the possibility that any observational differences between
men and women in the results could be driven by the intervention of a particular event in
time as opposed to gender-based differences in behavior. Additional details on our design
and randomization are provided in Appendix D.
3.3.3 Potential selection issues and randomization checks
To meet the target of 720 participants in 120 groups, we recruited a total of 1200 individuals
(720 participants and 480 back-ups). To obtain the goal of 1200 individuals, we recruited
40 individuals for each set of the five blocks. We block randomized individuals by profile
type and discussion block with the goal of obtaining 24 participants and 16 extras for each
discussion block.9 For each group session, we over-recruited by 50 percent for each profile
to make sure that we would have the correct group composition for the scheduled session.
Upon arrival at their scheduled discussion session, participants were checked in by staff and
informed consent was administered. Participants were not designated as ‘main’ or ‘backup’ in
advance. If extra participants arrived, those that were asked to stay were randomly selected.
This was essential to ensure that those who participated in each discussion were a random
sample of those who were assigned to that treatment condition. We asked our implementing
partner to schedule the discussions such that every person in the pool would show up at
9Additional information on the six profile types needed for each set of discussion groups is provided in
Appendix D, along with a more detailed description of the potential for selection into participation to bias
our estimates of cooperation.
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one discussion in accordance with their treatment assignment, ensuring that we always had
more individuals than necessary of each profile type at each session. The implementing
partner was then supposed to randomly select (for each profile type) who would actually
stay to participate and who would be asked to go home (after receiving compensation) or be
invited to a different session. In actuality, however, the partner typically ended up getting
only the target number of participants to show up for each discussion, which introduced the
possibility that there was some differential selection into who ended up participating in the
public goods game.
The main concern here is that selection into participation could have introduced imbal-
ances in pre-treatment characteristics for individuals in treatment (mixed-class) and control
(same-class) groups. To help address this potential issue, we draw on data collected from a
pre-treatment survey that participants filled out after arriving to the study site and before
learning the composition of their group and playing the public goods game. Alongside the
data from the screening survey, this pre-survey allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of our
randomization protocol, as well as test for significant differences in our sample on key co-
variates, such as gender and class. Table 24 (in Appendix E) shows that random assignment
to mixed-class and same-class treatment groups was effective, as nearly all of the potential
confounding characteristics of individuals are distributed evenly across treatment conditions
within the full sample (713 observations) as well as within the women’s subsample (285
observations, see Table 22) and within the men’s subsample (428 observations, see Table
23). This increases our confidence that any cause for concern is negligible. We nevertheless
include control variables in our main analysis to correct for any imbalances in observable
pre-treatment covariates.10
Relatedly, since participant gender is obviously not randomly assigned, our estimation
strategy relies on using controls for any potential confounding variables to prevent omitted
variable bias from affecting our inferences. We discuss this more in describing our estimation
strategy in Section 3.4.2 below. Summary statistics for both the men and the women in
10Summary statistics for all women in our sample, as well as disaggregated by socio-economic class background,
are available in Appendix G.2 alongside an extended discussion of the importance of class-based differences
among women.
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our sample are available in Appendix G.3, along with an extended discussion of observable
gender-based differences in background characteristics.
3.3.4 A novel approach: identifying participants by economic class
While we are confident that our protocol for random assignment was effective, making valid
inferences based on our results depends on our ability to accurately categorize participants as
either upper-class or lower-class for the purpose of random assignment to group types. This
is also one of the most novel features of our study, since all subjects recruited to participate
in our experiment were first approached by a professional recruiter who interviewed them
using a specially designed screening survey meant to elicit both objective and subjective
measures of socio-economic class status.11
3.3.4.1 The importance of incorporating natural identities Our original contri-
bution is to explicitly consider the interaction of socio-economic class identity and gender on
cooperation among women using natural identities and random assignment to groups that
vary in terms of their socio-economic class composition (either all same-class or mixed-class).
Other public goods game experiments present results that are suggestive of heterogeneous
effects of identity on cooperation (Eckel and Grossman, 2008a,b; Croson, Marks and Snyder,
2008; Charness, Cobo-Reyes and Jimenez, 2014; Chowdhury, Jeon and Ramalingam, 2016).
However, most analyses of the impact of economic class on cooperation rely on experiments
that attempt to mimic economic class cleavages by introducing artificial wealth inequality
into the group setting. For instance, it is not uncommon to test the effect of inequality in
groups on cooperation by providing participants in public goods experiments with varying
initial endowments (see, for example, Buckley and Croson (2006); Chan et al. (1996)). Those
select few studies that do try to engage with participants’ actual economic class member-
ship tend to rely on measures of wealth that use the income level of the neighborhood (or
university) where participants are sampled from as a proxy for socio-economic status and its
11Incorporating both types of measures is thought to be essential for capturing various dimensions of class
identity and its potential influence on individual behavior (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg and McKee, 2017).
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effect on cooperation in public goods experiments (Candelo, Croson and Li, 2017; Martins-
son, Villegas-Palacio and Wollbrant, 2015), or proxy for class status using measures of an
individual’s occupation or level of educational attainment (Ga¨chter, Herrmann and Tho¨ni,
2004).
In our case, the incorporation of natural identities is not only novel, but also potentially
essential for detecting results. For example, Goette, Huffman and Meier (2012) show that
(relative to minimal group designs) those involving real social groups demonstrate larger
in-group effects on cooperation and beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. This means
that observing any impact of class identity on cooperation may depend on incorporating real
class identity into the experiment and not only simulating it. More importantly, additional
evidence suggests that women (compared to men) are especially sensitive to the use of
real identities in experimental settings involving social dilemmas (Chowdhury, Jeon and
Ramalingam, 2016). This means that detecting any effect of class identity on cooperation
among women could hinge on the use of natural identities. Consequently, our design uniquely
positions us to investigate the effect of the interaction of real socio-economic and gender
identities on group-level outcomes with serious implications for understanding the limits
and possibilities of women’s collective action in the real world.
3.3.4.2 Eliciting class group membership using the screening survey The pri-
mary purpose of the screening survey was to identify potential participants by their socio-
economic class status, in addition to collecting minimal demographic information. The
screening survey included a set of eight questions designed to categorize potential partici-
pants’ class background using multiple measures of economic aﬄuence.12 We assigned each
of the answer options for these questions a value indicative of low (1), middle (2), or high
(3) economic status. For each potential participant, the answers to these economic status
questions were converted to one of these three values. All values for these questions were
then totaled to yield an economic status index that we used to approximate the economic
status of each potential participant. The minimum possible score was 8 (1 point on each
12See Appendix F for the full text of the Screening Survey administered to recruits.
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question), while the maximum possible score was 24 (3 points on each question). Recruits
scoring between 8 and 13 were labeled ‘lower income,’ while those scoring between 19 and
24 were labeled ‘upper income.’ We discarded those recruits who scored between 14 and 18
as ineligible for the study because we wanted to maximize (to the greatest extent possible)
the class cleavages between lower-income and upper-income participants. We anticipated
that class differences between participants in mixed-class groups would be more evident if
we removed those who qualified as ‘middle class’ according to our screening survey index.
In the event that responses were missing to 1 or 2 of the questions included in the index,
we applied an alternative scoring system, outlined in Appendix F. In the event that more
than two questions in the screening survey were unanswered, we disqualified the recruit from
participation in the study.







Test of the Difference
b p-value
Value of total household assets (1-3) 1.65 1.02 2.27 1.24 0.000
Estimated area (size) of household (1-3) 1.72 1.12 2.32 1.20 0.000
Owns a summer house (1-3) 2.04 1.12 2.96 1.84 0.000
Power alternatives during an outage (1-5) 2.55 1.85 3.25 1.41 0.000
Can afford to vacation at least once per year (1-3) 1.87 1.15 2.59 1.45 0.000
Frequency of dining out per month (1-3) 2.11 1.57 2.65 1.09 0.000
Monthly household net income (1-10) 6.73 5.57 7.90 2.33 0.000
Subjective monthly household income (1-5) 3.29 2.11 4.47 2.36 0.000
N 713 356 357
All estimates incorporate weights that correct for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across strata and use
robust standard errors.
A test of the internal validity of our class index measure for categorizing respondents
demonstrates that our eight measures of socio-economic class status reveal highly significant
statistical differences between rich and poor participants in our sample overall (see Table
4).13 We also checked the correlation of our ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ categorization to two other mea-
13See Table 28 in Appendix G.3 for confirmation that this is also true for the subsample of women’s groups
as well as the full sample overall.
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sures of economic class status using data we collected with our on-site pre-treatment survey
instrument. Our categorization of participants by class group membership (where poor =
1) is highly correlated with self-reported economic class membership (correlation coefficient
= 0.631), as elicited in the following self-administered pre-treatment survey question: “Q9:
Which of the following do you think best describes the economic class to which you or your
household belongs? (1) Elite (very wealthy), (2) Upper class (rich), (3) Middle class (neither
rich nor poor), (4) Lower class (poor), or (5) Destitute (extremely poor)?” We also repeated
the screening question that asked about total net monthly household income in the on-site
pre-treatment survey and found that responses to this question were also highly correlated
with economic class status (where rich = 1) as measured by the index of screening survey
questions (correlation coefficient = 0.700). On the whole, these robustness checks lend strong
support to our categorization method and increase our confidence that class group cleavages
were evident in these interactions.
3.3.5 The protocol for treatment exposure
Upon arrival at the study site, participants were asked to provide informed consent and fill
out the self-administered pre-survey questionnaire. After filling out the survey, participants
were invited to sit together at a table where everyone could see one another, as well as the
trained session Moderator.14 Most importantly, to ensure that participants were aware of
their group composition before playing the public goods game, the Moderator provided this
information during her introductory remarks using the following script:
14All 120 sessions were led by one of two (women) moderators, who themselves belonged to different sectarian
groups (our main analysis includes moderator fixed effects, as described in Section 3.4.2). The moderators
took care not to reveal their sectarian affiliations, their names are common to all sectarian groups in Lebanon,
and they displayed no outward signs of religiosity in their language or dress.
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We are meeting today to discuss the recent developments in the country, mainly the
protests that recently began in Lebanon. Many persons consider that these protests
may present an important moment to reflect about the future of this country regard-
less of their outcome.
We have invited you here today to engage in a discussion with members from
[SAME/ DIFFERENT] sectarian groups and [SAME/DIFFERENT] economic
classes so that you can share with each other your thoughts and feelings about your
economic and political hopes and concerns. Some of what we discuss today could
be sensitive and at times people might disagree—that is ok. We just ask that you
engage with one another with honesty and respect so that we can all learn more
about how people who we do not know personally are thinking and feeling on the
issues that we all face.
Participants were then asked to introduce themselves and offer basic personal information
(e.g. on their jobs or neighborhoods) that would confirm their profiles to all other members
of the group.15 We took precautions to ensure that the public goods game was administered
by a separate member of the moderation team who was trained to lead the exercise. This
was to offset the potential for social desirability bias to affect the contribution decision
since participants knew the main moderator would be leading them through an hour-long
discussion after the first round of the public goods game was completed.
3.3.6 The public goods game
3.3.6.1 Overview of the design Our public goods game includes features common to
one-shot, voluntary contribution mechanism designs. We focus on one round of play that
occurred immediately after the introduction script was read and participants introduced each
15Participants were then led in a moderated, structured discussion. The structure was the same for all groups.
In other work, we analyze the impact of group composition on the outcomes of political discussion. Here,
we focus only on the impact of group composition on cooperation prior to discussion.
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other, thereby confirming the gender and socio-economic class composition of the group.16
The game was supervised by a trained assistant who completed two example exercises and
two practice activities with the participants to ensure comprehension of the payoffs.17 All
participants were informed that there could be no talking during the exercise and that
contribution decisions would be kept anonymous. Our focus is on evaluating whether there
is a clear preference for cooperation in same-class group settings as opposed to mixed-class
group settings. We interpret the difference in average contributions to the Group Pot in
mixed-class groups compared to same-class groups as evidence of class bias in cooperation.
We view contribution behavior in the public goods game as a strong measure of will-
ingness to cooperate conditional on group composition for several reasons. First, there is
general consensus in behavioral economics that one-shot public goods games are useful for
identifying substantively meaningful patterns of cooperation (Ledyard, 1995; Fischbacher,
Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2001; Chaudhuri, 2016). Second, the small group design of the public
goods game lends itself well to manipulating aspects of shared group membership, a promi-
nent feature of the social setting shown to have a positive impact on cooperation (Chen and
Li, 2009; Benjamin, Choi and Strickland, 2010). Finally, voluntary contribution designs like
ours are indicative of behavior in real-world settings involving choices about whether to take
collective political action (Nosenzo and Tufano, 2017): “Voluntary associations, collectives,
community groups, and collaborative institutions are typical real-world examples of organi-
zations facing collective action problems where agents have the freedom to join in, or opt out
from, participating in the common endeavors.” Altogether, this increases our confidence in
being able to draw meaningful inferences from our results that have substantive real-world
applications to women’s capacity for collective organizing.
3.3.6.2 Payoff structure of the game Participants played with 10,000 Lebanese pounds
(LL) that they earned for completing a pre-survey upon arrival at the site. Participants were
16This round of play took place at the start of the pre-registered discussion experiment and was designed as
a pre-discussion measure of willingness to cooperate. There was a second round of play after the discussion
took place, but we do not focus on that here.
17In Appendix H, we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of a payoff comprehension measure
constructed from data collected using these practice activity instruments.
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allowed to contribute any amount in 1,000 LL increments to the group pot. To indicate their
choice, participants circled a contribution amount on a slip of paper,18 inserted the paper
into an envelope labeled with their participant identification number, and then passed the
envelope back to the assistant moderator. Payoffs were determined as follows: the total
amount contributed to the group pot was multiplied by 1.5 and divided evenly among all six
participants, regardless of whether they contributed or not. Thus, the payoff function for
each subject i was:




where ci is the contribution to the public good (group pot) of subject i, in any group whose
6 members are indexed by j. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the public good
was 0.25. Participants were not informed of the final results of the game until just prior
to exiting the facility, after completing a post-survey questionnaire and signing receipts for
payment.
A total of 713 subjects participated in the experiment.19 The average amount earned in
the public goods game was $7.85 USD.20 The maximum amount earned in the public goods
game was $14.00 USD while the minimum amount earned in the public goods game was
$2.50 USD.21 For women specifically, the average total payoff from the public goods game
was $7.78 USD, with a minimum earned of $2.67 USD and a maximum of $12.17 USD.22
18All participants had the option to contribute from 0 to 10,000 LL in increments of 1,000.
19The average group size of six participants in our study is in line with standard public goods game designs
where groups typically include 3-6 participants (Kurzban, Burton-Chellew and West, 2015, 585).
20For reference, the hourly minimum wage in Lebanon is about $3.78 USD.
21In Lebanese currency: the average amount earned in the public goods game was 11,769 LL, with a minimum
of 3,750 LL and a maximum of 21,000 LL earned for the full sample of participants. The amount earned
in the game was combined with a $20 USD show-up fee for participation in all activities involved in the
experiment, including the discussion portion not analyzed here, to yield each individual’s total compensation
for participation in the approximately 90-minute study.
22For men, the average total payoff from the game was about $7.89 USD, with a minimum of $2.50 USD and
a maximum of $14.00 USD.
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3.4 MAIN ANALYSIS
3.4.1 The distribution of contributions across groups
Before subjecting our data to statistical analysis of the mixed-class group treatment for
women, we present some of the descriptive statistics for our main dependent variable: con-
tributions to the public good in mixed-class versus same-class groups. Figure 2 presents
the distribution of contributions to the Group Pot by treatment group (same-class versus
mixed-class) and by socio-economic class background (poor versus rich) for women’s groups
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Figure 2: Distribution of contributions to the group pot by class group treatment and socio-
economic background, women’s groups only.
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This initial look at the data suggests that the pattern of contributions to the public
good by women varies across same-class and mixed-class group settings and depends on the
individual’s socio-economic class. Among rich women, we observe a much higher average
contribution in same-class groups compared to mixed-class groups: 4,476 LL in same-class
groups compared to just 2,442 LL in mixed-class groups. We observe a similar preference
for same-class cooperation among poor women: the average contribution by poor women
is higher in same-class (3,830 LL) compared to mixed-class (3,110 LL) group settings. In
both instances, the evidence strongly suggests that there is a negative effect of the mixed-
class group setting on cooperation among women on average, pointing to the possibility that
cross-cutting class cleavages do inhibit cooperation between women.
Additionally, of the four subgroups presented in Figure 2, rich women in same-class
groups have the highest mean contribution level, while rich women in mixed-class groups
have the lowest mean contribution level. In contrast, poor women are less cooperative in
same-class groups than rich women (mean contribution of 3,830 LL compared to 4,476 LL),
while they are more cooperative in mixed-class groups than rich women (mean contribution of
3,110 LL compared to 2,442 LL). These patterns suggest that the magnitude of the negative
effect of class heterogeneity could be greater for rich women than for poor women.23
3.4.2 Estimation Strategy
The descriptive evidence suggests that women are not unconditionally cooperative with one
another and that socio-economic class cleavages do impact the level of cooperation among
women. To confirm this relationship, we also examine our data using statistical models to see
how well these results perform when we account for other factors that could have influenced
the results. To estimate the effect on cooperation of mixed (versus homogeneous) class group
23Taking advantage of our experimental design, we also investigate whether this pattern holds depending
on whether women are making decisions in same-sect or mixed-sect groups. The results are presented in
Appendix I. We find that the decrease in average contributions in mixed-class compared to same-class groups
holds regardless of the sectarian composition of the groups. This suggests that class cleavages matter for
cooperation among women even more so than sectarian/ethnic cleavages.
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composition, we employ a weighted least squares regression of the following form:
Yij = α + βTi +X
′
iγ + i (3.2)
where Yij is the outcome (i.e. contribution to the Group Pot) for individual i in group
session j. Ti is the treatment indicator for whether an individual is in a mixed-class group.
The key coefficient of interest is β, which gives the effect of being in a mixed-class versus
same-class group on the level of cooperation (i.e. average contribution to the Group Pot).
X ′iγ is a vector of individual-level controls included to improve efficiency and control for any
imbalance, and i is the individual level error term.
24 All analysis is performed using weights
to account for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across blocks (Gerber and Green,
2012); see Appendix D.4 for more on how the weights were constructed.
We run the analysis for the subsample of 285 women participants in women-only groups
to arrive at the average treatment effect (ATE) of the mixed-class group for women overall.
Then, to evaluate the impact of the treatment separately for rich and for poor women, we
employ the same model specification but limit our analysis to the ATE of the mixed-class
treatment for poor women only (n = 142) and the ATE of the mixed-class treatment for rich
women only (n = 143). In a later section, we perform the same analysis on our data from
men’s groups (n = 428) for comparison.
We present the average treatment effect (Model 1) without controls as well as the main
estimation (Model 2) which includes a battery of pre-treatment covariates plus an additional
indicator for the number of participants in the session25 and a dummy variable indicating
which of the two possible moderators led the discussion portion of the session (moderator
fixed effects). Our data preparation closely followed our pre-analysis plan for the larger
pre-registered design. We implemented 10 rounds of predictive mean-matching imputation
to address a small amount of item-level missingness in pre-treatment covariates. Where
measures capture one latent trait of interest, we aggregate them into indices using inverse
covariance weighting, which creates an optimal weighted average by weighting-up index
24We do not cluster standard errors because treatment was assigned at the individual level (Abadie et al.,
2017).
25Out of 120 groups, seven completed the experiment with only five participants instead of the required six.
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components that provide more ‘new’ information (Anderson, 2008). All indices, unless noted,
were pre-registered. Summary statistics for all variables are in Appendix G. All models
incorporate robust standard errors. In Appendix H, we show that our main results are
robust to a number of different estimation strategies, including specifications that use strata
fixed effects26 and that control for comprehension of the payoff structure in the public goods
game and whether any of the participants claimed to know one another prior to meeting at
the study site.
3.4.3 Regression results
The initial patterns we observed in the descriptive data for our dependent variable are
reflected in the statistical analysis of the average treatment effect of the mixed-class group
setting presented in Table 5. For the full sample of women in our study (presented in Row 1
of the table), we observe a statistically significant (p < 0.01) negative effect on contributions
to the Group Pot in mixed-class compared to same-class groups. On average, across all
women in our study, individuals contributed about 1,300 LL less in mixed-class compared
to same-class groups. This result holds even after controlling for an array of covariates
and moderator fixed effects (see Model 2). This means that women, on average, are about
30% less cooperative in the context of cross-cutting socio-economic cleavages than when
cooperating with women from a similar socio-economic background.
Turning to the results for the subgroups of poor and rich women, the results confirm
that the negative effect of the mixed-class treatment holds for both rich and poor women
in our sample. However, there are some notable differences. First, the negative effect of
the mixed-class treatment for poor women is only statistically significant at the 0.10 level in
Model 2, where we control for potential confounding variables and moderator fixed effects.
In Model 1 (without controls), the coefficient of the mixed-class treatment for poor women is
not significant at conventional levels, though the magnitude of the effect is notable and the
direction of the effect aligns with the descriptive evidence presented earlier. Poor women,
26For each of the five recruitment cycles, we block randomly assigned participants to treatment groups within
strata defined by gender, sect, economic class, and neighborhood, additionally blocking on recruiter where
possible.
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on average, contribute about 1,000 LL less to the Group Pot in mixed-class compared to
same-class groups (as per Model 2).
Table 5: Women’s contributions in mixed-class groups overall and by class.
Same Class
Mean
Model 1 Model 2 N
Women overall








Mixed class 4476 -2034*** -1793*** 143
(540) (615)
0.000 0.004
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models incorporate weights that correct
for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across strata. Model 1 has no controls; Model 2 includes controls and
moderator fixed effects.
In contrast to the ATE for poor women, we observe a highly significant (p < 0.01)
and large negative effect of the mixed-class treatment on cooperation by rich women. In
fact, looking at Row 3 in the table, we see that rich women contribute about 2,000 LL less
to the Group Pot in mixed-class compared to same-class groups. This translates into rich
women cooperating nearly 50% less in group settings that include poor women than in group
settings that only involve cooperation with other rich women. Compared to the ATE for
poor women, these results suggest a stronger negative effect of class cleavages on cooperation
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by rich women than on cooperation by poor women.
On the whole, these results are striking in how strongly they refute the contention that
women tend to abide by gendered social role norms of cooperation with one another. Our
findings clearly indicate that women are not unconditional cooperators and that class cleav-
ages do impede cooperation between women. These results generally hold for both rich
and poor women, though the negative effect of the mixed-class environment is stronger, on
average, for rich women.
3.4.4 Checking for gender differences in response to class cleavages
However, before we interpret the above results in light of the existing literature, it is worth
taking a moment to verify that this is indeed a finding that is rooted in gendered norms
of cooperation in group settings. One way to do this is to examine whether the pattern of
contributions to the Group Pot in all-male groups differs from what we observed for women.
For our results to be attributable – at least in part – to gendered social norms, it should be
the case that we observe a different pattern of behavior for men. In this section, we take
advantage of the all-male groups embedded in our experimental design to demonstrate that
this finding is particular to the women in our study.
Using the same method of statistical analysis as we did for the women’s groups presented
above, we produced the average treatment effect of the mixed-class group setting for men
overall and disaggregated by socio-economic background (poor men and rich men only).
One concern could be that our design does not allow for direct comparisons between men
and women given that the group sessions were conducted during different periods of time
and at different times of day.27 However, many of the differences that may exist between
27All-male groups were implemented from January 19th to February 3rd (15 days), from March 2nd to March
22nd (21 days), and from April 6th to April 21st (16 days). Meanwhile, all-female groups were implemented
from February 4th to February 26th (23 days) and from March 23rd to April 5th (14 days). The sessions took
place at different times of day with a clear correlation between group gender and start time of the session:
58 percent of women’s groups met before noon, while just 12 percent of men’s groups did. This could have
affected the type of men and women recruited to participate, as shown in the fact that 56 percent of female
participants self-identified as “homemakers” while only 2 men (less than 1 percent of the male subsample)
did so.
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the men and women in our sample as a consequence of the precise timing of the session
during the day would be factors that we would expect to covary with gender in a society as
unequal as Lebanon (e.g. employment status).28 We are most concerned about controlling
for factors that do not covary with gender, which we address by again including the full slate
of pre-treatment covariates (those used in Model 2 for women) in our analysis of the ATE for
men. This allows us to observationally compare men and women in our sample and locate
meaningful differences in their patterns of behavior. To the extent that implementing the
men’s groups and women’s groups in different sets over time may influence our outcome of
interest, we believe this concern is minimized by our having alternated between all-men and
all-women sets in implementing our data collection.
Table 6 presents the results for the subsample of men’s groups, as well as the ATE of
the mixed-class treatment for the subgroups of poor men and rich men, respectively. The
evidence shows that the mixed-class group treatment had the opposite effect on men overall
than it did on women. Instead of a negative effect on cooperation, the men in our sample
cooperated at significantly higher levels in mixed-class groups than they did in same-class
groups. Overall, men in mixed-class groups contribute about 900 LL more in mixed-class
settings than they do in same-class settings (p < 0.01). Moreover, this positive effect of the
mixed-class group setting on cooperation among men generally holds for both poor and rich
participants in our sample. There is also no evidence that the magnitude of the positive
effect of the mixed-class group differs for rich men compared to poor men: both subsamples
cooperate at similar levels, on average, in same-class groups (2,856 LL for poor men compared
to 3,359 LL for rich men) and in mixed-class groups (both rich and poor men contribute
about 4,000 LL in mixed-class group settings).
This suggests that men are actually more cooperative in mixed-class group settings than
they are in same-class group settings, which is precisely the opposite effect of what we
observe for women. Additionally, there is comparatively less evidence that this effect varies
by socio-economic class for men compared to what we observe for women, where cooperation
levels seem to vary by rich versus poor status. Most importantly, this evidence confirms that
28These differences are noted in the summary statistics presented in Table 28 in Appendix G.3.
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Table 6: Men’s contributions in mixed-class groups overall and by class.
Same Class
Mean
Model 1 Model 2 N
Men overall








Mixed class 3359 922* 818 214
(486) (529)
0.059 0.124
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models incorporate weights that correct
for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across strata. Model 1 has no controls; Model 2 includes controls
and moderator fixed effects.
there is something specific to gender that is interacting with socio-economic class cleavages
in the context of group-based cooperation, since we do not observe the same effect of the
mixed-class treatment for both men and women in our sample. This lends credibility to
our decision to focus on cooperation and collective action potential across class lines among
women in particular.
87
3.5 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
Overall, we clearly do not observe the unconditional cooperation of women in single-gender
group settings anticipated by several recent studies. To be consistent with recent evidence on
cooperation between women in public goods settings (e.g. Fearon and Humphreys (2017)),
we would have to observe no difference in the level of cooperation in mixed-class compared to
same-class treatment groups. Instead, our results suggest that the presence of class cleavages
in all-women group settings leads women to cooperate at significantly lower levels than they
would in settings where all women share a similar class background. This could suggest that
women are prone to same-class bias in cooperation, preferring to cooperate with women from
similar socio-economic class backgrounds than with women from different class backgrounds.
Notably, the same-class bias we observe for women is present for both rich and poor women,
suggesting that class bias influences cooperation among women regardless of socio-economic
background. This result is especially pronounced for upper-class women, though we observe
a similar direction in the effect for lower-class women as well.
There are at least two ways to interpret this result. One way is to interpret this as
evidence of same-class bias in cooperation between women. In this view, women are more
motivated to cooperate in same-class settings than in mixed-class settings due to a desire
to reward in-group members and punish out-group members. This would be consistent with
the view that women (more so than men) care about egalitarian norms and seek to correct
perceived imbalance in group settings (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001). The presence of
high degrees of wealth inequality may trigger a negative reaction among women if within-
gender group norms favor reciprocity and egalitarian principles. In this context, increasing
the salience of class heterogeneity could lead some group members to ‘punish’ others by
withholding cooperation due to a perceived failure to abide by in-group norms. This would
be plausible in a country like Lebanon, where there is a long history of animosity between
upper class and lower class women in the context of collective action for group gains.
However, given that we see both rich and poor women cooperate less in mixed-class
compared to same-class settings, it is not obvious that a concern for equity is driving this
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result. If it were about equity and fairness norms, then we might expect poor women to
cooperate less in mixed-group settings, but rich women to cooperate more, thus correcting
the imbalance. In actuality, we observe the strongest negative effect of class cleavages on
cooperation among rich women. This makes it seem less plausible that women are primarily
and unconditionally motivated by gendered social role norms of equity, pro-sociality, and
other-regardingness.
A second way to interpret these results is that class cleavages among women are not
triggering same-class bias as much as they are cuing women to act on norms of same-class
solidarity. Existing evidence supports this interpretation, as Carpenter, Daniere and Taka-
hashi (2004) show that lower-class women may be more cooperative with one another owing
to strong norms of cooperation that support collective efforts to secure access to public
goods and resources. This could suggest that the potential for collective action capacity
among women is high within class groups because women have experience with the benefits
of abiding by pro-social norms and sacrificing individual pay-offs for group level gains only
when working with similarly situated others. Less cooperation in mixed-class groups, in
this interpretation, could merely be a function of increased uncertainty about the norms of
cooperation (and at what level one should cooperate) in the context of class heterogeneity.
In other words, women want to cooperate with one another, but they are more unsure of the
risk involved in mixed-class settings than in same-class settings.
In this view, women are conditional cooperators and shared class group membership
provides valuable information to women regarding the likelihood that other women in the
group will also cooperate. A vast empirical literature in economics supports the notion that
individuals conditionally cooperate in small-group settings (Fischbacher, Ga¨chter and Fehr,
2001; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010; Croson, 2007; Kocher et al., 2008; Chaudhuri, 2011;
Chaudhuri, Paichayontvijit and Smith, 2017). Conditional cooperators can be altruists (they
contribute less as beliefs about others’ giving become more optimistic) or reciprocators (they
contribute more as beliefs about others’ giving become more optimistic) (Croson, 2007, 2008).
More optimistic expectations are typically associated with settings where uncertainty about
others’ willingness to contribute is reduced. Shared group membership, in particular, is a
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prominent feature of the social setting shown to have a positive impact on cooperation (Chen
and Li, 2009; Benjamin, Choi and Strickland, 2010). Priming shared group membership is
thought to encourage cooperation by cuing individuals to the existence of a set of shared
norms that correspond to shared group membership. In fact, Yamagishi and Mifune (2009)
argue that this cuing to the contribution behavior of others – more so than attachment to
the shared identity itself – is what drives cooperative behavior. In other words, in-group
members expect one another to cooperate more than they expect out-group members to
cooperate, so cooperation levels tend to be higher when individuals confront social dilemmas
in homogeneous group settings. The negative effect of the mixed-class group setting on
contributions to the public good by women could thus be indicative of less certainty about
the willingness of other women to contribute in mixed-class compared to same-class settings
rather than a desire to harm or punish women from a different class background. This
suggests that one way to increase the capacity for women to mobilize across class lines is
to reduce the uncertainty present in the decision to cooperate. Policy interventions could
target the building of bridges across class lines, focusing on the shared goals of women who
come from different class backgrounds.
Yet, while the evidence suggests that reducing uncertainty about willingness to cooperate
across class lines may be a way forward, it also points to a potential explanation for why we
observe ‘elitism’ in the behavior of upper-class women and how this contributes to barriers
in women’s organizing across class lines. In Lebanon and elsewhere, upper-class women, and
particularly women in politics, are often accused of being elitist and self-serving rather than
acting as representatives of women more broadly (Tamale, 1999). In fact, evidence from the
American politics literature demonstrates that women representatives who enjoy the benefits
of their status as ‘tokens’ in a male-dominated political arena are less likely to help other
women gain a seat at the table, potentially for fear that doing so would dilute their own
influence (Kanthak and Krause, 2010, 2011). Applying this to our analysis of cooperation
among women in Lebanon, we could infer that heightened economic inequality in mixed-class
groups raises the potential threat of a relative loss of status for rich women. This could be
due to the fear of loss of access to benefits or a consequence of the psychological benefits
associated with belonging to a more exclusive subgroup within society (Brewer, 1991). This
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could explain why the negative effect of the mixed-class group treatment on the average level
of cooperation by women is so much greater for rich women than it is for poor women. It is
plausible that the relatively high level of cooperation between rich women is motivated by a
desire to protect their privileged status, a form of class-based solidarity in the face of threat.
At the same time, it makes sense that we do not observe a similarly negative effect on
cooperation for rich men in mixed-class settings since their gender group membership is not
associated with the same degree of perceived social, political, and economic exclusion as
women. Rich men do not stand to risk losing their status in the same way that rich women
do. Rather, men’s behavior in mixed-class group settings reflects more of what we might
expect given the nature of the social hierarchy in Lebanon. For instance, Wilkinson and
Pickett (2017) argue that in societies characterized by strict dominance hierarchies, there
are incentives for individuals to try to move up the social ladder by gaining favor with higher
ranked social superiors, usually those with access to a larger share of material resources. For
lower-class men, the positive effect of the mixed-class setting on cooperation could reflect a
desire to win the approval of higher ranked (wealthier) men. For upper-class men, greater
cooperation in mixed-class settings may derive from a desire to gain or maintain their social
status through a display of ‘competitive altruism’ that seeks to demonstrate their ability to
provide for the group regardless of personal cost (Hardy and Vugt, 2006). Unlike in same-
class scenarios where there is no opportunity to gain status in the eyes of higher ranked
others, there is an opportunity for men to competitively cooperate and gain social status in
heterogeneous class settings.
One reason we do not observe a similar phenomenon in all-women group settings could be
due to differences between men and women in terms of how they respond to competition. For
instance, women are less likely than men to self-select into competitive environments when
other options are available (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), and some evidence suggests
that increased competition in group settings has a particularly negative effect on collective
action outcomes for women (Lee, Kesebir and Pillutla, 2016). Some argue that this is the
result of institutional and structural inequalities in male-dominated societies that create an
environment in which women view other women as rivals, discounting men because of their
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innate privilege as members of the dominant gender group in society (Tanenbaum, 2011).
This could explain why the presence of inequality among women has the opposite (negative)
effect on cooperation.
Finally, we might interpret these results for cooperation among women in light of recent
work by Klar (2018). She argues that the potential for shared gender identity to unite women
across salient political divides depends on the extent to which gender entails the same set of
values and expectations of behavior for women on opposite ends of that divide. This implies
that to the extent that the values and norms of behavior associated with women’s gender
identity differ along other social identity dimensions, we might not observe high levels of
cooperation among women when these other cross-cutting identities are made salient. Our
results suggest that socio-economic class cleavages may represent another type of socially
salient cross-cutting identity that (like partisanship) overlaps with perceptions of the norms
appropriate to women’s gender identity in important and substantively meaningful ways. In
fact, existing survey data supports this interpretation in the Lebanese context specifically.
For example, there is some evidence that attitudes toward gender equality among women
vary by income level (Ceyhun, 2017), and a recent public opinion survey shows that wealthier
women hold more positive views of advancing gender equality than poor women (El Feki,
Heilman and Barker, 2017). It is therefore possible that the values and norms of appropriate
behavior linked to women’s gender identity in Lebanon could vary by class and that raising
the salience of class differences in groups of women could enhance the salience of these
differences in terms of what women think the norms of appropriate behavior for women in
society should entail. In turn, these differences could trigger divisions among women and
lead to less cooperation, as we see in our mixed-class group settings. In the absence of the
cross-cutting class cleavages, these differences may not be activated.
At the same time, this could plausibly explain why we do not observe the same negative
effect of the mixed-class setting on cooperation among men, since the issue of norms of
appropriate behavior linked to male gender identity are not salient in the same way. In other
words, men are not as likely to be divided along class lines in terms of how they view men’s
social role in society and what constitutes appropriate behavior for men. Consequently,
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increasing the salience of class cleavages within groups of men is unlikely to trigger deep
divides along class lines that correlated with attitudes toward male gender identity with the
effect of impeding cooperation across class lines.
3.6 CONCLUSION
The prevailing view of socio-economic class and its effect on behavior in group settings is
that lower-class individuals tend to exhibit more pro-social behaviors than upper-class indi-
viduals (for a review, see: Manstead (2018)). More recently, there has been push back on
this generalization that points to various mediating factors that exist within socio-economic
ranks. At the same time, there is relatively little understanding of what we should expect
to observe when social class interacts with other socially salient group identity categories.
Given that individuals do not experience social class in a vacuum, it is important to under-
stand whether the social psychological mechanisms thought to drive expectations of behavior
in group settings are inconsistent with expectations of behavior associated with other social
categories, such as gender. A growing body of evidence suggests that within-gender group
differences are an important object of study (Balliet et al., 2011). Hyde (2014), in particu-
lar, identifies the need for more research on gender differences in in-group versus out-group
experimental settings, noting a number of theoretical traditions would predict gender dif-
ferences in response to variation in the group composition of the social setting. Moreover,
the implications of detecting gender differences in cooperation are not negligible; even small
effect sizes that differ by gender could have a large substantive effect over time because of
the nature of gender as an intervening variable (Balliet et al. (2011) cite Abelson (1985) and
Martell, Lane and Emrich (1996) on this point).
Our results build on this work to demonstrate that women are not unconditionally coop-
erative with one another; socio-economic class cleavages have a negative effect on cooperation
among women. This result is unique to women, as we observe the opposite effect on coop-
eration among men. This is consistent with recent evidence that women’s shared gender
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identity may not prime norms of within-gender group cooperation in the context of other
cross-cutting social cleavages that divide women in important ways (Klar, 2018). In fact,
given that other socially salient identities (such as political partisanship) may cross-cut gen-
der and class dimensions of group membership, future research could further explore behavior
at these intersections (such as at the intersection of gender, class, and partisanship).
Our findings also underscore the complexity of drawing conclusions based on interactions
in shared group settings. They can help explain why results for women’s cooperation in
experimental settings are so mixed, since researchers do not often take into account the real
socio-economic class background of study participants when interpreting outcomes. While we
recognize it may not be possible to control for every possible factor in a single research design,
scholars need to be cognizant of how the interaction between gender and various dimensions
of individual identity (such as class) could jointly determine behavior and influence how we
interpret our findings. In this respect, we seek to echo the work of Crenshaw (1991) and
others who point to all the ways that an individual’s multiple social identities intersect to
influence attitudes and behavior. These results lead us to caution against treating either
class identity or gender identity as discrete social categories. The interaction between them
clearly primes different social norms and leads to different behavioral outcomes.
The potential policy implications of our results include the proposition that organizing
women to mobilize for policy change depends on reducing barriers to cooperation across
class groups. In the Lebanese case, the lack of effective mobilization among women for
policy change that targets women as beneficiaries – such as with respect to policies that
would change the fractured system of personal status laws or lead to reserved seats for
women in public office – is a byproduct of the cleavages introduced by raising the salience
of socio-economic class identity among women. If within-class group cooperation between
women is the norm, then there is little reason to expect that poor women would associate
policy initiatives linked to the preferences of elite or upper-class women – such as gender-
based quotas for political representation – as worthwhile. Similarly, it is not obvious that
rich women would see obvious benefits to advocating for more egalitarian policy initiatives
that could negatively impact their relationship with male elites (who themselves may be
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more interested in maintaining the status quo).
Our evidence confirms that socio-economic class-based cleavages are a barrier to collective
action among women, but it does not necessarily provide a clear path forward for addressing
this issue. Future research could explore the relative effectiveness of cross-class versus within-
class efforts to mobilize women on behalf of broad policy changes. This could also include
efforts to explore whether certain policy initiatives receive more widespread support than
others and whether these victories could help bridge the gap between women of different
class backgrounds.
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4.0 WOMEN CANDIDATES, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND THE
INCENTIVE TO PRIORITIZE WOMEN CONSTITUENTS: SURVEY DATA
FROM WOMEN POLITICIANS IN WESTERN UGANDA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Under what conditions do quotas for women’s representation in politics improve the sub-
stantive representation of women constituents?1 A large body of research on gender-based
quotas suggests that the connection between women representatives and the substantive rep-
resentation of their women constituents’ priorities is quite strong. Even in the most difficult
cases, such as in clientelistic or patriarchal systems where women are historically excluded
from influencing policy-making through (predominantly male) institutions, reserved seats
for women in office are shown to improve women’s access to the distribution of resources
through political elites (Benstead, 2016). As well, increasing the number of women in local
government is associated with policy-making that is more likely to address the demands of
women constituents (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Kudva, 2003), and research across
various country contexts shows that women representatives are more likely than their male
colleagues to prioritize policy issues that are frequently associated with women’s interests
(Braga and Scervini, 2017; Clayton and Zetterberg, forthcoming). On the whole, the lit-
erature on gender-based quotas largely demonstrates that women who succeed in reaching
office under quota-based systems of representation do a better job than male representatives
1This project was made possible through a collaborative effort with the Centre for Women in Governance.
I am sincerely grateful to Joy Mukisa for her enthusiastic support of this research, and to Julian Basemera
and Gloria Ayesiga for their excellence research assistance. This project is covered under the IRB of the
University of Pittsburgh: PRO16040496.
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at substantively representing their women constituents.
At the same time, however, other evidence demonstrates that quota seats for women in
elected office are subject to elite capture under certain conditions. For instance, despite being
praised as an early adopter of quotas for women, Uganda’s political system has been widely
criticized for promoting women candidates to fill reserved seats who are “unrepresentative
of the female population and too closely allied with the ruling party to effectively challenge
its patriarchal agenda” Josefsson (2014, 94). In fact, some evidence suggests that in semi-
authoritarian regimes or those democracies – like Uganda – where a single political party
exerts primary influence over the electoral process, introducing quotas for women may be
a tactic to consolidate the power of the ruling party in electoral areas where party leaders
can largely control which candidates ultimately win office (Weeks, 2018; Muriaas and Wang,
2012; Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2017). In these settings, party leaders face strong
incentives to support women candidates for reserved seats who have strong ties to the party
and demonstrate a willingness to abide by norms of behavior that reinforce the status quo
distribution of political power.
While there is broad agreement in the academic and practitioner communities that elite
capture of quota seats for women is problematic, the extent to which these seats are taken
by politicians who neglect the interests of their women constituents (the very group whose
political participation the quota is designed to encourage) is rather unclear. On the one
hand, there are good reasons to think that women candidates in party strongholds will be
more beholden to existing political party elites than to their constituents more broadly and
could therefore adopt clientelistic strategies of representation that maintain the status quo of
catering to existing political elite interests once in office. On the other hand, if a candidate is
virtually guaranteed to win given the support of the dominant party in a stronghold, then the
relative lack of electoral accountability could allow her to use her position to direct resources
to traditionally marginalized groups in addition to party elites, such as women or youth. In
this sense, clientelism could still dominate patterns of representation, but the beneficiaries
could be just as likely to include historically marginalized groups as long as this is consistent
with the ruling political party’s agenda. This contrasts with the situation faced by women
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candidates in more competitive electoral settings where accountability to a wider range of
stakeholders with the ability to influence the outcome of the electoral process (beyond party
elites) could incentivize candidates to cater to a broader range of constituent groups, or even
to adopt a more universalist perspective on representing the community as a whole.
In this essay, I explore whether the constituent groups prioritized by women candidates
seeking quota seats varies with the degree of competition candidates face in the broader
electoral environment. One limitation of existing research on gender-based quotas is that it
tends to concentrate on the behavior or characteristics of women once they are elected to
office, overlooking the potential for the attitudes or behavior of women candidates to provide
insight into the conditions under which quotas are most likely to lead to collective gains for
women in society as a whole. Since the constituent groups women plan to prioritize once in
office could affect whether they receive a political party nomination and make it onto the
general election ballot in the first place, it is important to examine whether there are patterns
among candidates and not only patterns among representatives. This is an important issue
to investigate since it could shed light on the presence of additional institutional barriers
to the effective representation of women’s interests on a broad scale. If women candidates
for reserved seats in party strongholds are more likely than women in competitive areas
to prioritize the distribution of resources to various client groups in exchange for political
support – such as political elites or close peer networks – then this suggests that implementing
quotas in the absence of a competitive electoral process could merely reinforce or entrench
existing patterns of clientelism rather than lead to greater gender equality in access to the
political process overall. Alternatively, if women candidates in party strongholds intend to
use their position to redirect resources toward more marginalized groups – such as women,
youth, or the otherwise physically vulnerable – this could suggest that quotas can enhance
political access for traditionally marginalized groups even when the leadership of a single
political party largely controls which women hold these seats.
I evaluate these predictions using original survey data collected from a non-random sam-
ple of 157 women candidates running for office across 27 constituencies in the Western
Region of Uganda in 2016. My findings suggest that women candidates do vary in the elec-
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toral strategies they emphasize depending on the competitiveness of the electoral process.
While a commitment to prioritizing the needs of women does not vary across electoral set-
tings, women candidates in less competitive party strongholds are more likely to prioritize
the needs of constituents linked to clientelistic patterns of representation, such as friends
and family, those in the same religion, and those in the same clan or tribe, than are women
in competitive electoral areas. I contrast these results with preferences for prioritizing ‘all
people in the community’ and find that the probability of prioritizing the interests of all
people (a more universalist approach) increases significantly as the electoral environment
becomes more competitive. My results largely support arguments from feminist scholars
that policies presumed to enhance inclusion, such as gender-based quotas, may only serve to
reinforce gender inequities in political participation if implemented in the absence of larger
institutional reforms designed to give men and women equal access to the tools needed to
effectively and independently participate in political decision-making (Pateman, 1988, 2011;
Task Force on Democracy, Economic Security, and Social Justice in a Volatile World, 2011).
I return to this discussion in the conclusion.
4.2 COMPETITION, POLITICIAL INCENTIVES, AND CONSTITUENT
REPRESENTATION
There are many factors that could influence the types of constituent groups that women
politicians plan to prioritize if elected to office. This paper focuses on one feature of the
electoral environment that could plausibly influence women candidates’ priorities: the level
of competition they face in getting elected. This represents an important departure from
other research that focuses on women candidates’ characteristics (e.g. Josefsson (2014)), such
as their partisanship, level of education, or ethnic affiliation as factors that could explain
behavior once in office. I seek to control for many of these individual level factors and in-
stead consider how the broader institutional environment could influence women candidates’
electoral strategies in competing for reserved seats. Drawing on existing literature, I find
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that there are good reasons to expect that whether women candidates plan to prioritize the
interests of groups linked to traditional notions of clientelistic politics (such as co-partisans,
political party elites, coethnics, or close friends and family), or more marginalized groups
typically excluded from male-dominated networks of resource distribution (women, youth,
the disabled or otherwise physically vulnerable), or instead adopt a more universalist ap-
proach to representing all people in their community, could depend on the extent to which
the political process is dominated by a single political party. At the same time, I empha-
size the exploratory nature of this analysis since much of the literature generally suggests
competing expectations of how competition ought to affect candidates’ priorities.
4.2.1 Non-competitive electoral environments
Non-competitive electoral areas are typified by political party strongholds where the slate of
candidates appearing on the ballot is heavily influenced by the dominant party’s leadership.
In general, much of the gender and politics scholarship is critical of the potential for women
holding quota seats in these settings to do much beyond further consolidate the patronage
networks that typically benefit a predominantly male political elite (Josefsson, 2014). In
fact, recent evidence suggests that political party elites tend to support the introduction
of gender-based quotas precisely when they have a strong enough monopoly within a given
electoral area to control the candidate selection process, thereby ensuring that those women
candidates approved by the party elite win office and help consolidate the party’s control
over political decision-making within the area (Weeks, 2018). These findings bolster long-
standing concerns that reserved seats for women in electoral systems dominated by a single
political party are subject to elite capture, reducing the potential for women to be elected
under quota systems who are motivated to serve the interests of anyone outside of the ruling
political elite (Tamale, 1999, 2003; Tripp, 2006).
This capture of quota seats in party strongholds is often made possible by the fact that
a single political party dominates the electoral landscape through deep patronage networks
and clientelistic relationships with key constituent groups. To maintain control over a given
electoral area, party leaders may engage in vote-buying or seek to channel goods and services
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toward loyal supporters (Corstange, 2016). Yet, these clientelistic practices are expensive and
research shows that women politicians are systematically disadvantaged from participating
in these networks to the same extent as their male colleagues. In many societies characterized
by widespread gender inequities, women politicians generally lack the ability and opportunity
to access many of these clientelistic networks of resource distribution because of structural
inequalities that prevent women from amassing financial or social capital to the same extent
as their male colleagues (Benstead, 2016), or because of social norms of appropriateness
linked to gender that bar them from entering many of the informal spaces where this kind
of politics takes place, such as bars or gambling halls (Beall, 2005). This suggests that
it should be difficult for women candidates to emerge in party strongholds and succeed in
winning office without the support of the dominant party leadership in the area, since it is
highly unlikely that an independent woman candidate could mount an effective opposition
against such a formidable political machine. This creates an environment where women
seeking reserved quota-based seats may become overly reliant on strong party regimes for
electoral support.
I expect that it is more likely that party elites will choose to support women candidates
they know will reinforce their agenda once in office. This creates incentives for women
candidates in party strongholds to prioritize the interests of political party elites as a key
electoral strategy necessary to secure the party’s nomination and electoral support. To the
extent that the priorities of party leaders and women constituents do not align, this could
have a negative effect on the substantive representation of women in the community, broadly
speaking. This could occur, for instance, if women candidates for reserved seats are less likely
to advocate on behalf of issues that matter to women in the community but that do not
align with the party’s agenda (Bauer, 2008; Tripp, 2006; Walsh, 2012; Clayton, Josefsson
and Wang, 2017). In this case, relative to competitive electoral environments, I expect to
observe a stronger preference for prioritizing the interests of political elites among women
candidates in party strongholds, consistent with expectations that party elites will want to
maintain networks of patron-client relationships and use quota seats for women to further
consolidate their influence over the populace at large.
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At the same time, it is also possible that political party leaders in stronghold areas face
incentives to support women candidates who contribute to the party’s ability to maintain
a monopoly in the area. One way to do this may be to support the candidacy of women
who represent socially salient constituent groups in the region that are already part of exist-
ing clientelistic networks of the distribution of resources. For instance, qualitative evidence
gathered by the author suggests that elected officials may be selected to participate on elite
committees within local legislatures, in part, on the basis of their membership in other so-
cially relevant groups, including religious, ethnic, and tribal groups.2 This is consistent with
results presented by other scholars in the field who show that, in societies characterized by
the clientelistic distribution of resources, “attributes such as familial ties, voter mobiliza-
tion, or benefactor loyalty [can be] more salient than gender identity in candidate selection”
(Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo, 2012, 237). Promoting candidates who ‘check the right
boxes’ can go a long way toward ensuring continued public support by enhancing perceptions
of the ruling political elite as upholding promises to direct the flow of resources toward po-
litically relevant groups. In this context, I also expect that women candidates may be more
likely to show preferences for prioritizing the needs and interests of strategic constituent
in-groups with ties to clientelism and the strategic distribution of resources to supporters,
such as coethnics, members of the same clan or tribe, members of the same religion, or
close friends and family. This could be especially likely for women candidates who perceive
their role as one of reinforcing existing patronage networks in line with reinforcing the ruling
party’s control over the area. This would be consistent with evidence that it is not the case
that women are any less corruptible than men, but simply that they have fewer opportu-
nities to engage in the same patterns of clientelism as men (Goetz, 2007). Afforded these
opportunities, women candidates may be every bit as likely to direct resources to those same
types of groups linked to clientelistic patterns of behavior. However, this does not necessarily
imply that women candidates in party strongholds will not be interested in prioritizing the
needs of historically marginalized groups, such as women, youth, or the disabled or physi-
cally vulnerable. Rather, it suggests that women candidates face trade-offs in terms of how
2Interviews and focus group discussions with women representatives in local government. Western Region.
Summer 2016.
102
they direct their limited time and resources.
One possibility is that women politicians in less competitive areas may choose to direct
their attention to historically marginalized groups with cross-cutting membership in social
groups that are considered most relevant to maintaining the political status quo. While
this suggests that we might not expect women candidates in party strongholds to prioritize
women voters in a broad sense, it does mean that they could prioritize women voters in a
narrow sense, such as coethnic women voters or women who belong to the same religious
group. In other words, it could be that party strongholds create incentives for women
candidates to direct the flow of resources toward historically marginalized groups and not
only toward political party elites. In fact, Benstead (2016) shows that quota-elected women
in patriarchal settings with little multiparty competition provide more legislative clientelism
to women voters than either male legislators or women elected through unreserved seats. This
is an important counter-narrative to consider given that it suggests quotas can be useful for
giving women access to the clientelistic distribution of resources where they might otherwise
be excluded from the system entirely. As a result, I expect that women candidates in party
strongholds may use their position to represent the interests of historically marginalized
groups with the caveat that this is unlikely to entirely substitute for representing the interests
of historically dominant social groups who largely control the candidate selection process
through clientelistic networks of political patronage.
4.2.2 Competitive electoral environments
Overall, then, I expect women candidates in less competitive areas to be more likely to
prioritize the needs of particular constituent groups linked to historical patterns of clientelism
rather than to show a preference for universally representing the interests of the community as
a whole. This raises the question: why might electoral competition alter these dynamics? By
definition, in competitive electoral settings, no single party can entirely control the outcome
of the electoral process. Competition for votes creates incentives for candidates to appeal
strategically to a broader base of the voting public and not only to rely on support from
association with the dominant party regime. In fact, recent evidence suggests that the
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incentive to appeal to a wider range of constituent groups with influence over the outcome
of the election is what drives women representatives holding reserved seats to engage in
policy-making that crosses party lines and may even deviate from the ruling party’s primary
political agenda (Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2017). This implies that competition creates
incentives for women candidates to appeal to a broader base of constituent groups than they
might otherwise in the absence of competition, such as when party leaders largely control
the slate of candidates available to voters.
This could suggest that women candidates in competitive electoral settings will choose
to emphasize the needs and interests of constituent groups who are historically marginal-
ized from the distribution of resources through clientelistic networks. One possibility is that
women candidates in more competitive areas will be more likely to appeal to women vot-
ers in particular. For instance, Dolan (2010) shows that women candidates who take more
pro-women stances and are thereby viewed as ‘acting for’ women are more likely to elicit
same-gender voting support than women candidates who are only seen as ‘acting as’ women.
Moreover, some evidence suggests that women elected to quota seats perceive a stronger
mandate – by virtue of their position as a ‘women’s representative’ – than either non-quota
women or male representatives to direct the flow of resources toward women voters in par-
ticular (Benstead, 2016). This suggests that women candidates seeking quota seats reserved
for women could be more likely to view their role as partially one of prioritizing their women
constituents.
Relatedly, if women candidates perceive an electoral advantage to catering to the inter-
ests of women more broadly, this could extend as well to serving constituent groups who
are historically linked to women’s social role in society, such as youth and children or the
disabled or otherwise physically vulnerable. This could partly explain why examples of suc-
cessful policy outputs in the wake of adopting quotas for women representatives in national
legislatures frequently include laws targeting domestic violence, the protection of children,
and human trafficking (Muriaas and Wang, 2012; Wang, 2013). This suggests that in the
absence of strong incentives to strictly adhere to the agenda of a dominate party elite, women
politicians in more competitive electoral environments may strategically opt to prioritize the
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interests of women, youth and children, or other vulnerable population groups.
However, when quota seats for women are filled through universal suffrage, this creates
incentives for women candidates to avoid alienating the interests of male voters. This suggests
that, to some extent, women candidates may see value in adopting a more universalist
approach to representation in competitive constituencies. In this case, women candidates
may want to target the interests of all members of the community as a whole rather than
targeting only specific constituent groups. This kind of behavior would suggest a strong
deviation from clientelistic patterns of resource distribution. On the other hand, it is also
possible that the incentive to appeal to men in competitive settings will encourage women
candidates to prioritize the interests of select in-groups whose membership crosses gender
lines, such as ethnic, clan, or religious groups, or even political party groups. In this case,
appealing to key constituent groups that consist of both men and women members could be
an effective electoral strategy. This suggests that under certain conditions women candidates
in competitive area may show similar preferences for clientelistic representation as women
in party strongholds. The two major differences in competitive areas are (1) that there
could be stronger incentives to make universalist appeals than what the literature suggests
would be the case in strongholds, and (2) the types of groups candidates choose to prioritize
in competitive areas are less likely to be predominantly determined by the preferences or
agenda of ruling party elites.
4.2.3 Summary of expectations
On the whole, I expect that women candidates in party strongholds will prioritize constituent
groups consistent with existing patterns of clientelism that reflect status quo political elite
interests in maintaining electoral dominance. This should include prioritizing the interests
of political party elites, as well as members of other politically salient social groups through
which resources may reasonably be expected to flow in order to maintain political support,
such as coethnics, members of the same clan, tribe, or religious group, or close social net-
works of friends and family. At the same time, women candidates may be influenced by the
culture of clientelism in party strongholds to redirect resources to historically marginalized
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groups in a display of buying support for the dominant party regime. In contrast, I find that
the expectations for women candidates in more competitive electoral settings are decidedly
less clear. On the one hand, I expect that women in more competitive electoral environ-
ments could be more likely to adopt a universalist approach to representing all members
of the community as a whole rather than appealing to clientelistic strategies of prioritizing
the needs of particular groups in exchange for support. On the other hand, I expect that
greater competition could lead women candidates in competitive settings to make more tar-
geted appeals with an issue-centered message designed to attract constituent groups who
have been historically marginalized in the political decision-making process. Competition
allows accountability at the ballot box, so candidates face incentives to prioritize the needs
of constituent groups who might not necessarily be at the top of the agenda for political
party elites who otherwise control the candidate selection process in the absence of electoral
competition.
4.3 WOMEN REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTORAL POLITICS IN
UGANDA
I evaluate these predictions using attitudinal data collected from women candidates for
reserved seats in local government in Uganda, a country with gender-based quotas for rep-
resentation and a dominant ruling party that maintains control over the majority of local
electoral areas but faces more electoral competition in some settings. I concentrate on the
case of Uganda because it is a prime example of the larger puzzle of the conditions under
which greater descriptive representation for women in government translates into better sub-
stantive outcomes for women on the ground. Frequently cited as a success story in terms
of setting gender-based quota goals and actually reaching them, Uganda first established re-
served seats for women in government in 1995.3 Women are guaranteed roughly one-third of
3Quotas are included in Article 180(2:b) of the 1995 Constitution, which states that one-third of each local
government council shall be reserved for women, and in Article 108(3) of the Local Governments Act of
1997, which also requires that women constitute one-third of any local council (The Quota Project, 2017).
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all seats in all legislatures from the national level in Parliament to the district level council,
all the way down to the sub-county level council (the lowest administrative unit with sig-
nificant autonomy in decision-making). As of December 2016, Uganda’s 34% representation
for women in Parliament placed it 30th worldwide for the share of women in the national
legislature, far out-pacing the average for Sub-Saharan Africa of 23% (Inter-Parliamentary
Union, 2016).
Since the introduction of quotas for women’s representation, Uganda’s Parliament has
passed several high-profile pieces of legislation designed to improve outcomes for women
around the country, including: the Equal Opportunity Commission Act (2006), the National
Equal Opportunities Policy (2006), the Penal Code (Amendment) Act (2007), the Prevention
of Trafficking in Persons Act (2009), the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act (2010),
and the Domestic Violence Act (2010). These legislative successes are often cited as evidence
of the substantive policy impact of having greater descriptive representation for women in
Uganda’s political system (Muriaas and Wang, 2012; Wang, 2013). Moreover, recent research
confirms that women Members of Parliament (MPs) in Uganda are more vocal representatives
of “historically feminized” issues (sometimes referred to as “women’s issues”) than their male
counterparts (Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2017).
Yet, despite the clear positive impact of increased descriptive representation for women
in Parliament on the substantive representation of women’s interests through the adoption
of gender-sensitive legislation, many recognize that the standards enumerated in these laws
have yet to be fully realized. For instance, research shows that after more than two decades
of quota-driven representation for women in government, women’s political empowerment
has improved while women’s level of economic participation, rate of educational attainment,
and key measures of health and survival have all declined relative to men (The World Eco-
nomic Forum, 2015). In a series of interviews conducted by leading Ugandan civil society
organizations (CSOs) and academicians, women MPs attributed this failure to the absence of
implementation at the local level, decrying the lack of training and sensitization for the local
representatives and local officials charged with overseeing the implementation of national leg-
islation (Center for Women in Government and Civil Society Rockefeller et al., 2014). This
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gap in leadership on gender issues at the local level (in contrast to the progress on gender
issues at the national level) is puzzling because similar quotas for women’s representation
exist at both levels, drawing attention to the question of why greater substantive represen-
tation for women at the local level has not followed from greater descriptive representation
in the same way that it has for women in national politics.
Some scholars attribute the disconnect between increased descriptive representation and
substantive gains for women on the ground to elite capture of women’s quota seats (Bauer,
2008; Tripp, 2006; Walsh, 2012). The case of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in
Uganda is no exception (Clayton, Josefsson and Wang, 2017, 283): “In Uganda, the ruling
National Resistance Movement (NRM) party implemented quotas in 1989 as part of a wider
strategy to ensure regime stability and strengthen support among various social groups. As
such, the Ugandan quota system has been criticized for creating a group of women more
beholden to the political regime than accountable to female citizens (see e.g., Goetz and
Hassim (2003); Tamale (1999); Tripp (2000, 2006)).” In fact, Sylvia Tamale – a prominent
academic and critic of Uganda’s quota system – once argued that quota seats were offered
to women by the ruling NRM as an inducement that would provide “access to the political
world of male power” without actually requiring party elites to make improvements that
would advance the status of women in society (Tamale, 2003). In the early years of the
Women’s Movement in Uganda, it was not uncommon for these seats to be filled entirely by
women who were asked to run by male elders or male party elites (Tamale, 1999), while the
NRM is widely believed to use the creation of additional subnational administrative units
(local government councils) as a political tactic to increase electoral strength and deepen
patronage networks (Green, 2010; Muriaas and Wang, 2012; Clayton, Josefsson and Wang,
2017). To the extent that the NRM can control which candidates reach office in these new
electoral areas, there is a high likelihood that the candidates who emerge in those contests
will be those with deep ties to the ruling party establishment and whose representation
priorities are consistent with those of the NRM leadership.
On the whole, this suggests that Uganda represents a prime example of how party
strongholds may be used to consolidate the power of a dominant political party, creating
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incentives for women candidates seeking office in these settings to cater to the interests of
powerful party elites rather than broader swaths of the electorate. At the same time, sub-
national variation in the level of competition faced by women candidates for office yields a
window of opportunity to study the independent effects of the electoral context on women
candidates’ priorities for representation that does not exist in the more competitive national
elections. Additionally, as an example of a gender-based quota system, Uganda also presents
an important opportunity to evaluate the normative implications of promoting quota-based
systems of representation in institutional environments where there may be institutional bar-
riers in the broader political system that make it difficult for women politicians to act in ways
that deviate from status quo norms of clientelism and in-group favoritism in representation.
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
4.4.1 Overview
I evaluate the relationship between the level of electoral competition in the broader political
environment and the constituent groups women candidates intend to prioritize using data
from an original, self-administered survey of 157 women candidates for local office in 27
constituencies across 10 districts in the Western Region of Uganda. I draw on survey data
collected from women candidates for office rather than from women representatives who
have already succeeded in winning office. This is a substantive distinction with a theoretical
motivation behind it. By using data from women candidates across constituencies that
vary in their competitiveness, I can get a broader picture of how the incentives to prioritize
different groups vary among the full slate of women contesting for office and not only those
who ultimately won. This is important because it could be the case that representatives who
win systematically differ from those who do not. By using data from candidates who vary
in terms of whether or not they won election, I can get a better sense of the general pattern
of representation priorities across all women candidates who were options for voters in the
general election.
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In this section, I review how the survey data was collected and important features of
the non-random sample of women candidates who responded to the survey that matter
for interpreting the results of the analysis. In the interest of full research transparency,
I emphasize that this study is intended as a preliminary, exploratory investigation of the
hypothesized relationships in the data. There are some notable limitations to what can
be inferred from the evidence presented here owing to some concerns about data quality
and reliability as well as the limited sample size and limited geographic coverage in the
sample. Still, it is highly unusual to have access to opinion data from women candidates
for office as compared to women representatives already serving in office. Moreover, there
is extremely limited data on women politicians seeking office at the local rather than the
national level in developing contexts, such as Uganda. As such, this data is unique and
affords the opportunity to explore some of the more interesting patterns in women candidates’
representation priorities in the interest of motivating future research in the area.
4.4.2 Survey implementation
The survey questionnaire was implemented approximately one month after the conclusion of
the primary election season, from November-December 2015, during a series of two-day train-
ing exercises conducted by the Centre for Women in Governance (CEWIGO), a Ugandan-led
non-governmental organization whose mission is to improve policy-making for women. All
candidates who attended the trainings were invited to complete the questionnaire.4 After the
general elections in February and March 2016, respondents from the survey were matched to
the official election results list published by the Ugandan Electoral Commission to confirm
that the sample of women surveyed during the training exercises did in fact compete in the
4The first part of the survey was self-administered to 358 women in 10 districts, while the second part was
administered to 318 of those same women in 8 of the 10 districts; post-training surveys were not implemented
in Kabarole or Kasese. While 318 women completed both parts of the questionnaire, only 229 of those women
were candidates for women’s reserved seats on local councils. The remainder largely consisted of women
serving on lower level councils that were not up for election in 2016. Of the 229, only 157 answered the
survey question pertaining to the main outcome of interest, thus resulting in the reduced sample used here
for analysis. Very few women competing for unreserved seats in direct elections against men attended the
trainings, making it impossible to compare between women candidates for quota seats and those competing
for open/unreserved seats.
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general election in 2016. The survey data was collected using a single instrument divided
into two parts.5 To offset the potential for social desirability bias to influence individuals’
responses, all data used in this analysis was collected prior to the start of the training work-
shop. The only two survey questions from the post-training survey included in this analysis
are not measures that should be expected to change as a result of the training experience,
namely: two subjective measures of socio-economic background. Since I cannot distinguish
between respondents who may have attended CEWIGO trainings prior to the study pe-
riod, it is still possible that responses could be biased for individuals who are familiar with
CEWIGO’s training content and have a general idea of the types of responses that would be
looked on favorably by staff members. However, even if this were true, it would bias against
finding any differences in representation priorities given the level of competition faced.
In total, data are available for 157 women candidates who completed self-administered
surveys and contested for a reserved seat in the 2016 general election at either the sub-
county (LC3), municipal (LC4), or district (LC5) level. The data collected includes a rich
set of covariates and demographic information, including age, ethnicity, religious affiliation,
economic well-being, education, literacy, and English language fluency, among others. There
are also questions measuring attitudes toward representation as well as attitudes toward the
gendered dimensions of policy-making and policy priorities. Both parts of the survey began
with a consent script informing all participants of the purpose of collecting this data, how it
would be used, that their identity would be protected, that there were no risks to answering
these questions, and that they were free to skip questions or stop at any time. The survey
instrument was drafted and administered in plain English with the understanding that the
trainings would be conducted in English and the local language of each district where the
training was carried out. The training teams were instructed to help in answering questions
and clarifying terms as needed while allowing each participant to fill out the questionnaire
on her own. The training teams were also instructed to translate as necessary on the spot as
participants filled out the forms individually to protect the privacy and anonymity of each
5The first part was implemented immediately prior to the start of the first day of the two-day workshop
training, while the second part was administered at the end of the last day of the training. The survey was
divided into two parts to accommodate more questions under a tight timeline for implementation.
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respondent’s answers.6
4.4.3 The non-random survey sample
The survey respondents represent only a small fraction of the total number of women who
competed for reserved women’s seats at the local level in the 10 study districts in the 2016
elections, as shown in Table 7. According to statistics published by the Ugandan Electoral
Commission, these 10 districts also only represent a small fraction of the 8,199 total reserved
women’s seats available at the LC3, LC4, and LC5 levels in the 112 districts around the
country, for which 14,219 women competed in 2016. As the survey respondents represent a
non-random sample of the population of women competing in 2016, all results presented here
should be viewed in light of the fact that this convenience sample of women candidates is
not representative of all the women who competed in the study districts. Nevertheless, there
are good reasons to believe that valuable insights can still be gleaned from observational
analysis of these women’s responses to the questionnaire. I review some of the factors that
may distinguish the respondents who attended the training from the larger population of
women competing for office in the study districts. This helps put the results in perspective
and gives a better framework for generalizing beyond this set of responses.
Initially, CEWIGO sought to prioritize inviting women to the workshop who were com-
peting for open seats in direct elections against men. However, this narrow focus proved
too challenging for implementation, as very few women contested in open seat, direct elec-
tions at the local level. This complicated the recruitment process, and led to a number of
last-minute efforts to gather the targeted 50 women for participation in each district. The
fact that CEWIGO did not originally target women competing for reserved seats could help
explain why there is considerable variation in the share of the population present in the
sample across districts and levels of office (e.g. 56% of the candidates for LC5 in Isingiro
6The descriptive statistics for the sample indicate that only 69 out of 157 respondents indicated full fluency
in English. In Appendix P.1 I check the sensitivity of the results by restricting the sample to only those
candidates fluent in English. The main results for the effect of competition on constituent groups prioritized
does not change in any significant way. This helps offset some of the concerns related to data quality and
reliability given the method of survey administration.
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Table 7: Survey sample compared to the total population of women candidates for reserved
seats in the study districts.
2016 Election Candidates for Reserved Seats for Women Representatives on Local Councils
District
LC3 LC4 LC5
Sample Pop. % of Pop. Sample Pop. % of Pop. Sample Pop. % of Pop.
Bushenyi 16 92 17% – 21 0% 5 21 24%
Ibanda 9 80 11% – – – 7 17 41%
Isingiro 5 97 5% – – – 10 18 56%
Kabarole 8 188 4% 5 17 29% 5 37 14%
Kamwenge 15 91 16% – – – 4 14 29%
Kasese 3 271 1% – 23 0% 2 39 5%
Kiruhura 8 96 8% – – – 2 15 13%
Kyenjojo 21 130 16% – – – 2 20 10%
Mbarara 10 130 8% 4 34 12% 2 19 11%
Sheema 10 78 13% – – – 4 10 40%
Totals (10 study districts) 105 1,253 8% 9 95 9% 43 210 20%
Totals (112 UG districts) LC3 Candidates 11,056 LC4 Candidates 1,024 LC5 Candidates 2,139
LC3 Seats 6,867 LC4 Seats 373 LC5 Seats 959
District completed the survey, compared to just 5% of the LC5 candidates in Kasese Dis-
trict). Notably, a relatively larger share of LC5 candidates were surveyed and included in the
sample compared to LC3 and LC4 candidate groups. This makes sense in the case of LC3
compared to LC5 women, since there are far fewer total LC5 candidates for office. However,
the relatively higher shares often mask lower numbers of women included in the sample from
each district (e.g. only two LC5 women were surveyed from Kyenjojo, which translates to
10% of all LC5 candidates in Kyenjojo overall). This introduces the possibility that sampling
bias could skew the results at the district level and impede interpretation and abstraction
to the larger population of interest. I try to address this concern by controlling for the level
of office contested in the main statistical analysis.
Additionally, the method for recruiting participants to the trainings – and thus to filling
out the surveys – offers some insights into how the sample might differ from the broader
population of interest. CEWIGO designed the workshop intervention to expose the women
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candidates competing in the general election to the training content as early in the campaign
process as possible. The goal was to gather all primary election winners just after the primary
elections and be able to train them to more effectively compete in the general election.
Potential workshop participants were identified by CEWIGO from lists provided by the
political parties through heads of women’s leagues and district volunteers. These two groups
compiled lists using information from political party offices as well as special knowledge of
those planning to contest as Independents and forwarded these names to CEWIGO. As a
result, eligible workshop participants included winners of political party primary races and
well-known Independents, where the goal was to train approximately 50 women candidates
in each of the 10 districts. In each district, once CEWIGO had commitments from about 50
attendees, they stopped recruiting additional participants.
This method of recruitment suggests that women who were better connected to local
political networks were more likely to be invited to participate in the training workshops,
and thus to complete the surveys. Because CEWIGO relied on communication from local
party leaders and local organizations, it is more likely that the names provided to CEWIGO
included the names of women supported by and known to these organizations. This suggests
that the women in the sample are more likely to be politically connected than those in the
broader population. This conjecture finds some support in the descriptive statistics for the
sample. One post-training survey question asked participants if they met any new people
at the training workshop. Of the 120 respondents to this question, 47 (39%) replied that
they met fewer than five new people, implying that almost half of the participants in the
sample knew the majority of the other people at the trainings. This suggests a high level of
political, social, and civic connectivity for a sizable share of the sample.
At the same time, the relatively low share of opposition candidates (FDC primary winners
make up 16% of the sample, or 25 out of 157 respondents) and Independents in the dataset
(11 %, or 17 out of 157) suggests that the sample over-represents NRM party primary
winners compared to Independent and FDC challengers. Given that the recruitment method
relied on communication between CEWIGO and senior party officials and women’s league
leaders, it is entirely possible that political elites acted as gatekeepers in informing women
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candidates about the training. This could suggest that the women included in the sample
may be more likely to hold preferences aligned with their co-partisans and party elites than
women candidates who were not recruited by CEWIGO and therefore not sampled for the
survey. This suggests that the results of this investigation should be interpreted keeping
in mind that the survey sample likely over-represents women with ties to existing political
elites. Yet, even so, this would bias against observing differences in priorities in competitive
compared to stronghold constituencies. To the extent that differences emerge among women
candidates depending on the level of competition faced, this would be indicative of a strong
effect of political competition on the electoral strategies of women candidates regardless of
their connections to existing political elites.
On the whole, these concerns with the sample underscore the exploratory nature of this
study. Any insights gleaned from the data should be taken as suggestive, especially since
there is a possibility that the women in the sample are more likely to be politically connected
(particularly to party leaders) than the women in the broader population of candidates for
reserved seats in local government at large.7
4.5 DATA AND MEASUREMENT
4.5.1 Main independent variable: electoral competition
To capture the competitiveness of the electoral environment faced by each woman surveyed,
I draw on election results from 2011, the general election immediately prior to the one
where respondents were surveyed for this study. Since my sample is unbalanced with respect
to the number of women competing for various levels of office (LC3, LC4, and LC5), I
create a measure of electoral competition that can be applied across women competing
at different levels of local office. Importantly, Uganda’s electoral system is structured in
7Ideally, I would compare the women in the sample to women in the population on a range of factors to
establish whether there are systematic differences between them. Unfortunately, it is extremely rare to have
access to data on women candidates for office at the local level in Uganda that would allow for matching
with the women in this dataset for comparison.
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such a way that voters elect LC3 (subcounty), LC4 (municipal division), and LC5 (district)
women representatives within counties (also known as constituencies). Counties consist of
multiple subcounties or, in the case of municipalities, divisions. Because I want a measure
of electoral competition that can be used for all three levels of reserved seats, the lowest
possible level within the district at which to create this measure is the county level. Thus,
I construct a measure of electoral competition at the county level and then assign this
measure to all women candidates soliciting votes within that county (whether for LC3, LC4,
or LC5 positions). In other words, the unit of analysis is individual women candidates within
constituencies that range in their degree of competitiveness.
To create this county-level measure of electoral competition, I adapt the approach used
by Grossman and Michelitch (2018) that focuses on the margin of victory enjoyed by the
incumbent in the previous election cycle, in this case: the 2011 general elections.8 Following
Grossman and Michelitch (2018) and Cleary (2007), I calculate the margin of victory by
taking the vote share of the winner in a given contest minus the vote share of that person’s
main challenger, while assigning any candidates who win unopposed a value of 100 for their
margin of victory. I perform this calculation for all reserved women’s LC3 contests in 2011
in the 27 constituencies covered by my survey data.9 Then, I calculate the average margin of
victory across all women’s reserved LC3 contests in a given constituency and assign this value
to all women candidates in my dataset running for office within that constituency/county.10
This average margin of victory is a continuous measure of electoral competition and the
8Grossman and Michelitch (2018) use pre-treatment election results from 2011 to calculate politicians’ un-
certainty over reelection in 2016 where the politicians in their sample are randomly selected from a pool of
incumbents and they can match politicians directly to their constituencies. This is not possible with the
survey data used here so I adapt their approach and use the average margin of victory for all LC3 races at
the county level.
9Between 2011 and 2016, several new electoral areas were created by the Ugandan government. These new
constituencies are linked to 15 of the observations in the survey data, where women candidates competed for
seats in 2016 that did not exist in the 2011 general elections. This includes 8 observations from Kamwenge
(Kibale East County), 4 from Kyenjojo (Mwenge Central County), and 3 from Mbarara (Kashari South
County). I based the average margin of victory measure for these 15 observations on the LC3 election returns
for the subcounty electoral areas in 2011 that were later reassigned to the newly created constituency for
2016.
10My measure of electoral competition differs from Grossman and Michelitch (2018) as they do not aggregate
across electoral areas. The aggregation means that all candidates competing within a constituency are coded
as facing the same level of electoral competition.
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focus of the main analysis.11 For a detailed description of Uganda’s administrative system
and how I constructed the measure of electoral competition, see Appendix K.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of competition across constituencies represented in the
survey sample. The data clearly indicates that the majority of women candidates in the
sample come from constituencies that are less competitive, as represented by the fact that
observations of the key independent variable are concentrated towards the right side of the
graph, at the highest levels of the average margin of victory. This means that most women
surveyed at the trainings were contesting for seats in party strongholds. This is consistent
with my expectation that the sample could over-represent women with ties to existing party
elites given the method of recruitment.12
Yet, the lack of observations in more competitive areas is not inherently problematic for
observing relevant differences in candidates’ priorities. While it may appear that very few
survey respondents competed in competitive electoral settings, the strong skew to the right
in the data is driven by the fact that I had to assign competitiveness at the constituency level
using data that aggregated across multiple electoral areas within the constituency. While
I adopted this approach given limitations discussed in Appendix K, it means that I aver-
aged the margin of victory across electoral areas within a single constituency to create the
constituency-level measure of competition. For instance, it could be possible to have 8 out
of 10 subcounties within a constituency where women candidates won unopposed in 2011
(yielding a margin of victory of 100%), while just two subcounties contained competitive
elections where the margin of victory was much closer (e.g. 30% in each). Thus, the av-
erage margin of victory for that constituency overall would be 86 percentage points. This
obscures the fact that elections were competitive in two of those 10 electoral areas even if
in the aggregate it looks to be a clear party stronghold. In other words, the seemingly high
11This is useful because it allows for some within-district variation in electoral competition rather than mea-
suring electoral competition at the level of the district, since all districts in Uganda consist of at least two
constituencies. However, I do not include district fixed effects in the main estimation because not all districts
in my sample contain sufficient variation in the competitiveness of their constituencies. Still, I produce these
results in the interest of robustness and include them in Appendix P.
12One possibility that has not been substantiated is that party leaders could have framed sending women
candidates to the training as a reward granted to favored party loyalists given that the trainings provided
two days worth of leadership and guidance in addition to covering food, lodging, and transportation fees for
attendees.
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concentration of women competing in areas where incumbents won by 70 to 80 percent of
the vote share could actually be indicative of more competitive subcounty elections than is
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Figure 3: The level of competition across constituencies represented in the sample of women
candidates surveyed.
At the same time, this also suggests that the more competitive constituencies in the
sample are highly competitive areas since the average is not as highly skewed by a high
concentration of women winning without facing any opposition at all. The importance of
this insight into the data comes from acknowledging that the NRM’s dominance of local
elections is often so strong in party strongholds that anyone winning the party’s nomination
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during the primary phase of the electoral cycle is virtually guaranteed to win in the general
election (Izama, 2015). To the extent that primary winners at the local level in stronghold
areas are less likely to face any opposition at all in the general election, this creates a situation
where there is a much higher concentration of unopposed winners in stronghold areas that
could be weighting the distribution up towards higher average margins of victory.
4.5.2 Main dependent variable: constituent groups prioritized by women can-
didates
To measure the impact of electoral competition on women candidates’ priorities, I take
advantage of a survey question concerning the constituent groups respondents planned to
prioritize if elected: “Q23: Which groups of people in your community do you plan to focus
on most when it comes to delivering goods and services to address their needs? Please
rank the TOP 3 groups whose needs you plan to prioritize.” Participants then separately
marked which groups from the following list they would rank as “FIRST,” “SECOND,”
and “THIRD ” most important:
A. My political party agents.
B. Myself, my family, and my close friends.
C. Women in the community that will elect me.
D. Youth and children in the community.
E. All people in the community that will elect me.
F. The people in my community who share the same ethnic group as me.
G. The people in my community who practice the same religion as me.
H. The people in my community who share the same clan/tribal group as me.
I. Disabled or otherwise physically vulnerable people in the community.
I use this data to generate a series of binary dependent variables that take the value of ‘1’ if
the respondent ranked a given constituent group in her ‘Top 3’ groups to prioritize and ‘0’ if
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otherwise.13 Taken together, these measures are useful for evaluating whether there are clear
differences between women candidates in terms of clientelistic, marginalized, or universalist
patterns of constituency representation depending on the level of competition in the electoral
environment.
Most importantly, there are clear differences in how the answer options are framed, with
some constituent groups clearly identified as in-groups for the candidate in question (e.g.
same religion, same clan, same ethnicity), while others are more broadly defined (e.g. women
or youth in the community). This gives respondents the opportunity to more narrowly or
more broadly define their intentions with respect to whose interests they intend to prioritize
if elected to office. Participants could choose to prioritize ‘women in the community’ broadly
speaking, or they could choose to prioritize those ‘who share the same ethnic group as me’
which does not necessarily exclude women, since they may have a preference for prioritizing
the needs and interests of coethnic women in their community. It is also possible for the
same respondent to prioritize both in their top three.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of responses to this question across all candidates sur-
veyed depending on the level of competition faced. For ease of presentation, I summarize
responses within four ranges of electoral competition, ranging from most competitive (aver-
age margin of victory between 20 and 40 percent) to least competitive (average margin of
victory of 80 percentage points or more). This initial look at the data suggests there is a lot
of variation in the share of candidates who prioritize each group depending on whether they
are competing in a more or less competitive environment.
Most notably, this descriptive data suggests that more women in party strongholds favor
clientelistic patterns of constituent group priorities compared to women in highly compet-
itive settings. For example, 43% of candidates in the least competitive party stronghold
constituencies name ‘political party agents’ in their top three compared to just 24% of
women in the most competitive constituencies. The share of candidates in strongholds who
prioritize other groups traditionally linked to the distribution of goods and services through
13Due to some misunderstanding in completing the self-administered questionnaire, it is not possible to distin-
guish between first most important, second most important, and third most important. The data can only
be analyzed by considering whether a given group was in the candidate’s top three.
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clientelistic networks is also noticeably higher than what is observed in most competitive
areas, including more support for prioritizing ‘myself, family, and friends’ as well as mem-
bers of the same religion and the same clan. Somewhat surprisingly in light of much of the
existing literature, more women in stronghold areas prioritize the interests of historically
marginalized groups such as the disabled or physically vulnerable, while fairly high rates of
prioritizing women and youth or children are noted across electoral settings. In contrast,
the results for prioritizing ‘all people’ in the community suggest that adopting a universalist
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Prioritizes Group in Top 3 for Representation
Figure 4: Share of respondents within each level of competition who name a given constituent
group within their top three priorities.
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As alluded to above, some of these answer options arguably capture preferences for pri-
oritizing the representation of similar types of groups, such as those linked to status quo
distributions of political power through client-patron networks or those representing the re-
distribution of resources to historically marginalized groups. Thus, in addition to estimating
the effect of electoral competition on each type of constituent group, I assume that rep-
resentation priorities may be correlated and test for the possibility that different outcome
measures are related to the same underlying latent variable. To gauge the inter-relatedness
of these categories, I perform principal-component analysis (PCA) of the nine original vari-
ables.14 The results indicate that variation in representation priorities largely loads onto
three main component indices which can explain most of the variation in the data. The first
two of these component loadings strongly align with conceptually distinct underlying latent
variables represented by the choice of different groups to prioritize for representation, while
the third component loading seems to be primarily driven by the measure prioritizing ‘all
people in the community.’15 For this reason, I focus on the first two components and predict
the score on each of these for each individual. These two new measures and the variables
that load together on them are as follows:
(1) Clientelistic Groups Index: High positive correlation with prioritizing (A) My po-
litical party agents, (B) Myself, my family, and my close friends, (F) Coethnics, (G)
Members of the same religion, and (H) Members of the same clan/tribal group.
(2) Marginalized Groups Index: High positive correlation with prioritizing (C) Women,
(D) Youth and children, and (I) Disabled and/or Physically Vulnerable.
I refer to the first component index as ‘clientelistic’ because it captures an underlying
preference for prioritizing the needs of social groups known to be conduits for political
patronage. While it is true that some of these groups may genuinely be among those with
the greatest need in the candidate’s community, prioritizing these groups could also be
indicative of quotas for women representatives being used to solidify or reinforce existing
14Details on the procedure and results of the principal component analysis are available in Appendix L.
15I also produced the three indices using inverse covariance weighting (Anderson, 2008) to check the robustness
of the results. A discussion of the differences in these two approaches, along with a comparison of the results,
is included in Appendix P.2.
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bases of political elite power rather than serving to enhance the inclusion of historically
excluded groups in political decision-making. I contrast this with results for the ‘marginalized
groups’ index because this index captures an underlying tendency to prioritize the interests
of groups that are historically marginalized or excluded from benefiting through direct access
to patronage networks that disproportionately benefit men.
Figure 5 gives a preliminary look at how these two indices are represented in the survey
sample within each level of electoral competition. For ease of visual presentation, I divided
the sample into ‘below median’ and ‘above median’ groups based on the scores for each index
and then calculated the share of respondents within each of four bins of electoral competition
who scored above the median or below the median for the sample on each of the two indices.
I do not use the median-cut binary measures of the indices in the main analysis, but they
make it easier to get a sense of the data before proceeding to the statistical estimation of
the relationship.
In general, Figure 5 confirms the patterns noted when considering each of the constituent
group outcomes separately: women in party strongholds are more closely associated with
above median levels of clientelistic group representation than women in more competitive
electoral areas. Meanwhile, there is somewhat less variation in the prioritization of marginal-
ized groups across constituencies by level of competition. However, the high percentage of
above median levels of support for marginalized groups in areas where the average margin
of victory is 41-60 percentage points could suggest that marginalized groups are more likely
to be prioritized in more competitive areas than less competitive ones. On the whole, this
initial look at the patterns across constituencies by level of competition suggests that there
are significant differences among women candidates for local office in terms of the constituent











































Index Score Distribution within Each Level of Competition
Figure 5: Distribution of indices within each bin of electoral competition.
4.5.3 Control variables
To isolate the independent effect of the electoral environment on representation priorities,
I take advantage of additional information about the individual candidates provided by
the survey questionnaire. I briefly review the measures included as controls here, but the
summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are available in Appendix M.
In terms of political factors, I include NRM party affiliation as a binary variable that
takes the value of ‘1’ if the candidate ran under the flag of the NRM and ‘0’ otherwise.
The vast majority of the candidates in the sample are NRM-affiliated (115, or 73%), while
25 (16%) represent the Forum for Democratic Change (the FDC is the leading opposition
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party) and 17 are Independents. The majority of party strongholds in Uganda are dominated
by the NRM, but there are some areas in the study districts where the FDC maintains a
considerable presence, such as in Kasese District. Since Ugandan political parties differ very
little in the substance of their party platforms, I control for party affiliation to capture the
independent effect of competition rather than to account for any substantive differences in
constituent priorities linked to party platform differences. I also include a binary variable that
accounts for whether the candidate’s spouse has served in elected or appointed government
or party leadership (‘spousal networks’). Some evidence suggests women candidates may be
selected by political elites to compete for quota seats as placeholders whose interests are more
closely aligned with male party elites than with the interests of their women constituents
or the population more broadly (Ahikire, 2009). This could be most likely for women with
immediate familial connections.
To account for demographic and economic status variation between individuals, I also
control for age (continuous), marital status (1 = married), religious and ethnic affiliation,
and level of education. Age could impact candidates’ constituent group priorities since age
may be correlated with the extent to which candidates themselves benefit from policy-making
that prioritizes different groups. For instance, younger candidates may be more interested
in prioritizing policy-making that benefits youth, such as job creation. Meanwhile, older
candidates could be more interested in programs aimed at improving adult literacy or elderly
care initiatives. In terms of marital status, interviews conducted by the author in Uganda
suggest that many Ugandan voters perceive a candidate’s marital status as an important
indicator of their ability to lead. Interviewed subjects reported that being married is a
signal that a woman can manage a household, and thus an indication that she can manage
her responsibilities as a woman representative. At the same time, marital status could impact
candidates’ policy preferences and constituent group priorities. For instance, married women
may be more likely to prioritize youth and children as they may also be more likely to have
children of their own. I also include binary indicators for membership in one of the two most
common religious groups in the Western Region (Anglican/Protestant and Catholic) and
membership in one of the two most common ethnic groups in a given study district (varies
by district, but includes Munyakole, Mukiga, Mukhonzo, and Mutoro). In both cases, if the
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candidate is a member, they receive a value of ‘1’ while all others receive a value of ‘0’. I
include membership in these groups because political parties may not be the only source
of influence over candidates in local elections. The extent to which respondents prioritize
other clientelistic interest groups besides political party elites could partly be due to their
membership in socially salient groups.
A candidate’s level of education could also influence their representation priorities. I
include an ‘education index’ composed of survey questions regarding the respondent’s highest
level of education completed, level of literacy, and degree of English fluency. All three
measures are combined into an index using inverse covariance weighting (Anderson, 2008). I
include English fluency and literacy in particular since these factors should affect the ability
of the respondent to fully comprehend and answer the questions in the survey, not to mention
her ability to effectively participate in the legislature (if elected).16 To account for variation
in the socio-economic background of candidates, I include two ordered categorical measures
of household income. One measure asks candidates to rank their household economic well-
being relative to the other households in their constituency, while the second measure asks
candidates to reflect on their subjective level of income and whether it covers their needs
or not. These two measures are not highly correlated, and thus are included separately as
controls.
Finally, I also include a dummy variable for the level of office contested that takes the
value of ‘1’ if the candidate is competing for LC5 woman representative (at the district level)
and ‘0’ if she is competing for LC3 (subcounty) or LC4 (municipality) representative. LC5
candidates must appeal to a larger electoral constituency and campaigns for this position
are much more costly and high profile than that of LC3 or LC4 representative. This could
alter the incentives for women candidates to prioritize certain groups.
Before proceeding to the statistical analysis, I note that there is some interesting variation
in the observable characteristics for women candidates in the sample depending on the level
16English is one of the two official languages of Uganda and the primary language used in national political
bodies. Literacy levels also matter given that budget proposals, council meeting notes, and policy proposals
are frequently circulated before, after, and during meetings, requiring representatives to be able to read in
order to effectively prepare for and participate in council sessions.
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of competition. In Table 8, I present the means for two sets of variables used in the analysis –
the main dependent variables and the main control variables – calculated within each of four
bins of electoral competition. The variation in the controls is especially important to note,
since the data confirms that party strongholds are largely dominated by NRM candidates and
more women in less competitive constituencies report having spouses with ties to government
or party leadership. For the most part, the candidates seem fairly similar to one another on
a range of demographic factors, including across several measures of education and socio-
economic status. This suggests that controlling for these characteristics is important, but
that the variables expected to vary alongside the level of competition generally do so in line
with my expectations.
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Table 8: Variation in the means of variables used in the analysis across four bins of electoral
competition.
Mean Mean Mean Mean
20-40 41-60 61-80 81-100
Dependent Variables
Clientelistic groups index, PCA (continuous) -0.53 0.03 -0.54 0.88
Top 3: Party agents 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.43
Top 3: Self, family, friends 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.39
Top 3: Same religion 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.22
Top 3: Coethnics 0.06 0.29 0.04 0.28
Top 3: Same clan 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.30
Marginalized groups index, PCA (continuous) -0.16 0.71 -0.18 0.10
Top 3: Women 0.41 0.86 0.35 0.56
Top 3: Youth 0.53 0.93 0.46 0.56
Top 3: Disabled/physically vulnerable 0.24 0.07 0.44 0.57
Top 3: All people in the community 0.65 0.71 0.69 0.48
Control Variables
NRM affiliated (%) 0.24 0.57 0.88 0.74
Spousal networks (%) 0.18 0.28 0.34 0.32
Age (continous) 41.29 40.71 43.42 42.84
Married (%) 0.59 0.36 0.75 0.79
Member of dominant religion (%) 0.47 0.43 0.70 0.72
Member of dominant ethnic group (%) 0.65 0.71 0.80 0.85
Education index (continuous) 0.34 0.55 -0.36 0.23
Highest level of educ completed (0-7) 2.35 2.76 1.62 2.43
Literacy level (0-2) 1.87 1.93 1.51 1.75
English fluency (0-2) 1.53 1.57 1.26 1.46
Subjective HH monthly income (1-4) 2.06 2.73 2.11 2.22
Subjective relative HH econ. well-being (1-5) 3.18 3.90 3.61 3.52
HH dependents under age 13 (continuous) 2.59 2.76 2.88 2.52
LC3 Candidates (%) 0.53 0.43 0.83 0.56
LC4 Candidates (%) 0.24 0.36 0.00 0.00
LC5 Candidates (%) 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.44
N 17 14 72 54




While the descriptive evidence suggests there is some variation in representation priori-
ties given the competitiveness of the electoral environment, it is still necessary to evaluate
whether this is driven primarily by competition (or lack thereof), or some other factor. For
this reason, I estimate a series of regressions with each index of representation included (sep-
arately) as the dependent variable. Electoral competition enters these models as the main
independent variable of interest, but I also include the covariates listed above as controls
since they could theoretically impact the likelihood that a candidate would prefer prioritizing
a particular group once in office. To estimate the effect of electoral competition on women
candidates’ representation priorities, I employ an ordinary least squares regression of the
following form:
Yij = α + βCi +X
′
iγ + ij (4.1)
where Yij is the outcome (score on a given representation index measured as a continuous
variable) for individual candidate i in county j. Ci is a continuous measure of the level
of electoral competition in the county where the individual competed in 2016. The key
coefficient of interest is β, which gives the effect of a percentage point increase in the average
margin of victory (i.e. a decrease in the level of competition faced) on the level of support for
prioritizing a given constituent group index. X ′iγ is a vector of control variables (identified
in Section 4.5.3 above) included to improve efficiency and isolate the effect of the electoral
environment on women candidates’ representation priorities, while ij is the individual level
error term clustered at the level of the constituency.17 I implemented 10 rounds of predictive
mean-matching imputation to address a small amount of item-level missingness in survey
17I cluster standard errors at the constituency-level because this is the level at which I assign the measure of
electoral competition to candidates in my dataset. In Appendix O and Appendix P, I check the sensitivity
of the results to the use of robust standard errors as well.
129
covariates.18 Where measures capture one latent trait of interest, I aggregate them into
indices using inverse covariance weighting which creates an optimal weighted average by
weighting-up index components that provide more ‘new’ information (Anderson, 2008).
In the main text I present only the results for the main model specification which includes
all covariates as controls and clustered standard errors at the constituency level. I present the
regression table of the output for the models that include the indices as continuous dependent
variables in Appendix O, but I present figures showing the average value of the dependent
variable for different levels of competition (continuous measure) holding all other variables
in the model at their means in Section 4.6.2 below. In the specifications where I evaluate
the probability of a candidate prioritizing a specific group in their top three rather than one
of the indices, I use a probit specification to accommodate the binary dependent variable.
I check the robustness of the main results to several alternative specifications, including
no controls, original controls plus constituency fixed effects, original controls plus district
fixed effects, additional controls developed from the survey data, and additional controls
to account for district-level variation that could plausibly influence candidates’ constituent
group priorities (see Appendix P). I also confirm the main results for the subsample of only
those women who are fluent in English given that the surveys were self-administered and
printed in English. In general, the main results for the effect of competition on candidates’
representation priorities holds across specifications, though I note some differences in the
significance of the control variables depending on the specification (discussed at length in
Appendix P).
4.6.2 Regression results
The effect of electoral competition on candidates’ representation priorities measured as con-
tinuous indices of clientelistic or marginalized group priorities is presented in Figure 6. This
is akin to running an ordinary least squares regression of each level of competition on the
outcome and producing the adjusted average effect at each level holding all other variables
at their means. In the first panel of Figure 6, the results suggest that there is significant vari-
18Details on the imputation are available in Appendix N.
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ation in the likelihood that women candidates will prioritize clientelistic constituent groups
for representation in more competitive compared to less competitive electoral environments.
The average index of clientelistic group priorities in the most competitive constituencies is
negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, while the average level of clientelistic
priorities increases as constituencies become less competitive. This translates into a negative
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Figure 6: Constituent group priorities at different levels of competition, all controls held at
means.
In contrast, the second panel of Figure 6 indicates that the level of competition has
no statistically significant effect on women candidates’ intent to prioritize the kinds of con-
stituent groups that make up the index of marginalized groups. In fact, there is no indication
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that electoral competition – whether at the lowest or at the highest levels – influences the
prioritization of marginalized groups broadly defined. This lack of variation is clearly differ-
ent from what occurs in the case of clientelistic representation, where there are differences
in priorities in the most competitive compared to the least competitive constituencies in the
sample.
The regression table of coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for all variables in the
two equations depicted above are available in Appendix O. In the main model specification
with controls and constituency clustered standard errors (Model 2), the output confirms that
a percentage point increase in the average margin of victory (corresponding to a decrease
in competitiveness) is associated with a statistically significant 0.02 unit increase in the
likelihood of demonstrating clientelistic group priorities (p-value = 0.065). In Model 3 (only
presented in the Appendix), I include constituency fixed-effects to account for some of the
unobservable variation that could be affecting the results. This leads to an increase in
the size of the effect, yielding a statically strong and large positive relationship between a
decrease in competition and the level of clientelistic group representation (p-value=0.000,
coefficient=0.09). As illustrated in the second Panel in Figure 6, the regression output
confirms that there is no evidence of a statistically significant effect of competition on the
marginalized group index. However, I acknowledge this result with some caution since the
specification that includes constituency fixed effects does show a highly significant negative
effect of an increase in the margin of victory (corresponding to a decrease in the level of
competition faced) on prioritizing marginalized groups.
To understand how much these effects may be driven by the various components of each
index, I also estimate the predicted probability that a candidate will select a given index
component as one of their top three priorities at various levels of competition, holding all
other variables at their means. Figure 7 shows the results for the trace elements that correlate
with the clientelistic groups index, while Figure 8 presents the primary elements underlying
the marginalized groups index. The results for each clientelistic group considered separately
suggest that there are three constituent groups that women candidates are significantly more
likely to prioritize in strongholds compared to in competitive election areas: the candidate’s
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personal network of family and friends, those who share the candidate’s religion, and those
who belong to the same tribe or clan. The direction of the effect, while not significantly
different at conventional levels, also suggests that prioritizing political party agents and
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Same Clan
Figure 7: Average predicted probability of prioritizing clientelistic constituent groups, all
controls at their means and standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
Meanwhile, the group-specific outcomes presented in Figure 8 suggest a slightly different
story than the results for the index of marginalized groups overall. Here, it is clear that the
probability of prioritizing women is consistent across electoral settings, but there is some
evidence that the likelihood of prioritizing the disabled or physically vulnerable increases in
party strongholds compared to more competitive electoral settings. While there is a slight
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negative effect of stronghold status on the probability of prioritizes the interests of youth
or children, the slope of the line linking the averages (holding all control variables at their
means) is fairly flat. This suggests that the probability of a woman candidate prioritizing
women or youth is fairly consistent regardless of the level of electoral competition. This could
indicate that electoral competition does little to affect whether women or youth will receive
attention from women politicians. Although, there is some evidence that other marginalized
groups may be more likely to benefit in strongholds than in competitive areas, such as the
disabled or physically vulnerable. At the same time, it is clear that clientelistic groups receive
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Disabled/Physically Vulnerable
Figure 8: Average predicted probability of prioritizing marginalized constituent groups, all
controls at their means and standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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Yet, none of the evidence presented thus far indicates a clear trend in priorities in compet-
itive constituencies. In the theory section, I anticipated that a lack of clientelistic preferences
in competitive areas could signal a more universalist approach to representing all members
of the constituency, broadly speaking. To this end, I also consider whether the tendency to
adopt a more universalist outlook varies by competitiveness. I present the results for the
probability of prioritizing ‘all people in the community’ across different levels of competition
in Figure 9. The results suggest a dramatic decrease in representation for all in the absence
of political competition. This drop corresponds with the increased likelihood of prioritiz-
ing narrowly defined in-groups, but also coincides with a steady probability of supporting
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Figure 9: Average predicted probability of prioritizing all people in the constituency, all
controls at their means and standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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Lastly, while I do control for NRM party affiliation in the models that produced the
results shown above, I took an additional step with my analysis to evaluate the conditional
marginal effect of NRM affiliation (relative to non-NRM affiliation) across all levels of com-
petition on both the clientelistic groups index and the marginalized groups index. While I
do not report the results here, I confirm that there is no clear evidence that NRM-affiliation
has an additional influence on candidates’ priorities that is statistically different from the
effect of competition for non-NRM candidates.
4.7 GENERAL DISCUSSION
4.7.1 Summary and interpretation of main findings
Overall, my analysis of the survey data indicates support for the expectation that women
candidates in party strongholds will be more likely to prioritize the interests of constituents
with ties to clientelistic networks than women candidates in more competitive constituencies.
By contrast, women candidates in highly competitive areas are significantly more likely than
women in party strongholds to adopt a more universalist approach to representing all mem-
bers of their community as a whole. This could reflect strategic incentives women candidates
in competitive areas face to appeal to a wider range of constituent groups with the power
to influence the outcome of the electoral process, whereas in party strongholds there are
stronger incentives for women candidates to reinforce existing norms of clientelistic politics
rather than issue-based politics. At the same time, however, I find some evidence that women
candidates in party strongholds are more likely than those in competitive constituencies to
prioritize the interests of disabled or physically vulnerable groups. This could suggest that
party strongholds afford women candidates the opportunity to selectively redirect resources
toward historically marginalized groups. Additional research is needed to unpack whether
this is something that distinguishes women candidates for quota seats from their male col-
leagues and from women holding unreserved seats. Otherwise, it is difficult to interpret this
as evidence of any improvement in access to clientelistic networks of resource distribution
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for marginalized groups in party strongholds following the adoption of gender-based quotas.
Importantly, my results hold while controlling for individual-level factors that could vary
across candidates, such as level of education, socio-economic well-being, religious, and ethnic
affiliation. This suggests that regardless of individual candidate factors, the competitiveness
of the electoral setting can exert an independent effect on the electoral strategies adopted
by women candidates for office. These strategies – in the form of which constituent groups
candidates tend to prioritize if elected to office – may reflect a more nuanced understanding of
the groups whose support candidates believe they need to win office in competitive compared
to non-competitive settings. Where victory is virtually assured once the primary elections
are over (non-competitive, stronghold areas), women representatives may be more likely to
use their reserved seat to channel benefits toward groups linked to status quo norms of
clientelistic politics.
One way to interpret this is as evidence that quotas implemented in the context of
electoral competition are more likely to lead to equitable representation for all community
members, whereas quotas without competition may only reinforce the power of existing
client-patron networks in politics. Given that these networks largely exclude women from
meaningful decision-making processes (Beall, 2005), this could contribute to the perpetua-
tion of gender inequality even when quotas are effective at getting more women in office.
The extent to which these clientelistic patterns of behavior in party strongholds affect the
potential for broader swaths of the electorate to benefit from having more women in office
likely depends on the extent to which women candidates plan to focus mostly on directing
the flow of resources to select patrons rather than considering the broader interests of the
constituency as a whole. To the extent that women candidates face a trade-off in choosing
client group members over collective policy gains for broader swaths of the electorate, then
quotas may serve to reinforce existing inequalities in political decision-making rather than
enhancing the inclusion of all individuals belonging to historically excluded groups. This is
important, since this is exactly the kind of inequality in political participation that quotas
for group-based descriptive representation are intended to help correct.
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4.7.2 Additional considerations and study limitations
These results also merit discussion in light of the limitations of the survey sample. As noted
previously, the sample of women who responded to the survey was a non-random sample of
women, composed entirely of women seeking to serve in reserved seats. It is worth considering
whether these results should be expected to vary if the sample included women running for
office in open elections against men as well as for reserved seats. While qualitative data I
collected from interviews and focus groups with women candidates, elected representatives,
and non-profit professionals suggest that it is still exceedingly rare for women to contest
for open seats against men, this is an area that many non-governmental organizations (like
CEWIGO) hope to improve on in the future.
If the logic forwarded here is correct, then it is not obvious that we should expect
women’s behavior to change much in open/unreserved seat contests relative to reserved
contests. It is highly unlikely that a woman candidate would be elected without facing
competition since she is almost certain to be opposed by at least one male candidate given
evidence that male co-partisans are typically the most threatened by the adoption of quotas
for women in government (Zetterberg, 2008). There are at least two possibilities given
this scenario. On the one hand, competition for the party nomination could lead women
candidates for open seats to show even more deference to party leaders, thus increasing their
likelihood of prioritizing clientelistic representation strategies. On the other hand, party
leaders themselves want to see candidates nominated who have the best chance who have
the best chance of winning. Given that existing evidence shows that public attitudes toward
women in leadership positions do not always improve following quotas when quotas give the
impression that women candidates could not compete against men on the basis of merit
and qualifications alone (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008), it is not clear that a political
party would back a woman candidate over a suitable male candidate for the nomination
in a highly competitive context. This puts women seeking open seats in the position of
contesting as Independents (in the event that they do not secure the party nomination),
which is much more difficult to manage from a financial perspective. This suggests that,
somewhat unexpectedly, the most favorable place for a woman to contest an open seat would
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be in party strongholds where the outcome of the electoral process can be more effectively
controlled by the dominant political party. Provided she can secure the party nomination
in the primary, this could put additional pressure on women in open seats in strongholds to
appeal to the interests of powerful party elites. Once again, this illustrates how even with
quotas designed to enhance women’s participation in office, women are more constrained
than their male colleagues by structural inequalities that make it difficult for them to act
with the same degree of freedom as their male colleagues.
This discussion is also pertinent to the issue of potential endogeneity in that the level
of competition could have an influence on the types of women who run in a given area.
The concern is whether competition affects the supply of candidates (who are more or less
clientelistic), or whether competition influences women candidates to prioritize different
things. In short, the answer is likely to be both. Based on the preceding discussion, another
factor to consider is the influence of party leaders over the outcome of the nomination process.
In less competitive areas, women candidates know they are unlikely to win without party
support, so women who do not support the party or lack strong connections to party elites
may be less likely to run in general. This could result in women who are more prone to
client representation priorities to dominate the slate of candidates in party strongholds. By
contrast, there is less certainty over who will win in competitive areas, which may attract
women candidates who vary more in their representation priorities, and not all of whom
prioritize the interests of political party elites or other select in-groups. Thus, the supply
of candidate types could differ across constituencies as a byproduct of the level of electoral
competition. Even so, this does not detract from the overall finding in this essay that
institutional conditions impact the ability of women to organize and participate in political
decision-making without regard for the interests and preferences of a predominantly male
political elite. If party strongholds are more likely to attract party loyalists than those
seeking to prioritize the interests of all constituents, this still constitutes a potential barrier
to mobilizing and acting on behalf of women’s policy interests to the extent that they deviate
from those of elite interests.
As a final consideration, the results should be interpreted as preliminary evidence rather
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than conclusive given the same sample size as well as the potential for unobserved factors
to be driving the results. While I try to control for this possibility in the robustness checks
included in Appendix P, it is important to acknowledge that future iterations of this research
could include other variables in the analysis that could influence the results but which were
not possible to obtain in this study. For instance, at the individual-level ideally I would want
to control for whether the candidate was the incumbent and whether they had previously
received training on electoral strategy since either of these could influence their priorities.
As well, I would ideally create a measure of electoral competition that would not require
aggregating across subcounties and losing so much of the variation in the sample. This is-
sue in particular could be addressed if I were to expand the coverage of women candidates
surveyed to a representative sample of a random selection of constituencies across Ugandan
districts and ensure even coverage across the level of office contested. Moreover, while I at-
tempt to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to district-level variation in observable factors
such as gender inequality, poverty, and development (access to clean water and electricity)
in the Appendix, it would be an improvement to be able to account for these factors at the
constituency level. Future iterations of this research should bear these limitations in mind.
4.8 CONCLUSION
On the whole, I find that there is variation among women candidates in terms of the electoral
strategies they emphasize. Depending on the competitiveness of the electoral environment
and the degree to which existing political elites control the candidate selection process,
women may be more likely to prioritize constituent groups consistent with those favored
by the dominant party in the area. This implies that women candidates may not always
be motivated to prioritize the interests of women constituents generally speaking; in the
absence of electoral competition that creates opportunities to appeal to voters who may not
be at the top of the ruling party’s agenda, they may be more inclined to adhere to existing
political norms of clientelism along status quo group lines.
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This is an important finding because it shows that women politicians may not always
be motivated to act on behalf of their women constituents, broadly speaking. This matters
because it suggests that substantive representation of women may not follow from the de-
scriptive representation of women in settings where the institutional reality of financing and
running an election campaign requires considerable support from the ruling elite. Given the
systematic inequalities in access to the resources needed to participate equally in political
life, women candidates may find it difficult to step outside of the boundaries of political
priorities set up a predominantly male political elite. This interpretation of the evidence is
consistent with feminist critiques of democratic systems that fail to provide the tools and
entitlements necessary for women to participate as equal citizens (Pateman, 1988, 2011; Task
Force on Democracy, Economic Security, and Social Justice in a Volatile World, 2011).
As such, this essay also implies that an alternative mechanism through which policy-
makers can positively influence the quality of representation for women as a population
group would be to focus on improving the conditions under which quota women run for
office. Specifically, these results underscore the importance of a competitive electoral process
for democratic accountability. In this sense, these findings are consistent with other recent
evidence from Uganda that incumbent representatives (broadly defined to include both men
and women) are more likely to advocate on behalf of their constituents when they face a
more competitive electoral environment (Grossman and Michelitch, 2018). With respect to
women politicians, I find preliminary evidence that the incentives to substantively represent
constituent groups hold not only for incumbents, but also for the broader pool of candidates
available to voters at the ballot box. On the whole, this research underscores the need to
build more effective political institutions alongside the introduction of quotas if the goal is
ultimately to improve equity in outcomes for all rather than a subset of those individuals with
access to clientelistic networks of political support. My findings caution against assuming
that women politicians for office will necessarily be motivated to actively pursue the interests
of women in their community as opposed to the interests of a narrow client base. Rather,
women may be constrained by the broader reality of social inequalities that persist along
gender lines and affect the extent to which they can afford to deviate from status quo patterns
of representation, as well as the extent to which they may even be motivated to do so.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
5.1 OVERVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS
On the whole, the evidence presented in these three essays paints a stark picture of the
prospects for cooperation among women on the basis of shared gender group membership
alone. Indeed, the evidence suggests that differences among women consistent with cleavages
along elite versus non-elite lines constitute a significant barrier to collective action in groups.
I review the key insights of my dissertation below before proceeding to focus on how insights
from intersectional scholarship can aid in interpreting the implications of these results for
policy-makers seeking to address the problem of women’s political inequality worldwide.
In the first essay, I examine whether women and men respond differently to the ethnic
composition of group settings with the goal of demonstrating that there are important within-
gender group differences in terms of the salience of ethnic group membership for individual
behavior. I find weak evidence that women and men differ in terms of their willingness
to cooperate with non-coethnics but strong evidence that strength of attachment to ethnic
(i.e. sectarian) identity reinforces norms of coethnic favoritism among men but not among
women. I also find that women with weaker attachment to their gender identity cooperate
more in same-ethnic than in mixed-ethnic settings. This could suggest that increasing the
salience of gender identity among women may help reduce barriers to cooperation among
women across ethnic lines. However, the extent to which this is possible could depend on the
ways in which women differ in other socially salient ways. For instance, I find that both men
and women with access to benefits through politicians are less cooperative in mixed-ethnic
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than in same-ethnic groups. I interpret this as evidence that it is not the case that women
are inherently less biased against members of other ethnic groups than men are, but that
women overall benefit less – in a material sense – from these networks, which makes them
less susceptible to stronger norms of cooperation in same-ethnic compared to mixed-ethnic
groups. Yet, these results suggest that women with access may differ from women without
access to resources through existing political elite networks of clientelism. This suggests a
potential cleavage among women along socio-economic class lines that informs the next two
essays.
In the second essay, I develop a more focused analysis of cooperation among women
(using men as a comparison group for perspective) and examine whether there are barriers
to cooperation along socio-economic class lines. This investigation complements the finding
in the first essay that women with access to benefits through the sectarian political system
behave very differently in mixed-sect group settings than women without access. I find that
both rich and poor women cooperate significantly less in mixed-class than in same-class
groups, though the negative effect of the mixed-class setting is most pronounced for rich
women. In contrasting this with what I observe for all-male groups, I find that the negative
effect of the mixed-class group setting is unique to women in my sample. Given that the data
was collected at a time of unusually heightened political discourse on the need to work across
sect/ethnic and class lines, the persistence of the observation that class differences among
women translate into barriers to cooperation is especially noteworthy. On the whole, both
essays support my argument that it is important to examine within-gender group differences
in cooperation because the logics thought to explain in-group favoritism in cooperation may
not always apply to men and women in the same way depending on how gender interacts
with the salience of other social, political, or economic group differences.
The third essay broadens the scope of inquiry to demonstrate how the institutional en-
vironment can also influence the behavior of politically connected women and yield different
outcomes in terms of the types of constituent groups women politicians intend to prioritize.
Drawing on survey responses from a sample of largely well-connected women candidates for
reserved quota seats in Uganda, I find that women in non-competitive, party stronghold en-
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vironments are significantly more likely to prioritize the needs and interests of more narrowly
defined in-groups – such as political party agents, family and friends, and members of the
same clan and same religion – than are women in competitive areas. At the same time, the
likelihood of intending to represent all members of the community significantly increases as
competition increases, while the level of support for prioritizing women constituents remains
fairly consistent across electoral settings. Overall, this suggests that institutional conditions
– such as the competitiveness of the electoral environment – influence the likelihood that
women elected under reserved seats will advocate on behalf of the interests of the historically
marginalized groups the quotas are designed to empower rather than perpetuating status quo
distributions of political power through existing clientelistic networks. This suggests that
it is possible broader gains for women overall are more likely to take place in competitive
electoral areas, while benefits may be more likely to accrue to existing networks of political
elites in less competitive electoral areas. Thus, the distribution of gains for women on the
ground may be partly explained by the presence, or absence, of incentives for politically
connected women to appeal to a broader range of voters outside of their immediate circle of
existing political elites.
As laid out in the introductory chapter, I see the implications of my empirical investi-
gations as evidence of the importance of taking the insights of theories of intersectionality
seriously. Consistent with Collins (2015) and Hancock (2007), I see intersectionality as a
critique of the “race-as-a-variable” approach in quantitative social science (Harnois, 2010).
According to Harnois (2010), a major insight of intersectional scholarship is that reducing
race (or other group categories) to a binary categorical variable is problematic because it
assumes that all members of that category are influenced by the same set of characteristics
and experiences in the same way. This can lead researchers to arrive at erroneous conclu-
sions about why individuals behave a certain way in a given context and whether they can
always be expected to behave that way. In particular, policies designed to correct historic
imbalances in political power based on generalizations about women as a group may not
be effective or sufficient in isolation and may even contribute to ignorance regarding the
persistence of marginalization in some communities.
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My dissertation applies this critical insight to an empirical investigation of the extent
to which differences among women can inhibit cooperation around any collective interests
that women might share on the basis of their shared experience as women. My finding that
women face considerable barriers to cooperation along socio-economic class lines resonates
with canonical examples of intersectional scholarship. For instance, Dill (1983) documents
and explains how a long history of cross-cutting race and class cleavages create obstacles to
mobilization among women in the United States. Moreover, the insight that elite women
tend to cooperate with one another and reinforce existing distributions of political power
that privilege them over other subgroups of women is consistent with evidence that group-
based advocacy at the intersection of race, class, and gender tends to privilege the interests
of those who are better off within the group than members of disadvantaged subgroups
(Strolovitch, 2006). This is also consistent with my finding that politically well-connected
women are not more likely to direct their efforts in policy-making toward disadvantaged or
marginalized constituent groups unless the electoral environment incentivizes them to do so.
In the absence of electoral accountability, politically well-connected women candidates may
be more likely to reinforce status quo patterns of inequality in access to benefits than to
work to correct them.
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY-MAKING
Arguably the most important application of intersectional theory to my findings lies with
interpreting the results to inform policy-making that could better address gender inequality
on a broad scale. In this section, I elaborate on several key policy recommendations that
emerge from my findings when considered from an intersectional perspective.
First, given the evidence that well-connected and wealthy women may be more likely
to prioritize the interests of other elite women over the interests of women in general, some
might conclude that quota-based seats for women in politics are a bad idea since they are
prone to elite capture. Instead, I argue that the potential for elite women to abuse their
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access to political power is evidence of a kind of gender equality in political participation
since these “bad” practices are emblematic of the patron-client politics of male-dominated
political networks in many societies where political corruption and in-group favoritism rule
(Goetz, 2007). Rather than abandoning quotas for women’s representation altogether in
these contexts, I argue that we need to consider implementing other policies and reforms
alongside quotas that help to address the problems identified by examining the cleavages
among women within these settings. In particular, my evidence suggests that women from
different socio-economic backgrounds are less likely to work with one another in the pursuit
of collective gains. This makes it problematic if all women holding quota seats come from
the same, upper-income background. While they may work well together, they will not
necessarily share the same policy priorities as lower-income women which could result in these
women’s needs going largely unaddressed even though the semblance of having representation
is there in the form of “women representatives.” This is the danger that intersectionality
warns against, the perception that all women are represented when it is possible that the
interests of only a subset of women really are.
To address this issue, policy-makers should consider adopting quotas in the context of
reforms that aid in increasing the diversity of women candidates competing for seats. In
particular, my research draws attention to the need to vary the representation of candidates
from different socio-economic backgrounds. Some examples of reforms that could help in
this context involve reducing financial barriers to entry for candidates. For example, policy-
makers could begin to address political inequities along class lines that are magnified by
cross-cutting inequalities along gender lines by correcting structural inequalities between
men and women in access to resources (including financial and social capital) (Pateman,
1988, 1996). For instance, Pateman (2011) argues for a basic income guarantee to help
level the playing field with respect to financial security which can greatly influence the
ability of women in particular to effectively participate in public decision-making. As well,
campaign finance reform could help reduce barriers to candidate entry that systematically
disadvantage women relative to men in many countries where women lack the same degree
of access to financial resources or social networks due to their marginalization within the
labor force (Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo, 2012). Other examples speak to how changes
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in procedures could help alleviate pressures that disproportionately disadvantage women of
limited financial means. In interviews with women representatives in local government in
Uganda, I frequently heard women ask that the voting process be more localized (reducing the
need to travel long distances, which can be prohibitively expensive), as well as consolidated
to a single day (streamlining the process to vote on all positions on a single day on a single
ballot also lowers costs and barriers to entry for voters as well as candidates). In some cases,
these types of adjustments to the political process may help reduce the salience of these
structural inequalities and create more opportunities for women outside of elite political
circles to compete for elected office. This could increase electoral competition, which could
in turn incentivize candidates to appeal to a broader swath of the electorate.
Another possible approach to improving the utility of quotas for addressing women’s
political inequality might be to expand the size of the quota requirement. In most settings,
quotas for women’s representation in politics are set somewhere below 50 percent. In increas-
ing the share of seats held by women and thus the count of women in office, it is reasonable
to expect that this could lead to more diversity among those women holding office. Greater
diversity among women representatives could translate into a higher likelihood that the in-
terests of a broader range of women in the population as a whole will be represented. In any
case, my findings clearly point toward the need to empower more different types of women,
which necessarily entails tackling barriers to political participation that exist for women not
only on the basis of their gender identity, but because of how their gender group membership
intersects with other aspects of how they are situated in society.
Finally, my findings yield insights into opportunities for mobilizing women across group
lines. The evidence of socio-economic class divisions among women is particularly striking
in my dissertation, perhaps even more so given the suggestive evidence that women are
even more responsive to class cleavages than to ethnic cleavages in some settings. This
suggests that an important new avenue for applied work is in the area of understanding
how to breakdown class divisions among women, but also to better understand the micro-
foundations behind why this cleavage appears to be especially salient in interactions between
women. On the one hand, my results suggest that women may be especially amenable
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to mobilizing for collective action within socio-economic class groups, regardless of ethnic
divisions. But on the other hand, they suggest that there is a real need to figure out
how to reduce barriers to cooperation among women across class lines. This could be a
fruitful area for new work on inter-group contact, democratic deliberation, cooperation, and
collaboration. In this context, intersectionality reminds us that these differences among
women in terms of socio-economic status and political connectedness are not given as fixed,
but instead can take on different meanings given a different context. For instance, rather
than framing wealth inequality among women as a threat or cause for division that impedes
progress in other areas of shared interest, group dialogues could help women find common
ground and a rallying point for collective efforts. My argument here echoes Collins (2015, 8)
in her description of the work of Valk (2008), whom she describes as detailing the efforts of
women’s organizations to build broad coalitions across categories of “race, class, gender, and
sexuality” in order to push for policy change on issues of shared interest that “linked African
American identity politics with those of white women across class and sexual orientation.” A
key insight here is that perceptions of the importance of socio-economic and ethnic cleavages
are malleable. These differences can become less salient in the context of an elevated sense of
collective gains to be had from cooperating on “collective interests” shared across subgroups
of women. Presenting women with opportunities and spaces in which to articulate and
discover these shared interests as well as act on them could go a long way towards building
cross-categorical coalitions with the power to enact the kind of changes that could have
widespread impacts on gender inequality in society at large.
5.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
Fundamentally, this dissertation is about unpacking the complexity inside group categories.
Consequently, it is also about the dangers of failing to consider how variation within groups
is related to very different patterns of behavior and attitudes than what might be expected
based on assumptions about the group as a whole. As such, this body of work joins that of
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others in recent years to encourage researchers and policymakers alike to pay more attention
to how individuals are shaped and influenced by the many contextual factors that surround
their decision-making processes in any given moment. Some of these are social or political
differences in group membership or belonging, others are related to the broader institutional
context or the ways in which that context interacts with and alters the salience of group
categories and the norms and values linked to them. While there is clearly value in identifying
broad patterns of behavior associated with group categorizations, it is also important to be
vigilant to the ways in which these patterns shift given certain conditions.
As the results presented in these essays show, some of the ambiguity in empirical findings
related to studies of gender, representation, cooperation, ethnic politics, and socio-economic
status may be due to the complexity of group membership and categorization. Following
other scholars in this area, I encourage future research to re-examine the evidence collected
to date and consider how it could be re-evaluated or reinterpreted given more careful at-
tention to the fact that many group-level categories used to identify individuals (such as
gender) suggest different kinds of behaviors in different social settings because of the way
in which they interact with other facts that can vary at the individual level. This is an
important position to adopt because of what it can tell researchers and policymakers about
the possibilities for a policy based on generalizations about group categories to address the
political marginalization of all group members. My empirical tests illustrate how ending
gender inequality in political participation on a large scale will require a more proactive
approach to understanding how individuals are situated within institutional structures that




BALANCE CHECK FOR MIXED-SECT TREATMENT
The screening and pre-treatment surveys contain a large number of pre-treatment covariates
that can be used to check balance. Table 9 shows the results of the balance test for our
full sample overall using 56 pre-treatment covariates. We also present the balance test
for our women’s subsample (Table 10) and for our men’s subsample (Table 11) to confirm
that the randomization was equally effective across the relevant gender subgroups. While
we check balance using the individual covariates, we also use inverse covariance weighting
to create pre-specified indices for measures that capture a common underlying concept, as
described in Section 2.4.2 of the main text. In all three balance tables, we present results
of the balance tests for the individual covariates as well as for the indices but note that if
there is an imbalance in an index component there is likely to be imbalance in the index
itself. We test for balance by running our main estimation equation specified in Section
2.4.2 of the main paper. Specifically, we run a weighted least squares regression of each
covariate on the treatment assignment indicator (excluding other covariates), where weights
account for unequal treatment assignment probabilities in ‘smaller’ strata (see discussion in
the Appendix for the second dissertation chapter).
The balance test for the full sample shown in Table 9 demonstrates that only 3 out of 56
covariates are significant at the 95 percent confidence level, well within what we would expect
to observe by chance. The vast majority of the coefficients are close to zero as well. Similarly,
the balance test for women shown in Table 10 reveals that only 3 out of 56 covariates are
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significant at the 95 percent confidence level, which is also about what we would expect to
happen by chance. Also as expected, the coefficients are close to zero for most covariates.
The balance test for men shown in Table 11 reveals that 5 out of 56 covariates are significant
at the 95 percent confidence level, which is still within what we would expect to see by
chance. Also as expected, the coefficients are close to zero for most covariates.
These results help to address concerns about the integrity of the randomization described
in the Appendix for the second dissertation chapter. In our main analysis we nevertheless
control for indices and individual variables to address further concerns, with the exception
of excluding the final 5 variables presented in the balance table (‘people in the group known
prior to the session’ and ‘answered all practice problem questions correctly’). Since pay-
off comprehension was measured after exposure to the group composition treatment (same-
versus mixed-class), we instead use this measure as a robustness check instead in Appendix
C.1, where we also check the robustness of our main results to the inclusion of the variable
representing ‘people in the group known prior to the session.’ Taken together, these addi-
tional balance tests lend support to our contention that the randomization procedure was
largely effective in ensuring that unobservable (and observable) characteristics are likely to
be evenly distributed across our treatment (mixed-sect) and control (same-sect) groups.
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Age 31.95 -0.78 0.324
Married (%) 0.49 0.04 0.295
Post-secondary education (%) 0.66 0.03 0.483
Christian (%) 0.33 0.00 0.940
Shia (%) 0.33 0.00 0.966
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.00 0.972
Economic status index -0.03 0.04 0.575
Value of total household assets 1.63 0.01 0.872
Estimated area (size) of household 1.69 0.04 0.514
Owns a summer house 2.03 0.01 0.936
Power alternatives during an outage 2.56 -0.01 0.839
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.88 0.00 0.995
Frequency of dining out per month 2.09 0.03 0.571
Monthly household net income 6.70 0.07 0.571
Subjective monthly household income 3.30 -0.02 0.808
Total net monthly household income 6.26 -0.02 0.896
Household’s economic class 1.02 0.03 0.639
Students (%) 0.14 0.00 0.935
Homemakers (%) 0.23 0.00 0.919
Prejudice against members of other sects index 0.06 -0.12 0.115
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.30 -0.08 0.334
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.36 -0.05 0.327
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.58 -0.11 0.058
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.07 -0.07 0.422
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.62 -0.01 0.874
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.70 -0.07 0.259
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.40 -0.11 0.026
Political activity/engagement index 0.03 -0.03 0.688
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.71 0.01 0.853
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.12 0.00 0.938
Signed a petition 0.07 -0.02 0.306
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.37 0.00 0.927
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.09 -0.19 0.015
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.92 -0.13 0.085
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.75 -0.17 0.037
Frequency discussing issues with people you disagree with often 2.30 0.02 0.713
Strength of sectarian identity index 0.04 -0.09 0.243
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.47 -0.11 0.088
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.48 -0.02 0.616
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.30 0.00 0.986
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index 0.00 -0.02 0.842
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.87 0.02 0.791
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 2.13 -0.05 0.531
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.52 0.04 0.798
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 5.08 0.01 0.964
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.90 -0.07 0.650
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.55 0.10 0.488
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.78 -0.28 0.071
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.42 -0.04 0.276
Number of participants in session 0.94 0.02 0.202
People in the group known prior to the session 0.06 0.07 0.057
Days until the next election 62.94 -3.64 0.106
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.82 0.04 0.207
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.97 0.01 0.508
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.90 0.02 0.415
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.91 0.01 0.642
Notes: P-values are from a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=713.
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Age 37.03 -1.92 0.158
Married (%) 0.72 0.00 0.977
Post-secondary education (%) 0.60 0.02 0.709
Christian (%) 0.33 0.00 1.000
Shia (%) 0.33 0.00 0.956
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.00 0.957
Economic status index -0.11 0.04 0.696
Value of total household assets 1.61 0.02 0.858
Estimated area (size) of household 1.69 0.04 0.587
Owns a summer house 2.04 -0.02 0.895
Power alternatives during an outage 2.50 -0.03 0.820
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.83 -0.01 0.949
Frequency of dining out per month 2.04 0.04 0.680
Monthly household net income 6.60 0.07 0.728
Subjective monthly household income 3.28 -0.02 0.885
Total net monthly household income 6.16 -0.19 0.388
Household’s economic class 1.02 0.05 0.553
Students (%) 0.11 -0.01 0.800
Homemakers (%) 0.57 0.00 0.939
Prejudice against members of other sects index 0.21 -0.12 0.331
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.60 -0.17 0.213
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.36 0.01 0.888
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.58 -0.13 0.153
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.17 0.03 0.836
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.65 0.10 0.347
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.73 -0.18 0.061
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.44 -0.18 0.030
Political activity/engagement index -0.13 -0.10 0.425
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.65 0.03 0.666
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.11 -0.02 0.692
Signed a petition 0.06 -0.04 0.131
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.29 -0.06 0.318
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.16 -0.07 0.606
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.93 -0.03 0.833
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.85 -0.09 0.547
Frequency discussing issues with people you disagree with often 2.30 0.09 0.361
Strength of sectarian identity index 0.13 -0.07 0.586
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.52 -0.01 0.926
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.51 -0.08 0.282
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.37 0.08 0.750
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index -0.24 0.11 0.345
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.64 0.10 0.349
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 1.93 0.09 0.469
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.43 0.13 0.602
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 5.46 -0.16 0.514
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.86 -0.15 0.519
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.40 0.15 0.534
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.50 -0.49 0.046
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.46 -0.12 0.036
Number of participants in session 0.96 -0.03 0.352
People in the group known prior to the session 0.03 0.07 0.042
Days until the next election 63.57 -5.02 0.079
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.85 0.05 0.185
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.97 0.02 0.169
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.94 -0.01 0.672
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.91 0.06 0.057
Notes: P-values are from a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=285.
153





Age 28.57 -0.02 0.982
Married (%) 0.33 0.07 0.154
Post-secondary education (%) 0.70 0.03 0.544
Christian (%) 0.33 0.00 0.923
Shia (%) 0.33 0.00 0.922
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.00 1.000
Economic status index 0.02 0.04 0.682
Value of total household assets 1.65 0.01 0.946
Estimated area (size) of household 1.70 0.03 0.683
Owns a summer house 2.03 0.02 0.832
Power alternatives during an outage 2.60 -0.01 0.934
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.90 0.00 0.965
Frequency of dining out per month 2.13 0.03 0.693
Monthly household net income 6.76 0.06 0.655
Subjective monthly household income 3.32 -0.03 0.846
Total net monthly household income 6.32 0.09 0.611
Household’s economic class 1.02 0.01 0.882
Students (%) 0.15 0.00 0.941
Homemakers (%) 0.00 0.00 0.655
Prejudice against members of other sects index -0.04 -0.13 0.212
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.09 -0.02 0.868
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.36 -0.09 0.141
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.57 -0.10 0.200
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.00 -0.14 0.199
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.61 -0.09 0.292
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.68 0.00 0.990
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.38 -0.07 0.278
Political activity/engagement index 0.13 0.01 0.925
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.74 -0.01 0.895
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.13 0.01 0.838
Signed a petition 0.08 -0.01 0.729
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.42 0.03 0.538
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.05 -0.27 0.005
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.91 -0.20 0.041
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.68 -0.23 0.020
Frequency discussing issues with people you disagree with often 2.31 -0.02 0.785
Strength of sectarian identity index -0.01 -0.11 0.287
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.44 -0.19 0.036
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.46 0.02 0.751
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.25 -0.06 0.785
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index 0.16 -0.10 0.372
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 2.02 -0.03 0.760
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 2.27 -0.14 0.194
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.58 -0.02 0.911
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 4.82 0.12 0.559
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.93 -0.01 0.959
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.64 0.08 0.703
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.96 -0.14 0.445
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.39 0.01 0.767
Number of participants in session 0.92 0.06 0.017
People in the group known prior to the session 0.08 0.06 0.233
Days until the next election 62.51 -2.72 0.401
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.80 0.03 0.517
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.97 0.00 0.977
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.88 0.04 0.209
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.92 -0.02 0.489




B.1 OVERVIEW OF THE DATA
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Table 12: Summary statistics for women only and men only.
Women Only Men Only
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Age 36.07 11.17 19 60 28.56 8.36 18 65
Married (%) 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1
Post-secondary education (%) 0.61 0.49 0 1 0.71 0.45 0 1
Christian (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1
Shia (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
Economic status index -0.09 0.90 -2.07 2.24 0.05 1.05 -2.26 2.28
Value of total household assets 1.61 0.71 1 3 1.65 0.79 1 3
Estimated area (size) of household 1.72 0.68 1 3 1.71 0.75 1 3
Owns a summer house 2.03 0.98 1 3 2.04 0.97 1 3
Power alternatives during an outage 2.49 0.88 1 5 2.60 0.99 1 5
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.83 0.84 1 3 1.91 0.85 1 3
Frequency of dining out per month 2.06 0.72 1 3 2.14 0.74 1 3
Monthly household net income 6.63 1.59 1 10 6.80 1.44 1 10
Subjective monthly household income 3.27 1.28 1 5 3.31 1.34 1 5
Total net monthly household income 6.07 1.77 1 11 6.37 1.85 1 12
Household’s economic class 1.04 0.65 0 2 1.02 0.73 0 2
Students (%) 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Homemakers (%) 0.57 0.50 0 1 0.00 0.06 0 1
Prejudice against members of other sects index 0.15 0.98 -1.23 4.12 -0.11 1.01 -1.23 4.12
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.52 1.09 1 4 2.08 0.98 1 4
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.36 0.66 1 4 1.32 0.60 1 4
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.52 0.72 1 4 1.52 0.76 1 4
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.18 1.11 1 4 1.93 1.03 1 4
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.70 0.86 1 4 1.57 0.80 1 4
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.64 0.78 1 4 1.68 0.87 1 4
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.35 0.65 1 4 1.35 0.64 1 4
Political activity/engagement index -0.17 0.94 -1.18 3.46 0.13 1.03 -1.18 3.46
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Signed a petition 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.13 1.06 -2.20 2.83 -0.09 0.95 -2.20 2.83
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.92 0.98 1 5 2.81 0.97 1 5
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.81 1.18 1 5 2.56 1.01 1 5
Frequency discussing issues with people you disagree with often 2.34 0.82 1 4 2.30 0.80 1 4
Strength of sectarian identity index 0.09 0.97 -2.73 1.52 -0.07 1.02 -2.73 1.52
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.52 0.78 1 4 3.34 0.86 1 4
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.47 0.50 0 1
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.41 2.01 1 7 4.22 2.13 1 7
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index -0.19 0.92 -1.11 2.36 0.11 1.03 -1.11 2.36
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.69 0.87 1 4 2.00 1.03 1 4
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 1.98 0.97 1 4 2.20 1.01 1 4
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.49 1.94 1 7 4.57 1.85 1 7
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 5.38 1.87 1 7 4.88 1.93 1 7
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.78 1.84 1 7 3.93 1.83 1 7
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.48 1.88 1 7 5.68 1.78 1 7
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.26 1.91 1 7 4.88 1.77 1 7
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Number of participants in session 0.95 0.23 0 1 0.95 0.22 0 1
People in the group known prior to the session 0.06 0.29 0 3 0.11 0.52 0 5
Days until the next election 61.07 23.57 33 94 61.15 32.21 17 109
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.88 0.33 0 1 0.82 0.39 0 1
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.98 0.14 0 1 0.97 0.18 0 1
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.93 0.25 0 1 0.90 0.30 0 1
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.94 0.25 0 1 0.91 0.29 0 1
Notes: Summary statistics for the imputed data used in the analysis. All indices include weights that correct for heterogeneous treatment assignment probabilities
across strata.
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Table 13: Summary statistics for the full sample.
Full Sample
Mean SD Min Max
Age 31.57 10.26 18 65
Married (%) 0.51 0.50 0 1
Post-secondary education (%) 0.67 0.47 0 1
Christian (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1
Shia (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1
Economic status index -0.01 1.00 -2.26 2.28
Value of total household assets 1.64 0.76 1 3
Estimated area (size) of household 1.71 0.72 1 3
Owns a summer house 2.04 0.97 1 3
Power alternatives during an outage 2.55 0.95 1 5
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.87 0.85 1 3
Frequency of dining out per month 2.11 0.73 1 3
Monthly household net income 6.73 1.50 1 10
Subjective monthly household income 3.29 1.31 1 5
Total net monthly household income 6.25 1.83 1 12
Household’s economic class 1.03 0.70 0 2
Students (%) 0.13 0.34 0 1
Homemakers (%) 0.23 0.42 0 1
Prejudice against members of other sects index 0.00 1.00 -1.23 4.12
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.26 1.05 1 4
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.34 0.63 1 4
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.52 0.74 1 4
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.03 1.07 1 4
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.62 0.83 1 4
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.66 0.83 1 4
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.35 0.65 1 4
Political activity/engagement index 0.01 1.01 -1.18 3.46
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.71 0.45 0 1
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.12 0.33 0 1
Signed a petition 0.06 0.24 0 1
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.37 0.48 0 1
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.00 1.00 -2.20 2.83
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.85 0.98 1 5
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.66 1.08 1 5
Frequency discussing issues with people you disagree with often 2.32 0.81 1 4
Strength of sectarian identity index 0.00 1.00 -2.73 1.52
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.41 0.84 1 4
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.47 0.50 0 1
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.29 2.08 1 7
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index -0.01 1.00 -1.11 2.36
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.88 0.98 1 4
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 2.11 1.00 1 4
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.54 1.88 1 7
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 5.08 1.92 1 7
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.87 1.84 1 7
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.60 1.83 1 7
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.63 1.86 1 7
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.40 0.49 0 1
Number of participants in session 0.95 0.22 0 1
People in the group known prior to the session 0.09 0.45 0 5
Days until the next election 61.12 29.06 17 109
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.84 0.37 0 1
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.97 0.17 0 1
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.91 0.28 0 1
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.92 0.27 0 1
Notes: Summary statistics for the imputed data used in the analysis. All indices include weights that correct for heterogeneous
treatment assignment probabilities across strata.
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B.2 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS






Test of the Difference
b p-value
Age 28.56 36.07 7.50 0.000
Married (%) 0.36 0.72 0.36 0.000
Post-secondary education (%) 0.71 0.61 -0.10 0.007
Christian (%) 0.34 0.33 0.00 0.951
Shia (%) 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.916
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.966
Economic status index 0.05 -0.09 -0.13 0.079
Value of total household assets 1.65 1.61 -0.04 0.472
Estimated area (size) of household 1.71 1.72 0.01 0.907
Owns a summer house 2.04 2.03 -0.01 0.945
Power alternatives during an outage 2.60 2.49 -0.11 0.143
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.91 1.83 -0.08 0.235
Frequency of dining out per month 2.14 2.06 -0.09 0.134
Monthly household net income 6.80 6.63 -0.16 0.175
Subjective monthly household income 3.31 3.27 -0.04 0.694
Total net monthly household income 6.37 6.07 -0.30 0.038
Household’s economic class 1.02 1.04 0.02 0.694
Students (%) 0.15 0.11 -0.04 0.107
Homemakers (%) 0.00 0.57 0.56 0.000
Prejudice against members of other sects index -0.11 0.15 0.26 0.002
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.08 2.52 0.44 0.000
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.32 1.36 0.04 0.395
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.52 1.52 0.00 0.996
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.93 2.18 0.26 0.006
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.57 1.70 0.13 0.050
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.68 1.64 -0.04 0.549
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.35 1.35 0.00 0.968
Political activity/engagement index 0.13 -0.17 -0.31 0.009
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.74 0.66 -0.07 0.039
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.235
Signed a petition 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.021
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.43 0.27 -0.17 0.000
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index -0.09 0.13 0.22 0.008
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.81 2.92 0.11 0.148
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.56 2.81 0.24 0.006
Frequency discussing issues with people you disagree with often 2.30 2.34 0.05 0.467
Strength of sectarian identity index -0.07 0.09 0.16 0.047
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.34 3.52 0.17 0.009
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.47 0.48 0.01 0.821
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.22 4.41 0.19 0.247
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index 0.11 -0.19 -0.30 0.000
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 2.00 1.69 -0.31 0.000
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 2.20 1.98 -0.22 0.008
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.57 4.49 -0.08 0.644
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 4.88 5.38 0.50 0.002
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.93 3.78 -0.14 0.332
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.68 5.48 -0.20 0.209
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.88 4.26 -0.63 0.000
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.987
Number of participants in session 0.95 0.95 0.00 0.887
People in the group known prior to the session 0.11 0.06 -0.04 0.155
Days until the next election 61.15 61.07 -0.09 0.968
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.82 0.88 0.06 0.025
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.97 0.98 0.01 0.232
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.90 0.93 0.03 0.143
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.91 0.94 0.03 0.221




C.1 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR THE MAIN AVERAGE TREATMENT
EFFECT
As an additional robustness check to confirm the validity of the results, we also run all
models with two additional control variables that could have influenced the findings. First,
we include an additional indicator for the number of group members an individual knew
prior to participating in the experiment. Research shows that interacting with friends or
acquaintances rather than strangers affects contributions in cooperation games. Second,
we include a measure that captures participants’ comprehension of the public goods game
payoff structure that we created by scoring answers in a ‘Practice Problem’ as correct or
incorrect. This helps us control for the possibility that some participants may have played
non-strategically because of confusion over payoffs. In addition to checking the sensitivity of
the main ATE result to the inclusion of these additional control variables, we also implement
the analysis with the full slate of controls (including these additional two) but with strata
fixed effects as well.
In Table 15 below, Models 1 and 2 replicate the results presented in the main text, while
Model 3 includes just the additional two control variables and Model 4 includes the additional
controls and strata fixed effects. The results do not indicate that our analysis in the main
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text is especially sensitive to the model specification. We observe similar patterns in the main
dependent variable across specifications that include control variables, and the incorporation
of strata fixed effects only increases precision; it does not change our interpretation of the
evidence.
Table 15: Sensitivity analysis of the main average treatment effect.
Same Sect
Mean
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 N
Women’s Groups
Mixed sect 3471 -11 -224 -173 -222 285
(376) (399) (409) (423)
0.977 0.574 0.672 0.600
Men’s Groups
Mixed sect 3762 -398 -465 -452 -675* 428
(343) (343) (345) (356)
0.247 0.175 0.191 0.059
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models incorporate weights
that correct for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across strata. Model 1 has no controls;
Model 2 includes controls and moderator fixed effects; Model 3 is Model 2 with two additional controls;
Model 4 is Model 3 with strata fixed effects.
C.2 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF STRENGTH OF IDENTIFICATION
To confirm the robustness of the results to alternative specifications of the variables used in
the subgroup analysis in Section 2.5, we also present the conditional marginal effect of the
mixed-sect group treatment for alternative measures of attachment to sectarian and gender
identity. Specifically, Table 16 shows the subgroup analysis if individuals are coded according
to whether a given identity is ranked in their top three most important social identities.
With respect to the coding of the measure of attachment to sectarian identity presented in
Panel A, we note that there are some slight differences with respect to the results presented in
the main text. While we still observe a null effect of the mixed-sect treatment on cooperation
for both weak and strong sectarian women, in this case we see evidence that the gap in terms
of how strong sectarian and weak sectarian women respond to the mixed-sect group treatment
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Table 16: Conditional marginal effects for various levels of identification.









Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Panel A: Strength of attachment to Sectarian ID
Weak Sectarian ID 3023 471 147 3571 -249 -230
(Sectarian ID is not top 3) (528) (570) (487) (503)
0.373 0.797 0.608 0.647
Strong Sectarian ID 3888 -463 -569 3942 -535 -646
(Sectarian ID is top 3) (559) (554) (504) (495)
0.408 0.305 0.289 0.193
Panel B: Strength of attachment to Gender ID
Weak Gender ID 4214 -1122 -1325** 3572 -963* -1084*
(Gender ID is not top 3) (708) (659) (544) (553)
0.114 0.046 0.078 0.051
Strong Gender ID 3210 417 266 3885 -56 -32
(Gender ID is top 3) (454) (483) (457) (458)
0.359 0.582 0.902 0.945
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models incorporate weights that
correct for unequal treatment assignment probabilities across strata. Model 1 has no controls; Model 2
includes controls and moderator fixed effects.
appears wider than in the version where strong sectarians are only those women who identify
their sectarian identity as most important. When we increase the threshold to any woman
naming sectarian identity in their top three identities (out of a possible 7), then the size of
the negative coefficient for contributions to the group pot increases among strong sectarian
women, suggesting that this broader categorization of sectarian identification leads to results
that appear more similar across genders. However, we still observe a key difference between
men in women in terms of the link between sectarian identity and cooperation in mixed-sect
groups, since weaker attachment to sectarian identity among women here shows a positive
(though statistically insignificant) coefficient compared to the negative coefficient we observe
for men (which is similar in magnitude to what we observe for weakly sectarian men in the
main analysis). On the whole, we see little reason to suspect that our interpretation in
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the main text is undermined by any of the findings here, using this alternative measure of
sectarian identification.
In the case of the alternative measure of attachment to gender identity, we observe that
the main finding of a negative effect of the mixed-sect treatment on cooperation among
weakly identified women is even stronger when the measure is broadened to include anyone
not indicating that gender identity is one of their top three most important social identities.
We interpret this as further support for our interpretation of the main result that stronger
attachment to gender identity can reduce the salience of norms of in-group favoritism in
cooperation among women across ethnic lines. Somewhat surprisingly, we do observe a
different result for men who weakly identify with their gender identity in this instance, since
the coefficient for the mixed-sect group is significant and more than twice the size of what we
observe in the main text. We do not attempt to interpret this result at length here, but we
note that it is possible it is driven by risk aversion among those men who are less motivated
by strong norms of masculinity in Lebanese society. Given that our main theoretical interest
is in evaluating the role of attachment to gender identity for women in particular (using men
as a comparison group for context), we are encouraged that the result for women does not
seem particularly sensitive to the coding of the attachment measure.
C.3 SUBGROUP ANALYSIS CONDITIONAL ON PREJUDICE
Relatedly, the literature on ethnic politics could suggest that an alternative mechanism to
explain coethnic favoritism in cooperation is actually rooted in prejudice, or discomfort in-
teracting with people from different ethnic backgrounds. Because our pre-treatment survey
affords us with the opportunity to create an index of prejudice and therefore test this pos-
sibility, we do so here, though we do not consider this mechanism to be as closely aligned
to our theory of in-group favoritism based on access to material and psychological benefits
associated with in-group cooperation. The results are presented in Table 17. We find no
evidence that prejudice against members of other sectarian groups affects cooperation in
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mixed-sect relative to same-sect groups for either men or women.
Table 17: Results by level of prejudice.









Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Panel A: Prejudice Index (ATE)
Low prejudice against other sects 3612 -177 -185 4189 -429 -506
(below median for full sample) (588) (665) (481) (491)
0.764 0.782 0.374 0.304
High prejudice against other sects 3376 106 -236 3311 -504 -447
(above median for full sample) (505) (567) (504) (513)
0.834 0.678 0.319 0.386
Panel B: Conditional marginal effect at both levels
Low prejudice against other sects 3612 -177 -127 4189 -429 -505
(below median for full sample) (587) (603) (482) (490)
0.764 0.833 0.374 0.303
High prejudice against other sects 3376 106 -297 3311 -506 -477
(above median for full sample) (506) (521) (491) (497)
0.834 0.570 0.303 0.337
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models incorporate weights that correct





D.1 BACKGROUND ON THE PRE-REGISTERED DESIGN AND
BROADER STUDY CONTEXT
In the much larger project, registered with the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP)
network1, we set out to investigate one main hypothesis: “Social interaction that cuts across
ethnic (sectarian) and class cleavages will weaken individual tendencies towards ethnic pol-
itics and strengthen tendencies toward programmatic politics.” The ‘tendencies’ that we
chose to focus on included a range of individual-level outcomes we anticipated might affect
support for ethnic versus programmatic politics, including: perceptions of social identities,
willingness to cooperate with individuals from similar (or different) social backgrounds, sup-
port for sectarian versus programmatic policies, and willingness to take political action.
To examine the effect of social interaction on our outcomes of interest, we designed a
small-group, discussion-based experiment. The idea was to systematically vary the ethnic
and class composition of these small discussion groups, lead participants through a discus-
sion guide that did not vary across group sessions, and then measure our outcomes and
mechanisms of interest using pre- and post-treatment surveys. The public goods game was
designed as a supplemental behavioral measure that would allow us to measure preferences
1egap.org/registration/2208
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for cooperation with group members prior to and immediately after the conclusion of the
discussion. We anticipated that the difference between contributions in Round 1 compared
to Round 2 across each of the four treatment types would tell us something important about
the impact of social interaction on cooperation conditional on group composition (in terms
of ethnic and class cleavages).
After implementation and data collection, we started to work with the public goods
game data and were surprised to find very little variation at all across our treatment groups.
This was a puzzling result given some of our other outcome measures, so we started to
look into the descriptive data on patterns of contributions for specific treatment groups as
well as for each round of play instead of focusing only on the difference between rounds. It
immediately became clear that there were dramatic differences in the patterns of contribution
behavior conditional on group gender. Since, by design, all of our groups consisted of either
all-male or all-women participants, we were able to look at differential treatment effects
on contribution behavior by gender. This led us to pursue existing literature to try and
understand whether we should have anticipated this degree of variation along gender lines
in the context of our ethnic and class group composition treatments. We quickly discovered
that the empirical evidence of gender-based differences in cooperation is decidedly mixed.
Moreover, we found that our design – employing natural socio-economic class and ethnic
identities in the recruitment and random assignment protocol – is exceedingly rare and
especially so given the scale of our experiment (N = 120 groups).
This led us to revise our approach to analyzing the public goods game data.2 We opted to
write two additional papers that focus on the gender-specific elements of how class and ethnic
group cleavages impact cooperation in group settings. In this paper, we focus specifically
on the mixed-class versus same-class treatment. In another paper (the first paper in my
dissertation portfolio), we focus on the mixed-ethnic versus same-ethnic group treatment. In
both papers, we focus on contribution behavior only in Round 1 of the public goods game
because we are primarily concerned with estimating the effect of the group composition
2In general, we concur with those who argue that the purpose of the pre-analysis plan is not to tie re-
searchers’ hands and prevent any deviations that might become necessary during the natural course of
research, but rather to encourage research transparency about those deviations and provide reasonable jus-
tification (Humphreys, de la Sierra and van der Windt, 2013; Monogan III, 2015; Olken, 2015).
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treatment alone and in the absence of any additional effect that could have been induced by
the discussion experience.
The Round 1 results are interesting in their own right because they reflect real-world
decision-making in several important ways. First, since participants are strangers and have
not interacted with one another in any significant way at that point, contributions to the
Group Pot are a better measure of willingness to cooperate with others knowing only their
ethnic and class background and shared gender identity. This increases the likelihood that
contribution behavior is a reflection of willingness to cooperate given shared group mem-
bership and not some other factor. This is similar to mass mobilization efforts in many
real-world settings where individuals may know very little about one another except that
they share membership in some socially or politically salient group. It is on the basis of this
shared group membership alone that they may choose to act in a variety of ways, including
joining protests, marches, or demonstrations, donating to an organization that represents
group members, or signing a petition because it is linked to shared group membership. In
many of these interactions, individuals voluntarily choose to participate on the basis of an
appeal to shared group identity, making contribution behavior in the context of this infor-
mation alone a very interesting object of study.
Consequently, the bulk of the analysis in this paper is exploratory, taking advantage
of our unique public goods game data to investigate some outstanding questions in the
literature. In this section, we review some important features of the pre-registered research
design through which the public goods game data was collected. This context is important
for understanding the robustness checks we employ to validate our results, as well as some
measures we take to address potential threats to inference that emerged from the way the
randomization was implemented by our partners in the field.3
3The remainder of the material in Appendix D (continued below) comes from the supplementary appendices to
the following paper: Paler, Laura, Leslie Marshall, and Sami Atallah. 2018. “How Talking Across Ethnic and
Class Divides Shapes Support for Ethnic Politics: Evidence from an Experiment in Lebanon.” Working Pa-
per. https://laurapaler.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/Leb_xcutting_MAIN.pdf. The complete Sup-
plementary Appendix is available online at: https://laurapaler.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/Leb_
xcutting_APPEND.pdf.
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D.2 RECRUITMENT AND RANDOMIZATION
We organized 120 discussion groups in the Beirut and Mount Lebanon areas in the spring of
2016. Individuals with different sectarian (Christian, Sunni, and Shia) and economic (lower
and upper income) profiles were randomly assigned to participate in either homogeneous or
heterogeneous sectarian discussions and either homogeneous or heterogeneous class discus-
sions. Assignment to the two treatments was orthogonal following a 2x2 factorial design
with 30 groups in each cell. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to one of
four discussion group types: (1) homogeneous sect and class, (2) mixed sect, homogeneous
class, (3) homogeneous sect, mixed class, and (4) mixed sect and class. Our main empirical
focus in this paper is on identifying the average treatment effect of heterogeneous versus
homogeneous class discussion.
The 120 discussion groups were organized in five blocks of 24 discussion sessions (6
sessions x 4 group types).4 In homogeneous sectarian groups all six participants were either
Christian, Sunni, or Shia. In mixed sectarian groups, two participants were Christian, two
were Sunni, and two were Shia. In homogeneous class groups, all six participants were either
lower or upper income. In mixed class groups, three participants were lower income and
three were upper income. (We refer to this combination of attributes, e.g. poor Christian,
as the ‘profile type’). To determine whether potential participants were rich or poor for
the class randomization, eight questions about economic status were asked on the screening
survey and these were used to create an index, discussed in detail in Section 3.3.4 as well
as in Appendix F. Table 18 provides a summary of the randomization while Table 19 shows
how class and sect combine for each of the 24 discussions in a set.
As described in the main text in Section 3.3.2, to obtain the correct group compositions,
we recruited 1200 individuals of which 720 would ultimately participate and 480 would be
‘back-ups’. Upon arrival at their scheduled discussion session, participants were checked
in by staff and informed consent was administered. Participants were not designated as
‘main’ or ‘backup’ in advance and if extra participants arrived, those that were asked to stay
4A set of discussions was completed every 2-3 weeks between February and April 2016.
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were randomly selected. This was essential to ensure that those who participated in each
discussion were a random sample of those who were assigned to that treatment condition.
There were some issues in how the scheduling was implemented that could raise concerns
about non-comparability of the treatment and control groups. We describe the issue below.
Table 18: Summary of randomization.
Sectarian discussion
Homog. Hetero.
Group 1 Group 2
groups = 30 groups = 30
Homog. n = 180 n = 180
Sect comp: 6 Sunni or 6 Christian or 6 Shia Sect comp: 2 Sunni, 2 Christian, and 2 Shia
Class Class comp: All poor or all rich Class comp: All poor or all rich
discussion
Group 3 Group 4
groups = 30 groups = 30
Hetero. n = 180 n = 180
Sect comp: 6 Sunni or 6 Christian or 6 Shia Sect comp: 2 Sunni, 2 Christian, and 2 Shia
Class comp: 3 poor and 3 rich Class comp: 1 poor and 1 rich of each sect
There were only a few instances in which discussions proceeded with fewer than six
individuals or with individuals with different demographic profiles than anticipated. This
includes seven instances in which groups proceeded with five rather than six individuals,
either because an insufficient number showed up or because a participant left before the
discussion was concluded. This affected three same/same groups, 2 mixed sect/same class
groups, 1 same sect/mixed class group, and 1 mixed/mixed group. The effects of the im-
balance are plausibly the greatest for the groups that are not homogeneous. To address
concerns, we control for the number of discussion participants in each group, described in
Appendix H. We also checked to make sure that we did not accidentally have individuals who
knew each other in the same discussion session. While 41 individuals in 26 sessions reported
that they knew at least one person in their discussion group prior to the session, only 15 of
those 41 were women participants. Upon further investigation with the session organizers,
we learned that these were mostly cases in which individuals had been transported together
or met casually just before the session. We nonetheless control for the total number of people
in the discussion that each participant reported knowing before the session (see Appendix
H).
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Table 19: Individual profiles by group type.
Group type 1: Same sect, same class Group type 2: Mixed sect, same class
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Chr. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Chr. P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Sun. R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Sun.
P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Chr. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Chr. P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Sun. R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Sun.
P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Chr. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Chr. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Shi. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Shi.
P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Chr. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Chr. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Shi. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Shi.
P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Chr. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr.
P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Chr. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr.
Group type 3: Same sect, mixed class Group type 4: Mixed sect, mixed class
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Chr. P. Chr. P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Sun.
P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Chr. P. Chr. R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Sun.
P. Sun. P. Sun. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Chr. P. Chr. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Shi. P. Shi.
R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Shi.
R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Chr. R. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr. P. Chr.
R. Sun. R. Sun. R. Shi. R. Shi. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr. R. Chr.
D.3 POSSIBLE CONCERNS ABOUT SELECTION INTO
PARTICIPATION
The way in which the randomization procedure was implemented raises two issues that need
to be taken into consideration in obtaining unbiased estimates of treatment effects. The first
has to do with possible selection effects in who participated in the discussions and the second
with whether and how to weight the sample of participants to resemble the ‘population’ that
was assigned. The first issue arises from the possibility that those who actually participated
in each treatment are not a random sample of those who were assigned. As discussed in
Section 3.3.3, the way in which individuals were scheduled to participate in the discussions
gives some cause for concern that there was selection into participation in a way that could
have introduced imbalances in pre-treatment characteristics for individuals in treatment and
control groups.
Recall that we recruited a total of 1200 individuals in order to obtain 720 participants
and 480 back-ups. To obtain the 1200, we recruited 40 individuals of each of the six profile
types (e.g. poor Sunni, rich Sunni, poor Shia, rich Shia, poor Christian, rich Christian)
for each of the five discussion blocks. We block randomized individuals by profile type and
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discussion block with the goal of obtaining 24 participants and 16 extras for each discussion
block. Panel A of Table 20 shows how the 40 individuals of each profile type were assigned
and Panel B of Table 20 shows the target number of participants per treatment. The targets
were set this way because we anticipated needing a different number of backups for each
experimental condition.5
Implementing randomization in this way would still yield unbiased estimates of treatment
effects as long as those who actually participated in the discussion were a random sample of
the pool that was assigned. We worked with the implementing partner to design a procedure
to try to ensure that this would be the case. First, the partner pre-screened all eligible
participants for willingness to participate in a discussion on political and economic issues
(without providing any information on the differing sectarian compositions of the groups).
This resulted in a pool of potential discussion participants who were all willing to join in
the activity. We asked our implementing partner to schedule the discussions such that every
person in the pool would show up at one discussion in accordance with their treatment
assignment, ensuring that we always had more individuals than necessary of each profile
type at each session. The implementing partner was then supposed to randomly select (for
each profile type) who would actually stay to participate and who would be asked to go
home (after receiving compensation) or invited to a different session. In actuality, however,
the partner typically ended up getting only the target number of participants to show up for
each discussion, which introduces the possibility that there was some differential selection
into who ended up participating.
To see why this is an issue, assume that there is some (unobserved) variable like enthu-
siasm that affects willingness to participate in a discussion.6 Assume also that treatment
assignment achieved balance in this variable across the four experimental conditions. For
5Specifically, we planned to over-recruit by 50 percent. For example, for poor Sunnis in homogeneous groups
there was one discussion and we needed six participants and 3 backups (6×1 + 3×1 = 9). The mixed sect,
same class treatment required two poor Sunnis for three discussions and one backup for each discussion (2×3
+ 1×3 = 9). The same sect, mixed class treatment required three poor Sunnis for two discussions and two
backups for each discussion (3×2 + 2×2 = 10). And the fully mixed treatment required one poor Sunni for
six discussions plus one backup for each discussion (1×6 + 1×6 = 12).
6Even though we pre-screened for enthusiasm, we can think of there being very and moderately enthusiastic
individuals.
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illustrative purposes, we assume that 50 percent of all assigned individuals are very en-
thusiastic and the rest were only moderately enthusiastic. Panel C of Table 20 shows the
proportion of individuals assigned who were very enthusiastic and we can see that this is
balanced across the four experimental conditions. Assume then that all very enthusiastic
individuals were the easiest to schedule and were therefore more likely to participate (regard-
less of their treatment assignment, which they did not know before arrival). Panel D of Table
20 shows how, if this were the case, the enthusiasm proportion would now be imbalanced
across the treatment conditions among those who actually participated. We emphasize that
this issue is not related to the treatment assignment itself but rather to the fact that we
assigned a varying number of individuals in each experimental condition in order to reach
our target of six participants of each profile.
Table 20: Illustration of potential selection into participation.
Mixed sectarian Mixed sectarian
N Y N Y
Mixed class N 9 9 Mixed class N 6 6
Y 10 12 Y 6 6
Panel A: Treatment assignment (n = 40) Panel B: Target participated (n = 24)
Mixed sectarian Mixed sectarian
N Y N Y
Mixed class N 4.5/9 = .50 4.5/9 = .50 Mixed class N 4.5/6 = .75 4.5/6 = .75
Y 5/10 = .50 6/12 = .50 Y 5/6 = .83 6/6 = 1
Panel C: Proportion of those assigned Panel D: Proportion of those who participated
who are ‘very enthusiastic’ who are ‘very enthusiastic’
So, how concerned should we be? After we discovered this, we discussed extensively with
our partner and it seems that in most cases attendance was driven by idiosyncratic scheduling
factors rather than systematic differences. Moreover, for this to be a problem, there would
have to be not only non-trivial differential participation but also that this disparity would
have to have non-trivial impacts on the outcomes. While we think this unlikely, some might
find this only somewhat reassuring. We are further reassured by the fact that the checks in
Appendix E suggest balance on a large number of pre-treatment covariates between treatment
and control. We also include covariates in all analysis to address concerns.
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D.4 TREATMENT ASSIGNMENT PROBABILITIES
The second main concern has to do with whether and how to weight the data to correct
for unequal treatment assignment probabilities given that we intentionally recruited and as-
signed at different rates depending on the profiles we needed for each group session. Our
main analysis employs inverse probability weights to correct for unequal treatment assign-
ment probabilities. We use two different weights, one in the main analysis and one as a
robustness check in Appendix H. We also consider whether weighting might magnify the
selection effects described above.
The description of our randomization above suggests that we block randomly assigned









). In practice, we stratified treatment assignment not only on set and profile type but,
where possible, we created even smaller strata using additional information on recruiter and
participant neighborhood and randomly assigned individuals using proportional probability
assignment within these small strata.7 We used these small strata to minimize the chances
that discussion participants would know each other, which was more likely if they came from
the same neighborhood and/or same recruiter network. In going from our pool of 40 of each
type to our 24 participants, we lose observations in small strata cells, resulting in a large
number of empty cells. Panel A of 21 provides an illustration of this, showing the number of
participants as assigned in small strata (left) and the number of participants that actually
took part in the discussions (right).
We address this issue through post-stratification where we collapse the strata until we
have no empty cells and then create new weights so that those who participated are weighted
up to reflect the pool of potential participants originally assigned. We create two versions
of weights based on two ways of collapsing the strata. First we created new ‘smaller’ strata
where we collapsed cells such that we had no empty cells but where we retained information
on recruiter or neighborhood were possible. Panel B in Table 21 provides an example of how
this was done. We then construct probability weights to weight individuals who participated
7We used proportional probability assignment because of the unequal number of backups for each group type.
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up to reflect the ‘population’ as assigned. Second, we create ‘bigger’ strata where we collapse
such that strata are formed by profile and set only, as in Panel C. We again create weights
to weight those who participated up to the population of those assigned.
Our main analysis uses weighted least squared regression employing the weights created
for the smaller strata. In Appendix H we check the robustness of results to several additional
specifications, including estimates of treatment effects on the sample, estimates using the
weights for bigger strata, and estimates with block fixed effects using smaller and bigger
strata.
Table 21: Example of post-stratification.
Panel A: Example of treatment assignment and participation in small strata
Assigned (n=40) Participated (n=24)
Small strata 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1
Small strata 2 1 1 0 0
1 2 0 1
Small strata 3 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1
Small strata 4 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1
Small strata 5 2 2 0 2
2 2 1 2
Small strata 6 2 2 2 1
2 3 2 0
Panel B: Example of treatment assignment and participation in ‘smaller’ strata
after collapsing strata
Assigned (n=40) Participated (n=24)
New small strata 6 6 3 3
(collapsed 1, 2, 5, 6) 6 8 3 4
Small strata 3 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1
Small strata 4 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1
Panel C: Example of treatment assignment and participation in ‘bigger’ strata
Assigned (n=40) Participated (n=24)
‘Big’ strata 9 9 6 6
10 12 6 6
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D.5 A NOTE ON DATA PREPARATION
Section 6.4 of the original pre-analysis plan for the larger project provides details on our
plans for cleaning and preparing the data, much of which is relevant here. We pre-specify
that we will perform 10 rounds of missing data imputation using multivariate imputation
via chained equations and recode variables for directionality. We also pre-specify that we
will use inverse covariance weighting to create indices using variables that are intended to
measure the same construct (and are pre-registered as such). We also specify the variables




The screening and pre-treatment surveys contain a large number of pre-treatment covariates
that can be used to check balance. Table 22 shows the results of the balance test for our
women’s sample using 55 pre-treatment covariates. We also present the balance test for our
men’s sample (Table 23) and for the full sample of men and women overall (Table 24) to
confirm that the randomization was equally effective across the relevant gender groups. While
we check balance using the individual covariates, we also use inverse covariance weighting
to create pre-specified indices for measures that capture a common underlying concept, as
described in Section 3.4.2 of the main text. In all three balance tables, we present results of
the balance tests for the individual covariates as well as for the indices but note that if there
is an imbalance in an index component there is likely to be imbalance in the index itself.
We test for balance by running our main estimation equation specified in Section 3.4.2 of
the main paper. Specifically, we run a weighted least squares regression of each covariate on
the treatment assignment indicator (excluding other covariates), where weights account for
unequal treatment assignment probabilities in ‘smaller’ strata (see Appendix D).
The balance test for women shown in Table 22 reveals that only 6 out of 55 covariates
are significant at the 95 percent confidence level, which is about what we would expect to
happen by chance. Also as expected, the coefficients are close to zero for most covariates.
These results help to address concerns about the integrity of the randomization described in
Appendix D. In our main analysis we nevertheless control for indices and individual variables
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to address further concerns, with the exception of excluding the final 5 variables presented in
the balance table (‘people in the group known prior to the session’ and ‘answered all practice
problem questions correctly’). Since payoff comprehension was measured after exposure to
the group composition treatment (same- versus mixed-class), we instead use this measure as
a robustness check in Appendix H. Likewise, we check the robustness of our main results to
the inclusion of the variable representing ‘people in the group known prior to the session’ in
Appendix H.
We present the balance tests for the men’s groups as well as the full sample for complete-
ness. The balance test for men shown in Table 23 reveals that only 1 out of 55 covariates
are significant at the 95 percent confidence level, which is well within what we would expect
to see by chance. Also as expected, the coefficients are close to zero for most covariates.
Similarly, the balance test for the full sample shown in Table 24 demonstrates that only 2
out of 55 covariates are significant at the 95 percent confidence level, also well within what
we would expect to observe by chance. The vast majority of the coefficients are close to zero
as well. Taken together, these additional balance tests lend support to our contention that
the randomization procedure was largely effective in ensuring that unobservable (and observ-
able) characteristics are likely to be evenly distributed across our treatment (mixed-class)
and control (same-class) groups.
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Age 36 1 0.625
Married (%) 0.72 0.01 0.842
Post-secondary education (%) 0.61 0.01 0.857
Christian (%) 0.33 0.00 1.000
Shia (%) 0.33 0.00 0.956
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.00 0.957
Economic status index -0.06 -0.05 0.663
Value of total household assets (screening) 1.61 0.01 0.931
Estimated area (size) of household (screening) 1.75 -0.06 0.472
Owns a summer house (screening) 2.04 -0.02 0.859
Power alternatives during an outage (screening) 2.46 0.05 0.655
Can afford to vacation at least once per year (screening) 1.83 -0.01 0.893
Frequency of dining out per month (screening) 2.08 -0.04 0.687
Monthly household net income (screening) 6.66 -0.05 0.801
Subjective monthly household income (screening) 3.27 -0.02 0.913
Total net monthly household income (pre-treatment) 6.20 -0.26 0.241
Self-identified economic class (pre-treatment) 1.05 -0.02 0.827
Students (%) 0.11 0.01 0.839
Homemakers (%) 0.54 0.06 0.313
Prejudice against members of other sects index 0.08 0.14 0.262
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.55 -0.06 0.686
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.31 0.10 0.235
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.50 0.04 0.636
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.11 0.15 0.272
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.67 0.05 0.630
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.53 0.22 0.025
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.31 0.06 0.432
Political activity/engagement index -0.10 -0.15 0.184
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.73 -0.13 0.032
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.14 -0.07 0.083
Signed a petition 0.02 0.03 0.177
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.27 -0.01 0.862
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.09 0.08 0.547
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.96 -0.08 0.488
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.69 0.23 0.114
How often you discuss when you disagree 2.38 -0.07 0.463
Strength of sectarian identity index 0.23 -0.29 0.016
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.62 -0.21 0.030
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.56 -0.17 0.007
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.36 0.10 0.688
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index -0.13 -0.12 0.306
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.77 -0.15 0.161
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 2.00 -0.05 0.666
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.31 0.36 0.142
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 5.36 0.05 0.854
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.73 0.11 0.648
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.47 0.02 0.947
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.15 0.21 0.401
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.37 0.04 0.456
Number of participants in session 0.92 0.04 0.122
People in the group known prior to the session 0.02 0.08 0.015
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.86 0.03 0.454
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.99 -0.01 0.519
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.93 0.01 0.851
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.93 0.02 0.598
Notes: P-values are from a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=285.
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Age 28 0 0.696
Married (%) 0.34 0.05 0.296
Post-secondary education (%) 0.72 -0.03 0.568
Christian (%) 0.34 0.00 0.923
Shia (%) 0.33 0.00 0.922
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.00 1.000
Economic status index 0.02 0.05 0.661
Value of total household assets (screening) 1.68 -0.04 0.577
Estimated area (size) of household (screening) 1.72 -0.02 0.737
Owns a summer house (screening) 2.01 0.05 0.602
Power alternatives during an outage (screening) 2.55 0.10 0.315
Can afford to vacation at least once per year (screening) 1.93 -0.05 0.586
Frequency of dining out per month (screening) 2.13 0.03 0.652
Monthly household net income (screening) 6.77 0.04 0.756
Subjective monthly household income (screening) 3.29 0.04 0.760
Total net monthly household income (pre-treatment) 6.32 0.10 0.611
Self-identified economic class (pre-treatment) 0.99 0.07 0.357
Students (%) 0.16 -0.01 0.734
Homemakers (%) 0.00 0.01 0.180
Prejudice against members of other sects index -0.13 0.04 0.662
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.08 0.01 0.923
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.28 0.09 0.160
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.51 0.02 0.830
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.92 0.02 0.864
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.55 0.04 0.602
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.69 -0.02 0.811
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.36 -0.01 0.836
Political activity/engagement index 0.06 0.14 0.196
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.72 0.04 0.369
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.13 0.02 0.627
Signed a petition 0.07 0.02 0.497
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.40 0.07 0.208
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index -0.03 -0.10 0.273
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.85 -0.09 0.351
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.60 -0.07 0.456
How often you discuss when you disagree 2.33 -0.06 0.495
Strength of sectarian identity index -0.07 0.01 0.920
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.40 -0.11 0.213
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.46 0.01 0.778
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.08 0.27 0.208
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index 0.08 0.06 0.552
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.92 0.15 0.163
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 2.22 -0.04 0.740
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.51 0.12 0.555
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 4.79 0.19 0.357
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.92 0.01 0.976
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.87 -0.38 0.054
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.83 0.11 0.545
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.37 0.06 0.219
Number of participants in session 0.92 0.06 0.018
People in the group known prior to the session 0.12 -0.03 0.618
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.82 -0.01 0.872
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.98 -0.03 0.126
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.89 0.01 0.621
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.90 0.01 0.647
Notes: P-values are from a two-tailed test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=428.
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Age 31 0 0.561
Married (%) 0.49 0.03 0.372
Post-secondary education (%) 0.68 -0.01 0.756
Christian (%) 0.34 0.00 0.940
Shia (%) 0.33 0.00 0.912
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.00 0.972
Economic status index -0.01 0.01 0.914
Value of total household assets (screening) 1.65 -0.02 0.689
Estimated area (size) of household (screening) 1.73 -0.04 0.484
Owns a summer house (screening) 2.03 0.02 0.772
Power alternatives during an outage (screening) 2.51 0.08 0.283
Can afford to vacation at least once per year (screening) 1.89 -0.03 0.611
Frequency of dining out per month (screening) 2.11 0.01 0.914
Monthly household net income (screening) 6.73 0.01 0.950
Subjective monthly household income (screening) 3.28 0.02 0.861
Total net monthly household income (pre-treatment) 6.27 -0.05 0.745
Self-identified economic class (pre-treatment) 1.01 0.03 0.537
Students (%) 0.14 0.00 0.868
Homemakers (%) 0.21 0.03 0.375
Prejudice against members of other sects index -0.04 0.08 0.300
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.26 -0.02 0.837
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.29 0.09 0.068
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.51 0.03 0.649
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.99 0.07 0.387
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.60 0.05 0.482
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.62 0.08 0.241
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.34 0.02 0.737
Political activity/engagement index 0.00 0.02 0.779
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.72 -0.03 0.458
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.13 -0.02 0.524
Signed a petition 0.05 0.02 0.219
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.35 0.04 0.362
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.02 -0.03 0.684
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.90 -0.09 0.244
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.64 0.05 0.586
How often you discuss when you disagree 2.35 -0.06 0.319
Strength of sectarian identity index 0.05 -0.11 0.176
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.49 -0.15 0.023
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.50 -0.06 0.142
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.19 0.20 0.214
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index 0.00 -0.01 0.926
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.86 0.03 0.723
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 2.13 -0.04 0.611
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.43 0.21 0.151
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 5.02 0.13 0.421
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.85 0.05 0.757
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.71 -0.22 0.147
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.56 0.15 0.323
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.37 0.05 0.153
Number of participants in session 0.92 0.05 0.005
People in the group known prior to the session 0.08 0.02 0.612
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.84 0.01 0.784
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.98 -0.02 0.100
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.91 0.01 0.606
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.91 0.01 0.501





Table 25: Screening survey questions and index creation.
Screening Survey Questions Included in Economic Status Index
Question No. Question Text Answer Options
Scoring for Index
(1-3)
1 When you think of the total number of your household acquirings 0 - 250,000 USD 1
(houses, lands, cars, mobile phones, computers and laptops, 250,001 500,000 USD 2
household appliances, valuable furniture/decoration items, 500,001+ USD 3
jewelry, etc.) what is, roughly, their estimated total value? Don’t know/Refuse/NA 0
2 What is the estimated area of your main place of residency? Less then 150m2 1
150 to 250m2 2
More then 250m2 3
Don’t know/Refuse/NA 0
3 Do you own a summer house? (Including chalets in seaside resorts) No 1




4 When faced with power shortage, what alternatives do you resort to? Nothing, we don’t have money to buy power 1
We buy power from a private generator 5 A 1
We buy power from a private generator 10 A 2
We buy power from a private generator 15 A+ 3
We own a private generator 3
Don’t know/Refuse/NA 0
5 In general, can you afford to travel on a leisure trip with your No we can’t afford it 1
family at least once a year? Yes, but only to cheaper destinations,
or on tour offers 2
Yes, we can go wherever we want 3
Don’t know/Refuse/NA 0
6 In a typical month, how often can you afford to go with your 0 1
family for lunch or dinner to restaurants (for bills totaling 1 to 2 2
at least 100 USD)? 3+ 3
Don’t know/Refuse/NA 0
7 What is your family’s net monthly income? (Shown here in US Dollars
but both options were provided in the original questionnaire.) 0 1
1 - 120 1
121 - 333 1
334 - 667 1
668 - 1,333 1
1,334 - 2,667 1
2,668 - 4,000 2
4,001 - 5,333 2
5,334 - 7,333 3
7,334 - 9,333 3
9,334 - 12,667 3
12,668 - 16,667 3
16,668 - 26,667 3
26,668 - 53,333 3
53,334 or more 3
Don’t know/Refuse 0
8 Which of the following is the best description of your family’s
monthly income? The family income does not cover our needs and
we face major problems making ends meet 1
The family income barely covers our needs and
we sometimes face problems making ends meet 1
The family income covers our needs but we
cannot afford luxury items or any extra leisure activities 2
The family income covers our needs without us
facing any major difficulties 3
The family income very well covers our needs and
we can also save some of it. 3
Don’t know/Refuse/NA 0
Creating the Index:
The minimum score is 8 (1 point on each question above) Score between 8 and 13 = lower income individuals
The maximum score is 24 (3 points on each question above) Score between 14 and 18 = middle class individuals disregarded
Score between 19 and 24 = upper middle class individuals
Scores below 8 means that at least one question was not responded to.
If more than two questions are not responded to, the screener is disregarded.
If 1 or 2 questions are not responded to, the following scoring applies:
Score between 6 and 9 = lower income individuals
Score between 10 and 13 = middle class individuals disregarded




G.1 OVERVIEW OF THE DATA
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Table 26: Summary statistics: women only, men only, and the full sample.
Variable Description
Female Subsample (n=285) Male Subsample (n=428) Full Sample (n=713)
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Age 36 11 19 60 29 8 18 65 32 10 18 65
Married (%) 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
Post-secondary education (%) 0.61 0.49 0 1 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.67 0.47 0 1
Christian (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
Shia (%) 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1
Sunni (%) 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
Economic status index -0.08 0.90 -2.07 2.31 0.05 1.06 -2.23 2.32 0.00 1.00 -2.23 2.32
Value of total household assets 1.63 0.73 1 3 1.66 0.79 1 3 1.65 0.77 1 3
Estimated area (size) of household 1.73 0.68 1 3 1.71 0.75 1 3 1.72 0.72 1 3
Owns a summer house 2.04 0.98 1 3 2.04 0.97 1 3 2.04 0.97 1 3
Power alternatives during an outage 2.48 0.86 1 5 2.60 1.00 1 5 2.55 0.95 1 5
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.82 0.84 1 3 1.90 0.85 1 3 1.87 0.84 1 3
Frequency of dining out per month 2.06 0.72 1 3 2.15 0.74 1 3 2.11 0.73 1 3
Monthly household net income 6.64 1.58 1 10 6.79 1.45 1 10 6.73 1.50 1 10
Subjective monthly household income 3.27 1.27 1 5 3.31 1.34 1 5 3.29 1.31 1 5
Total net monthly household income 6.05 1.75 1 11 6.37 1.86 1 12 6.24 1.82 1 12
Self-identified economic class 1.06 0.66 0 2 1.03 0.72 0 2 1.04 0.70 0 2
Students (%) 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Homemakers (%) 0.56 0.50 0 1 0.00 0.07 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Prejudice against members of other sects index 0.15 0.97 -1.30 4.17 -0.10 1.01 -1.30 4.17 -0.00 1.00 -1.30 4.17
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.52 1.09 1 4 2.08 1.00 1 4 2.26 1.06 1 4
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.36 0.65 1 4 1.32 0.60 1 4 1.33 0.62 1 4
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.51 0.71 1 4 1.52 0.75 1 4 1.52 0.73 1 4
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.18 1.11 1 4 1.95 1.04 1 4 2.05 1.07 1 4
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.69 0.85 1 4 1.57 0.80 1 4 1.62 0.82 1 4
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.65 0.79 1 4 1.67 0.87 1 4 1.66 0.84 1 4
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.34 0.64 1 4 1.35 0.64 1 4 1.35 0.64 1 4
Political activity/engagement index -0.17 0.93 -1.24 3.46 0.11 1.03 -1.24 3.46 0.00 1.00 -1.24 3.46
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.67 0.47 0 1 0.73 0.44 0 1 0.71 0.46 0 1
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 1
Signed a petition 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.27 0.44 0 1 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.11 1.05 -2.18 2.79 -0.07 0.96 -2.18 2.79 -0.00 1.00 -2.18 2.79
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.91 0.98 1 5 2.81 0.96 1 5 2.85 0.97 1 5
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.78 1.17 1 5 2.58 1.02 1 5 2.66 1.09 1 5
How often discuss when you disagree 2.36 0.82 1 4 2.30 0.79 1 4 2.33 0.80 1 4
Strength of sectarian identity index 0.10 0.97 -2.78 1.57 -0.07 1.01 -2.78 1.57 0.00 1.00 -2.78 1.57
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.52 0.77 1 4 3.34 0.86 1 4 3.41 0.83 1 4
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.47 0.50 0 1 0.47 0.50 0 1
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.43 2.02 1 7 4.23 2.14 1 7 4.31 2.10 1 7
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index -0.17 0.93 -1.15 2.35 0.11 1.03 -1.15 2.35 -0.00 1.00 -1.15 2.35
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.71 0.88 1 4 2.01 1.03 1 4 1.89 0.99 1 4
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 1.99 0.97 1 4 2.19 1.01 1 4 2.11 1.00 1 4
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.47 1.94 1 7 4.62 1.84 1 7 4.56 1.88 1 7
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 5.39 1.87 1 7 4.91 1.92 1 7 5.11 1.92 1 7
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.77 1.86 1 7 3.91 1.82 1 7 3.85 1.83 1 7
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.48 1.88 1 7 5.69 1.78 1 7 5.60 1.82 1 7
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.25 1.90 1 7 4.83 1.79 1 7 4.60 1.86 1 7
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.39 0.49 0 1
Number of participants in session 0.95 0.22 0 1 0.95 0.21 0 1 0.95 0.22 0 1
People in the group known prior to the session 0.06 0.29 0 3 0.11 0.52 0 5 0.09 0.44 0 5
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.87 0.34 0 1 0.82 0.38 0 1 0.84 0.37 0 1
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.98 0.14 0 1 0.97 0.18 0 1 0.97 0.17 0 1
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.93 0.26 0 1 0.90 0.30 0 1 0.91 0.29 0 1
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.93 0.25 0 1 0.92 0.28 0 1 0.92 0.27 0 1
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G.2 CLASS-BASED DIFFERENCES IN PRE-TREATMENT
COVARIATES FOR WOMEN
In line with what we would expect based on the literature, there are some important dif-
ferences between the women in our sample by socio-economic class background. Table 27
presents a formal test of the difference between rich and poor women in our sample on
52 pre-treatment covariates. On the whole, we do not observe many significant differences
between women in our sample on the basis of socio-economic class background. However,
those differences we do observe in terms of pre-treatment covariates are telling and generally
supportive of our results in the main text.
The data presented in Panel B shows that our socio-economic class categorization of
women was effective, as rich and poor women significantly differ on all relevant measures of
socio-economic status used in our class index for classification and random assignment to
treatment groups. As could be expected, more rich women have completed post-secondary
education than poor women; nearly all rich women in our sample have a post-secondary
degree of some sort, while less than one-third of poor women do. This might help explain
why there is a positive and significant (7 percentage point) difference in the share of rich
women (relative to poor women) who answered all practice problem questions correctly in
the public goods game example worksheet.
In line with what we might expect given the literature characterizing upper-class women
as elitist or benefiting from their privileged status, we also see evidence that the rich women in
our sample are significantly more likely than poor women to report having access to Za’im
or politicians for access to benefits (see Panel F). Rich women also report a significantly
higher strength of attachment to their class identity. This could be owning to psychological
benefits attached to their privileged class status (Brewer, 1991). It is worth noting that
the vast majority of poor women in our sample are occupied as homemakers (67%). This
is about 20 percentage points higher than the share of rich women engaged as homemakers
(46%), which could also help explain why we see that rich women in our sample are more
likely to report discussing political issues with family, friends, or neighbors since they may
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be more active outside of the home in the labor force or engaging in political activities.






Test of the Difference
b p-value
Panel A: Demographics
Age 38 34 -4 0.005
Married (%) 0.75 0.7 -0.04 0.443
Post-secondary education (%) 0.27 0.94 0.67 0.000
Christian (%) 0.32 0.34 0.00 0.962
Shia (%) 0.34 0.34 0.01 0.825
Sunni (%) 0.34 0.32 -0.02 0.789
Panel B: Economic class status
Economic status index -0.82 0.66 1.48 0.000
Value of total household assets 1.04 2.22 1.14 0.000
Estimated area (size) of household 1.2 2.25 1.05 0.000
Owns a summer house 1.1 2.97 1.88 0.000
Power alternatives during an outage 1.82 3.13 1.34 0.000
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.09 2.55 1.47 0.000
Frequency of dining out per month 1.54 2.57 1.02 0.000
Monthly household net income 5.39 7.87 2.49 0.000
Subjective monthly household income 2.09 4.45 2.36 0.000
Total net monthly household income 4.84 7.24 2.47 0.000
Household’s economic class 0.68 1.43 0.73 0.000
Students (%) 0.15 0.08 -0.08 0.022
Homemakers (%) 0.67 0.46 -0.20 0.001
Panel C: Prejudice
Prejudice against members of other sects index 0.15 0.15 -0.01 0.949
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.51 2.53 -0.02 0.891
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.36 1.36 0.00 0.958
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.53 1.5 -0.05 0.606
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.2 2.16 0.00 0.980
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.71 1.67 -0.03 0.768
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.59 1.72 0.10 0.300
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.36 1.33 -0.03 0.718
Panel D: Political Activity
Political activity/engagement index -0.27 -0.07 0.20 0.096
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.62 0.72 0.10 0.084
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.302
Signed a petition 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.557
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.25 0.29 0.03 0.565
Panel E: Social Networks
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index 0.1 0.11 0.04 0.767
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.88 2.95 0.08 0.518
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.81 2.75 -0.02 0.883
Frequency discussing issues with people you disagree with often 2.37 2.36 -0.03 0.793
Panel F: Strength of Sectarian Identity
Strength of sectarian identity index 0.11 0.09 -0.03 0.781
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.5 3.54 0.04 0.710
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.48 0.47 -0.01 0.893
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.53 4.33 -0.20 0.432
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index -0.39 0.05 0.41 0.001
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 1.43 1.98 0.51 0.000
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 1.87 2.11 0.21 0.130
Panel G: Other Social Group Identities
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.56 4.38 -0.24 0.330
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 5.52 5.26 -0.30 0.210
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.53 4.01 0.47 0.046
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.63 5.34 -0.31 0.223
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.12 4.37 0.28 0.240
Panel H: Session Implementation
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.37 0.42 0.06 0.331
Number of participants in session 0.92 0.98 0.08 0.006
People in the group known prior to the session 0.1 0.03 -0.08 0.017
Panel I: Public Goods Game Materials
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.84 0.9 0.07 0.051
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.97 0.99 0.01 0.395
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.92 0.94 0.04 0.218
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.9 0.97 0.06 0.036
All indices incorporate weights that correct for heterogeneous treatment assignment probabilities across strata.
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G.3 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
Viewing the summary statistics for women relative to men in our sample helps make the case
for focusing on cooperation between women rather than men. Table 28 shows the means
for pre-treatment covariates for the full sample overall, as well as the difference in means
between men and women. Important variation by gender emerges, as women and men in our
sample differ in key ways that could affect the propensity for class bias to affect cooperation
in group settings.
Turning first to differences in social status and economic background, the women in
our sample are seven years older than the men (on average). At the same time, a higher
share of the women are married (72% compared to just 36%), while a lower share of women
have completed post-secondary education (61% vs. 71%). More than half of the women
are occupied as homemakers (56%) compared to less than 1% of the men. It is possible
that this is related to the relatively high share of women who are married in the sample.
In terms of how this translates to occupational identity, women identify less strongly with
their occupational identity than men do, which makes sense given that far fewer women in
our sample work outside of the home (compared to men).
Other significant differences appear in connection to measures of sectarianism and gender
identity in Lebanon. Women are more uncomfortable with the prospect of inter-sectarian
marriage than men are. Women are also less willing to change their official sectarian af-
filiation than men are. This could reflect stronger attachment to sectarian identity among
women compared to men, but it could also be a reflection of the fact that women face sig-
nificantly greater legal barriers than men in marriage and family issues (Geagea and Fakih,
2015). This could mean that reluctance to change sectarian affiliation or to marry outside
of one’s sect is more a reflection of the costs and challenges associated with doing so, rather
than a reflective of stronger sectarian attachment among women.
In terms of other types of social identities, women more strongly identify with their
gender identity than men do. This makes sense given the significant barriers women face as
women in Lebanon, particularly when it comes to personal status laws (Geagea and Fakih,
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2015). Despite these shared challenges, the data suggests that there are also gender-related
differences in group-based mobilization for collective action. The women in our sample report
being more uncomfortable than men with discussing political and social or economic issues
with people from other sectarian groups. This is consistent with evidence that suggests
women try to avoid sectarian issues when organizing to take collective action (Joseph, 2001).
Consistent with the history of women’s organizing in Lebanon outlined in Section 3.3.1,
women in our sample have more homogeneous social networks than men do, and women’s
exposure to people from other economic classes is (on average) quite limited.
While almost half of the women in our sample report that most of their friends belong
to other sectarian groups, only about one-quarter of women have a similar number of friends
in other economic classes. In contrast, men report generally more heterogeneous social
networks. While our data does not allow us to identify how many of these social networks
interactions occur only with other women, it does tell us something about women’s social
homogeneity relative to men. Women, compared to men, are less likely to report peer social
networks composed of individuals from different sectarian and economic class backgrounds.
This means that in the context of our study, women are more likely to be interacting with
people from groups they do not have a lot of experience interacting with outside of the study
environment. In this context, information about the group’s composition is more likely to
have different effects on men and on women.
Also in line with the available evidence on women’s relative lack of participation in public
political demonstrations, women in our sample are less likely than men to report signing a
petition or attending a demonstration or protest march. While women are also statistically
less likely than men to discuss issues with family, friends, and neighbors, the percentage of
women who report having done so in the past is still quite high (67%), meaning most women
discuss their concerns with their immediate social networks even if they are less likely to act
publicly through protest or petition-signing to express their concerns. The fact that women
are much less likely than men to report access to benefits through sectarian elites (such as
religious leaders or Za’im) is also consistent with the narrative that women are more likely
to depend on organizing collectively within their communities for access to needed material
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goods and services than they are to depend on individual relationships with high-ranking
sectarian representatives.
On the whole, the gender variation in pre-treatment covariates supports existing evidence
on the history of women’s organizing in Lebanon. Women in our sample generally have more
homogeneous social networks, they avoid public debates on political issues, and they have
limited access to material benefits through sectarian elites relative to men. Importantly,
these are all dimensions along which we observe significant differences among women as
well, where rich women are more similar to men than they are to poor women when it comes
to these factors.
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Test of the Difference
b p-value
Panel A: Demographics
Age 29 36 8 0.000
Married (%) 0.36 0.72 0.36 0.000
Post-secondary education (%) 0.71 0.61 -0.10 0.007
Christian (%) 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.951
Shia (%) 0.33 0.34 0.00 0.916
Sunni (%) 0.34 0.33 0.00 0.966
Panel B: Economic class status
Economic status index 0.05 -0.08 -0.13 0.079
Value of total household assets 1.66 1.63 -0.04 0.472
Estimated area (size) of household 1.71 1.73 0.01 0.907
Owns a summer house 2.04 2.04 -0.01 0.945
Power alternatives during an outage 2.60 2.48 -0.11 0.143
Can afford to vacation at least once per year 1.90 1.82 -0.08 0.235
Frequency of dining out per month 2.15 2.06 -0.09 0.134
Monthly household net income 6.79 6.64 -0.16 0.175
Subjective monthly household income 3.31 3.27 -0.04 0.694
Total net monthly household income 6.37 6.05 -0.30 0.038
Household’s economic class 1.03 1.06 0.02 0.694
Students (%) 0.15 0.12 -0.04 0.107
Homemakers (%) 0.00 0.56 0.56 0.000
Panel C: Prejudice
Prejudice against members of other sects index -0.10 0.15 0.26 0.002
Marrying someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 2.08 2.52 0.44 0.000
Having a physician from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.32 1.36 0.04 0.395
Being neighbors with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.52 1.51 0.00 0.996
Discussing politics with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.95 2.18 0.26 0.006
Discussing social/econ issues w/ someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.57 1.69 0.13 0.050
Being supervised at work by someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.67 1.65 -0.04 0.549
Being friends with someone from another sect (discomfort coded high) 1.35 1.34 0.00 0.968
Panel D: Political Activity
Political activity/engagement index 0.11 -0.17 -0.31 0.000
Discussed issues with family, friends, or neighbors 0.73 0.67 -0.07 0.039
Talked to party members/Zaim/MPs about political issues 0.14 0.10 -0.03 0.235
Signed a petition 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.021
Attended a demonstration/protest march 0.41 0.27 -0.17 0.000
Panel E: Social Networks
Homogeneity of social networks (sect and class) index -0.07 0.11 0.22 0.008
Family, friends, acquaintances in other economic classes (none coded high) 2.81 2.91 0.11 0.148
Family, friends, acquaintances in other sects (none coded high) 2.58 2.78 0.24 0.006
Frequency discussing issues with people you disagree with often 2.30 2.36 0.05 0.467
Panel F: Strength of Sectarian Identity
Strength of sectarian identity index -0.07 0.10 0.16 0.047
Willingness to change official sectarian affiliation (unwilling coded high) 3.34 3.52 0.17 0.009
Political party (1=supports a sectarian party) 0.47 0.48 0.01 0.821
Relative strength of sectarian identity (strong coded high) 4.23 4.43 0.19 0.247
Connectedness to sectarian leaders for access to benefits index 0.11 -0.17 -0.30 0.000
Access to benefits through Zaim/politician 2.01 1.71 -0.31 0.000
Access to benefits through a religious leaders 2.19 1.99 -0.22 0.008
Panel G: Other Social Group Identities
Strength of age group identity (strong coded high) 4.62 4.47 -0.08 0.644
Strength of gender identity (strong coded high) 4.91 5.39 0.50 0.002
Strength of class identity (strong coded high) 3.91 3.77 -0.14 0.332
Strength of Lebanese identity (strong coded high) 5.69 5.48 -0.20 0.209
Strength of occupational identity (strong coded high) 4.83 4.25 -0.63 0.000
Panel H: Session Implementation
Binary indicator for Moderator 0.39 0.40 0.00 0.987
Number of participants in session 0.95 0.95 0.00 0.887
People in the group known prior to the session 0.11 0.06 -0.04 0.155
Panel I: Public Goods Game Materials
Answered all practice problem questions correctly (%) 0.82 0.87 0.06 0.025
Correctly answered amount earned from Group Pot (%) 0.97 0.98 0.01 0.232
Correctly answered Group Pot share (%) 0.90 0.93 0.03 0.143
Correctly answered total earned (%) 0.92 0.93 0.03 0.221




This section presents robustness checks for the main results. Specifically, we check the
robustness of results to the inclusion of additional control variables, to the use of block fixed
effects, and to the use of an alternative set of weights to account for unequal treatment
assignment probabilities.
To confirm the robustness of the results, we run all models with two additional control
variables that could have influenced the findings. First, we include an additional count
variable for the number of group members an individual knew prior to participating in
the experiment. Research shows that interacting with friends or acquaintances rather than
strangers affects contributions in cooperation games. Second, we include a measure that
captures participants’ comprehension of the public goods game payoff structure that we
created by scoring answers in a ‘Practice Problem’ as correct or incorrect. This variable
equals 1 if the participants correctly answered all three questions on the example exercise
worksheet provided prior to playing Round 1 of the game. This helps us control for the
possibility that some participants may have played non-strategically because of confusion
over payoffs. Table 29 presents the main results with these two additional control variables
included in the analysis described in the main text in Section 3.4.2. Table 30 presents the
main results in Model 1 (with all original controls and moderator fixed effects) and compares
it to the same model but with the addition of strata fixed effects (Model 2). Table 31 presents
the main results with alternative weights.
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Table 29: Main results with additional controls.
Same Class
Mean
Model 1 Model 2 N
Women overall








Mixed class 4476 -2034*** -1726*** 143
(540) (637)
0.000 0.008
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
models incorporate weights that correct for unequal treatment assignment prob-
abilities across strata. Model 1 has no controls; Model 2 includes controls and
moderator fixed effects.
Table 30: Main results with strata fixed effects.
Same Class
Mean
Model 1 Model 2 N
Women overall








Mixed class 4476 -1793*** -1743*** 143
(615) (607)
0.004 0.005
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
models incorporate weights that correct for unequal treatment assignment prob-
abilities across strata. Model 1 has all controls and moderator fixed effects;
Model 2 includes controls and moderator fixed effects and strata fixed effects.
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Table 31: Main results with alternative weights.
Same Class
Mean
Model 1 Model 2 N
Women overall








Mixed class 4431 -1952*** -1788*** 143
(532) (575)
0.000 0.002
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
models incorporate weights that correct for unequal treatment assignment prob-





I.1 DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS IN ALL-MALE GROUPS
Figure 10 shows the pattern of contributions conditional on treatment type and socio-
economic status for men in our sample. Where women in our sample clearly have a negative
reaction to the mixed-class treatment, men seem to respond to the mixed-class group setting
in a much more positive way regardless of socioeconomic status. Both rich and poor men in
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Out of 10,000 LL
Rich Men in Mixed Class Groups
Contributions to the Public Good
Figure 10: Distribution of contributions to the public good by men in same-class versus
mixed-class group settings, disaggregated by socio-economic status of participants.
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I.2 CONTRIBUTIONS BY WOMEN CONDITIONAL ON
CROSS-CUTTING SECTARIAN TREATMENT
The descriptive evidence for contributions cross-cut by the mixed-sect versus same-sect group
composition treatment suggests that the general average negative effect of the mixed-class
group treatment on cooperation holds, especially for rich women, regardless of the sectarian
composition of the group. This lends support to our argument that we should interpret our
findings as evidence that it is the class cleavage, more so than the ethnic cleavage, that is
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Rich Women in Mixed Class Groups
Contributions in Same-Sect Groups
Figure 11: Distribution of contributions to the public good by women in same-sect groups:
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Rich Women in Mixed Class Groups
Contributions in Mixed-Sect Groups
Figure 12: Distribution of contributions to the public good by women in mixed-sect groups:




THE PUBLIC GOODS GAME
In this section, we present the instruments used to implement and collect data during the
public goods game exercise, including:
1. The script used by the Assistant Moderator to introduce the game to participants and
guide them through it.
2. The example exercise worksheet used by participants to gauge comprehension of payoffs.
3. The practice grid exercise participants completed before Round 1 of the game.
4. The rubric used by the Moderation Team to record the public goods game data from
Round 1 (and Round 2).
A detailed field manual was also provided to all members of the Moderation Team and is
available from the authors upon request.
197
 1 
Assistant Moderator Public Goods Script (BULLETS) 
 
INTRODUCTION KEY POINTS: 
 
• Participatory exercise that reflects real world choices that people sometimes have to make 
• Already earned an additional 10,000 LL (for filling out the pre-survey) 
• Can use all, none, or some of it in this group activity 
• Doing this twice, once before our group discussion, and once again afterwards 
• We will not reveal the results of either round of the exercise until the end of the session  
• Only one of the two rounds will “count” in terms of how much extra money you earn today  




• No talking to each other! Clarifying questions about how the activity works only 
• Each have earned your own 10,000 LL  
• Contribute any amount from 0 up to 10,000 LL in increments of 1,000 LL 
• I will add up everything you individually contribute and increase it by half (multiply by 1.5)  
• Then redistribute this new total back to all 6 members of the group, whether they contributed 
or not 
• Your share of the group pot plus whatever you did not contribute will be your total extra 
earnings 
• This means that how much you stand to gain or to lose from contributing to the group pot 
depends both on your private decision about what to contribute, as well as on the private 










LOOK AT SOME EXAMPLES: 
 
• Remove the “Examples Worksheet” from your packets 
 
** Moderator Copy of the “Examples Worksheet” inserted here ** 
 
EXAMPLES WORKSHEET (Asst. Mod. Copy) 
 
Example 1 [Note: This is an extreme example where Participant 1 contributes a lot and everyone else contributes little.] 
 
Contributors To Group Pot Keep privately Earned from Group Pot Total Earned 
Participant 1 8,000 2,000 4,000  6,000 
Participant 2 0 10,000 4,000  14,000 
Participant 3 0 10,000 4,000  14,000 
Participant 4 2,000 8,000 4,000  12,000 
Participant 5 2,000 8,000 4,000  12,000 
Participant 6 4,000 6,000 4,000  10,000 
  
Total in group pot 16,000  
 Multiplied by 1.5 24,000 
Each person’s share from Group Pot 24,000/6= 4,000 
 
DEMONSTRATING EXAMPLE 1 WITH CASH (spoken script in bold Italics): 
• Each participant in the group has 10,000 LL (Separate the 10,000 LL into 6 piles, one representing each 
person.) 
 
• In Example 1, Participant 1 (indicate one pile of 10,000 as “Participant 1”) decides to contribute 8,000 
and keep 2,000 (Now, physically move 8,000 LL from that pile to a “group pot” pile and leave 2,000 LL behind) 
 
• Meanwhile, two of the other participants contribute nothing and keep all 10,000 (move nothing 
from those two piles to the group pot).  
 
• At the same time, two of the others contribute 2,000 each, but keep 8,000 (move 2,000 from two 
of the piles to the group pot).  
 
• And the last one contributes 4,000 and keeps 6,000 (move 4,000 from that pile to the group pot pile).  
 
• I will multiply whatever is contributed to the group pot pile by 1.5. So, the total here in the 
group pot is 16,000 (Count it out for them so they see how it is just like in the example) 
 
• 16,000 times 1.5 is 24,000, so I (as the Asst. Mod.) will add an additional 8,000 to the pot, so 
it is now 24,000 (physically add an additional 8,000 to the pile) 
 
• This 24,000 gets divided evenly back between the 6 participants no matter how much each 
contributed individually (Distribute it evenly to each pile of what was set aside as “kept” by each) 
 
• So, now you see that Participant 1 has 6,000; Participant 2 has 14,000; Participant 3 has 





Example 2 [Note: This is an extreme example where Participant 1 contributes little and everyone else contributes a lot.] 
 
Contributors To Group Pot Keep privately Earned from Group Pot Total Earned 
Participant 1 1,000 9,000 12,000  21,000 
Participant 2 9,000 1,000 12,000  13,000 
Participant 3 9,000 1,000 12,000 13,000 
Participant 4 9,000 1,000 12,000  13,000 
Participant 5 10,000 0 12,000  12,000 
Participant 6 10,000 0 12,000  12,000 
  
Total in group pot 48,000  
 Multiplied by 1.5 72,000 
Each person’s share from Group Pot 72,000/6= 12,000 
 
DEMONSTRATING EXAMPLE 2 WITH CASH (spoken script in bold Italics): 
• Each participant in the group has 10,000 LL (Separate the 10,000 LL into 6 piles, one representing each 
person.) 
 
• In Example 2, Participant 1 (indicate one pile of 10,000 as “Participant 1”) decides to contribute 1,000 
and keep 9,000 (Now, physically move 1,000 LL from that pile to a “group pot” pile and leave 9,000 LL behind) 
 
• Meanwhile, three of the other participants contribute 9,000 each and keep 1,000 each (move 
9,000 from those three piles to the group pot).  
 
• At the same time, the remaining two participants contribute all 10,000 each and keep 
nothing (move 10,000 from two of the piles to the group pot).  
 
• I will multiply whatever is contributed to the group pot pile by 1.5. So, the total here in the 
group pot is 48,000 (Count it out for them so they see how it is just like in the example) 
 
• 48,000 times 1.5 is 72,000, so I (as the Asst. Mod.) will add this additional earnings of 24,000 
to the pot, so the pot is now 72,000 (physically add an additional 24,000 to the pile) 
 
• This 72,000 gets divided evenly back between the 6 participants no matter how much each 
contributed individually. In this case, that is 12,000 per participant, or 72,000 divided by 6.  
(Distribute it evenly to each pile of what was set aside as “kept” by each) 
 
• So, now you see that Participant 1 has 21,000; Participants 2 and 3 and 4 have 13,000; and 
Participants 5 and 6 have 12,000 LL. 
 
EXAMPLE FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS: 
• When do participants take home the least money?  
o Answer: When they contribute a lot but no one else does. 
 
• When do participants take home the most money? 
o Answer: When they keep everything but other people in the group contribute a lot.   
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REPEAT KEY POINTS: 
• It is possible for everyone to contribute different amounts.  
• The “bonus” of 1.5 is only applied to money that is contributed to the Group Pot, and not to 
the amount that individuals choose to keep privately. 
• Everyone will benefit equally from the Group Pot earnings, regardless of whether they 
contributed or not (like in Example 1). 
• No one will ever know what anyone else contributed – totally anonymous. 
 
PRACTICE PROBLEM: 
• Fill in the blank columns in the “Practice Problem” exercise at the bottom of the “Examples 
Worksheet.”  




Contributors To Group Pot Keep privately Earned from Group Pot Total Earned 
Participant 1 6,000 4,000 10,000 14,000 
Participant 2 5,000 5,000 10,000 15,000 
Participant 3 5,000 5,000 10,000 15,000 
Participant 4 7,000 3,000 10,000 13,000 
Participant 5 7,000 3,000 10,000 13,000 
Participant 6 10,000 0 10,000 10,000 
  
Total in group pot 40,000  
 Multiplied by 1.5 60,000 
Each person’s share from Group Pot? 60,000/6 = 10,000 
 
** Note for the Asst. Moderator: The Participant Copy of the “Examples Worksheet” is blank in all of the places where 
you have values highlighted in RED above. Briefly compare each person’s answers to the correct answers you have here. 
If you see consistent issues across participants, make sure to clarify again how the activity works. **  
 
OTHER STEPS BEFORE ROUND #1: 
• Collect each person’s “Examples Worksheet.”  
 
• Briefly check his or her answers to the practice problem. If you notice that some people are struggling to understand how 
the exercise works, make a note of what the issue seems to be and clarify how the activity works a final time before 
proceeding.  
 
• Set the Examples Worksheets facedown and off to the side. DO NOT hand them back to the participants.  
 
• Direct participants to remove the “Practice Grid” handout from their packets and to fill them out quietly. 
 




ROUND 1 SCRIPT: 
• Any questions? 
• Remember, no talking! 
• [Pass out envelopes with slip of paper inside] 
• Circle the option corresponding to how many LL you would like to contribute to the group pot  
• No right or wrong answer 
• Your decision will remain anonymous 
• Put slip of paper back into the envelope and pass it to me 
[Put the envelopes in box labeled “Round 1” at the front of the room.]  
[Take the Examples Worksheets AND the Practice Grids with you when you exit the moderation space.] 
 
ROUND 2 SCRIPT: 
• Works the same way that it worked the first time 
• Remember, no talking! 
• All have 10,000 LL that you earned already today 
• Decide how much to keep for yourself or to contribute to the group pot 
• Everything contributed to the group pot will get increased by half (multiplied by 1.5) and 
distributed back equally to all members of the group. 
• How much you stand to gain or to lose from contributing to the group pot depends both on 
your private decision about what to contribute, as well as on the private decisions made by 
every other member of this group 
• You can make whatever decision you want, it can be the same or different from the first 
round 
• No one will ever know who contributed what – all contributions are anonymous  
• Afterwards, will flip a coin to see which round will count for actual earnings 
• Any questions?  
• [Pass out envelopes] Inside your envelope there is a slip of paper just like in the first round – 
circle the amount you want to contribute to the group pot 
 
[Do the exercise. Collect the envelopes and place them in the second labeled shoebox.]  
[Do the coin flip and take that box of envelopes from the room. Do not collect the other envelopes for data entry until 
all participants leave.] 
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Example 1:  
Contributors To Group Pot Keep privately Earned from Group Pot Total Earned 
Participant 1 8,000 2,000 4,000  6,000 
Participant 2  0 10,000 4,000  14,000 
Participant 3  0 10,000 4,000  14,000 
Participant 4  2,000 8,000 4,000  12,000 
Participant 5  2,000 8,000 4,000  12,000 
Participant 6  4,000 6,000 4,000  10,000 
  
Total in group pot 16,000  
 Multiplied by 1.5 24,000 
Each person’s share from Group Pot 24,000/6= 4,000 
 
Example 2:  
Contributors To Group Pot Keep privately Earned from Group Pot Total Earned 
Participant 1 1,000 9,000 12,000  21,000 
Participant 2  9,000 1,000 12,000  13,000 
Participant 3  9,000 1,000 12,000 13,000 
Participant 4  9,000 1,000 12,000  13,000 
Participant 5  10,000 0 12,000  12,000 
Participant 6  10,000 0 12,000  12,000 
  
Total in group pot 48,000  
 Multiplied by 1.5 72,000 
Each person’s share from Group Pot 72,000/6= 12,000 
 
Practice Problem 
Contributors To Group Pot Keep privately Earned from Group Pot Total Earned 
Participant 1 6,000 4,000   
Participant 2  5,000 5,000   
Participant 3  5,000 5,000   
Participant 4  7,000 3,000   
Participant 5  7,000 3,000   
Participant 6  10,000 0   
  
Total in group pot 40,000  
 Multiplied by 1.5 60,000 






As a final round of practice before we begin Round 1 of the exercise, please answer the following questions. 
There should be NO COMMUNICATING during this exercise.  
 
Question 1: If you had no idea what the other members of the group had contributed to the 
Group Pot, how much would you choose to contribute out of your 10,000 LL? 
 





Question 2: Now, how much you would contribute to the Group Pot if you knew the following 
information about what the other members of the group had contributed?  
 
 Average contribution by 
each of the other 5 group 
members: 
What would you 
contribute if you knew for 
sure that this was true? 
Scenario #1 0 LL LL 
Scenario #2 1,000 LL LL 
Scenario #3 2,000 LL LL 
Scenario #4 3,000 LL LL 
Scenario #5 4,000 LL LL 
Scenario #6 5,000 LL LL 
Scenario #7 6,000 LL LL 
Scenario #8 7,000 LL LL 
Scenario #9 8,000 LL LL 
Scenario #10 9,000 LL LL 






PUBLIC GOODS GAME RECORD SHEET 
Group ID:  
Date of Discussion: 
Assistant Moderator: 
Participant ID  
(Copy from 
contribution slips) 
Round 1 Round 2 








     
     
     
     
     
     




    
Round that counts 
(circle one): 
1 2 




UGANDA’S ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AND MEASURING
COMPETITION
Uganda is divided into 127 districts (plus the capital of Kampala) for the purpose of public
administration. Each of these 128 districts is further divided into counties and subcounties.
During a general election, voters within each district elect representatives to serve at the
subcounty, district, and national levels. One-third of all seats must be held by women
representatives at each level of government. To ensure this, certain seats are reserved for
women on the subcounty, municipal, and district councils, and each district is granted one
seat in Parliament for a woman representative. Only women can run in these reserved seat
contests, but they are voted on by all eligible voters who reside within the constituency,
including both men and women.
Figure 13 is a stylized illustration of the structure of the electoral system of representation
in Uganda. At the lowest level of Uganda’s governing structure are villages, typically consist-
ing of 50 or more households led by a local council (LC1).1 Multiple villages are grouped into
a parish, led by a local council (LC2). Multiple parishes are then grouped into a subcounty,
which is run by the elected local council (LC3). Multiple subcounties are then grouped into
a single county, and each county elects one representative to serve in the national Parliament
as that constituency’s representative. Each subcounty also elects representatives to serve in
1The explanation of Uganda’s administrative structure given in this paragraph is adapted from
the description available on Mbarara District’s website: https://www.mbarara.go.ug/district/
administrative-structure.
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the district-level local council as LC5 councilors. In municipalities (cities), the sub-county
level is referred to as a division. Multiple divisions make up the county (municipality). This
means that a division representative in a municipality is equivalent to an LC3 councilor in
a rural county. Because they are equivalent to rural counties, each municipality also elects
a representative to the national Parliament.
Figure 13: Illustration of Uganda’s electoral structure.
To construct the main measure of electoral competition, I first calculated the average
margin of victory across all LC3 woman representative elections in a given county in the 2011
general elections. In the context of Figure 13, this means that to arrive at the mean margin
of victory for women LC3 representatives in County A, I calculated the average margin of
victory for LC3 women who won in Subcounty 1 and Subcounty 2. That value is the measure
of electoral competition I then assigned to all women I surveyed in the 2016 election cycle
who contested for seats as representatives within County A. Because all LC3, LC4, and LC5
women candidates for office compete for votes at the county level or below, this measure
gives a general sense of the level of electoral competition faced by women competing for
office in County A overall.
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For a more specific example, Mbarara District, one of the districts with observations
in my candidate data, had 3 counties in the 2011 general election. One of these counties
was Mbarara Municipality, which consisted of 3 subcounties. In one of these subcounties,
there was only 1 LC3 woman representative seat in 2011, while in the second subcounty
there were 6 LC3 women representative seats and in the third subcounty there were 7 LC3
women representative seats. Across these 14 electoral contests, only 1 seat was won by a
woman candidate without facing any opposition; the other 13 seats were won in competitive
contests. However, the margin of victory for each contest varied. To generate a single
measure of electoral competition to represent all women in my dataset competing for votes
in Mbarara Municipality (county), I calculated the average margin of victory across all 14
of these LC3 (subcounty) contests. To account for the fact that the number of votes varies
considerably across races, I converted the actual vote count for all 2011 candidates in a given
race as a percentage out of 100 possible votes. For instance, if the winner received 1000 votes
and the loser received 500 votes, I coded that as the winner receiving 67 % of the vote and the
loser as receiving 33 % of the vote. This, in turn, would equate to a margin of victory for the
winner in that race of about 34 %. If a candidate won without facing opposition, I recorded
this as a margin of victory of 100 %. Using this method, I found the average margin of
victory for the 14 LC3 women representatives in Mbarara Municipality in 2011 to be 28.5%.
In my analysis I use this value of 28.5 as the measure of electoral competition for all women
candidates in my dataset who competed for votes in 2016 in Mbarara Municipality.
I prefer this county-level measure of electoral competition over a district-level measure
because it allows for more variation within the dataset, but also for an important substantive
reason. Namely, by assigning a value of electoral competition at the county level, I preserve
the potential to capture important within-district differences in the level of competition
women face in rural compared to urban settings. There are a number of good reasons
to expect that elections may be more competitive in urban areas than in rural areas in
general. By defining competition at the county level rather than the district level, I retain
the distinction between urban and rural counties in the dataset rather than aggregating all
of these responses into a single measure of competition at the district level. This is possible
because each municipality in Uganda is its own county for electoral purposes. Thus, in my
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dataset, a district may contain a more competitive county (perhaps the municipality) as well
as two less competitive counties (perhaps two rural counties).
Figure 14 gives a sense of how many elections were won unopposed in 2011 across the
constituencies represented in the sample. This further reinforces the need to consider unop-
posed winners alongside opposed winners when calculating the average margin of victory at
the constituency level, since in some instances a huge percentage of subcounty elections in
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Figure 14: The level of competition across constituencies represented in the sample of women
candidates surveyed.
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Figure 14 shows the share of LC3 seats won uncontested in 2011 for each constituency
represented in the sample. Removing those elections where the 2011 candidates won in the
general without facing any opponents and calculating the average margin of victory for only
those elections where there was competition produces the distribution shown in Figure 15.
While this distribution of the average margin of victory yields a more even distribution, it
risks obscuring the extent to which a constituency might only have one competitive election
at the LC3 level in 2011, whereas all other elections were won uncontested. For this reason,
I use the original measure of the average margin of victory, including those who won without
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CONSTRUCTING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING PRINCIPAL
COMPONENT ANALYSIS
This section details the procedure I followed to identify which variables had similar under-
lying relationships in the data so that I could correctly locate measures of clientelistic (or,
in-group) representation versus representation of women constituents’ interests more broadly.
I used principal component analysis to investigate the nine survey question response options
for constituent groups candidates could plan to prioritize for policy-making if elected to of-
fice. Candidates were asked to identify the top three groups whose needs they intended to
prioritize if elected. I then coded responses for each of the nine categories for all 157 surveys
into a binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if a given candidate intends to prioritize
that constituent group in their top three and ‘0’ if otherwise. To prepare the components
for use in the analysis, I predicted the scores of the components after estimating them us-
ing STATA’s ‘pca’ command.1 A scree plot of the eigenvalues produced in the principal
component analysis of the nine response options for the dependent variable (representation
priorities) is presented in Figure 16. The plot suggests that variation in the nine measures is
largely explained by three underlying component measures (those with eigenvalues greater
than 1).
1Details on employing principal-component analysis with STATA are available here: https://www.stata.
com/features/overview/principal-components/.
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Figure 16: Eigenvalues plot for the nine answer options for group representation priorities.
Together, these three components explain approximately 63% of the variation in the
data, as shown in Figure 17. Retaining these three underlying component indices produces
component loadings as shown in Figure 18. For the most part, youth and women load
together; party agents and family/friends load together; and, coethnics, members of the same
religion, and members of the same clan or tribe load together. Depending on the rotation,
disabled and physically vulnerable people loads separately from the other components, while
all people in the community is always by itself (see Figure 18).
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Figure 18: Component loadings for the principal component analysis: without rotation (top
left), with varimax rotation (top right), and with promax rotation (bottom left).
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The correlation between the original nine response options and the three underlying
components is presented in Figure 20. Correlation values above 0.3 and below -0.3 suggest
a strong correlation between the components and the trace variables. For the most part,
the share of the variation in each trace variable left unexplained by the component indices
is fairly low, except in the case of prioritizing friends/family (42%), women (51%), and
the disabled/physically vulnerable (53%). For each of these trace elements, the share of
variation in the data left unexplained by the components is more than 42 %. For this
reason, I do not solely rely on the PCA indices for analysis of the main dependent variables,
but also check the sensitivity of the results to indices produced using Anderson’s Inverse
Covariance Weighting (ICW) method (see Appendix P.2). I also run the analysis for each of
the component measures separately and present those results in the main text.
As a final check, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (see Figure 19) of the suitability of using
the PCA approach confirms that the sample is adequate to justify the use of the indices in
place of the original component variables. The fact that all variables show a value of greater
than 0.50 (rounded) justifies the use of PCA.
Figure 19: KMO measure of sampling adequacy.
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Figure 20: Correlation between the three underlying components and the original (trace)
variables.
On the whole, Figure 20 suggests two major underlying relationships in the trace elements
that fall within Component 1 and Component 2. By contrast, much of uniqueness in Com-
ponent 3 seems to be driven by the single trace element measuring the intent to prioritize ‘all
people in the community.’ For this reason, I focus on Component 1 and Component 2 as the
main indices representing two different approaches to representing constituent groups. In the
case of Component 1, there is a clear strong and positive correlation across the preference
for prioritizing party agents, self/friends/family, coethnics, members of the same religion,
and members of the same clan. These in-group constituents together suggest a preference
for clientelistic representation whereby the candidate seeks to prioritize benefits for those
with whom they share membership in salient social groups rather than the population more
broadly. In the case of Component 2, there is a clear strong and positive association between
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women, youth, and – to a lesser extent – the disabled or physically vulnerable. This suggests
that Component 2 represents a preference for prioritizing the needs of broader constituent
groups, and in particular those that are historically marginalized from accessing clientelistic
networks by the gendered division of labor in Uganda (i.e. gender, domestic labor, care-
taking, etc.). Consequently, these two component indices enter the analysis as the main
dependent variables of interest for gauging differences in women candidates’ representation




This appendix provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Specifically,
Table 32 presents summary statistics for all main outcome measures used in the analysis
(constituent groups to prioritize for representation) and Table 33 presents summary statistics
for all covariates generated from the survey data and used as controls (Panel A). For the
control variables, the summary statistics presented in Table 33 are based on the data prior to
imputing missing values using 10 rounds of predictive mean matching via the ‘ice’ command
in STATA (discussed in detail in Appendix N).
Table 32: Summary statistics for main dependent variables.
Mean SD Min Max Count Missing (%)
Client representation index, PCA (continuous) 0.00 1.78 -1.60 5.56 157 0
Client representation index, PCA (median-cut) 0.48 0.50 0 1 157 0
Top 3: Party agents 0.29 0.46 0 1 157 0
Top 3: Self, family, friends 0.22 0.42 0 1 157 0
Top 3: Coethnics 0.15 0.35 0 1 157 0
Top 3: Same religion 0.11 0.31 0 1 157 0
Top 3: Same clan 0.12 0.33 0 1 157 0
Women’s representation index, PCA (continuous) 0.00 1.23 -2.60 2.27 157 0
Women’s representation index, PCA (median-cut) 0.48 0.50 0 1 157 0
Top 3: Women 0.47 0.50 0 1 157 0
Top 3: Youth 0.54 0.50 0 1 157 0
Top 3: Disabled/physically vulnerable 0.43 0.50 0 1 157 0
Top 3: All people in the community 0.62 0.49 0 1 157 0
217
Table 33 also includes summary statistics in Panel B for additional control variables
gathered from district-level census data (Ugandan Census 2014). I include these measures
to check the sensitivity of candidates’ priorities to the broader district context since this
could influence the types of groups candidates are most likely to prioritize. In Appendix P, I
check the sensitivity of my main results to accounting for higher levels of gender inequality,
poverty/food scarcity, access to clean water, and electricity coverage which could proxy for
the level of development in the candidate’s constituency overall. The main effects with
respect to competition are generally robust to the inclusion of these additional controls.
Table 33: Summary statistics for control variables prior to imputation, includes missingness.
Mean SD Min Max Count Missing (%)
Panel A: Candidate Characteristics
NRM candidate 0.73 0.44 0 1 157 0%
Spouse is politically connected 0.31 0.47 0 1 140 11%
Age 42.71 9.66 21 75 154 2%
Married 0.71 0.45 0 1 154 2%
Member of common religion 0.66 0.48 0 1 154 2%
Member of common ethnicity 0.79 0.41 0 1 156 1%
Education index 0.00 1.00 -2.97 2.38 144 8%
Highest level of education completed 2.09 1.30 0 7 152 3%
Literacy level 1.67 0.55 0 2 153 3%
English fluency 1.39 0.61 0 2 151 4%
Subjective HH income* 2.09 0.86 1 4 120 24%
HH income relative to others in constituency* 3.59 0.91 1 5 121 23%
HH dependents under age 13 2.72 1.79 0 9 149 5%
LC3 (subcounty) candidate 0.67 0.47 0 1 157 0%
LC4 (municipal) candidate 0.06 0.23 0 1 157 0%
LC5 (district) candidate 0.27 0.45 0 1 157 0%
Panel B: District Characteristics
Proxy index of gender inequality 0.00 1.00 -0.48 2.68 157 0%
Share of girl children married, age 10-17 0.13 0.20 0.04 0.65 157 0%
Share of girl children w/ children, age 12-17 0.16 0.19 0.06 0.67 157 0%
Share of HHs w/ less than 2 meals per day 7.99 1.49 5.90 11.80 157 0%
Share of HHs w/ electricity 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.34 157 0%
Share of HHs w/ protected drinking water 0.52 0.13 0.17 0.73 157 0%
*The missingness is higher in these variables because they come from the post-training survey which was not administered in Kasese
or Kabarole. Without these two districts, the total sample size is 134 and both of these variables are only missing for 10% of the
surveys. In those 8 districts that completed a post-training survey, the mean for the unimputed data for ‘subjective HH income’ is
2.09 (sd=0.86) and the mean for the imputed data for ‘relative HH income’ is 3.59 (sd=0.91).
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APPENDIX N
IMPUTATION OF MISSING COVARIATES
To address item-level missingness in the covariates used for analysis, I performed 10 rounds
of missing data imputation using multivariate imputation via chained equations using the
‘ice’ command package in STATA. I excluded any variables with a high degree of item non-
response (more than 15% missing). Table 34 shows the summary statistics for all controls
included in the analysis following imputation though not all of these variables appear in the
models in the main text. Some are included in the sensitivity analysis in Appendix P.
As the key independent variable (average margin of victory in 2011), was assigned at the
constituency level, I was not able to include constituency dummy variables in the chained
equations due to collinearity with the main independent variable by construction. Instead,
I included the set of district dummy variable indicators, dummies for the level of office con-
tested (LC3, LC4, and LC5), and dummies for political party membership (NRM, FDC, or
IND) in the system of chained equations for predictive mean matching. These indicators
were included along with representation priorities (all binary), outcome of the 2016 elec-
tion (binary variable where 1 = winner and 0 = loser), member of majority ethnic group
(binary), member of majority religion (binary), marital status (binary), age (continuous),
household dependents under age 13 (continuous), level of education (ordered categorical),
literacy (ordered categorical), English fluency (ordered categorical), party leader influence
over candidacy (ordered categorical), spousal political networks (binary), attitudes toward
women representatives (ordered categorical), relative trust in women representatives to serve
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Table 34: Summary statistics for control variables after imputation.
Mean SD Min Max N
NRM candidate 0.73 0.44 0 1 157
Age 42.75 9.67 21 75 157
Married 0.71 0.45 0 1 157
Member of common religion 0.66 0.47 0 1 157
Member of common ethnicity 0.79 0.40 0 1 157
Education index 0.00 1.00 -2.97 2.38 157
Highest level of education completed 2.08 1.29 0 7 157
Literacy level 1.67 0.55 0 2 157
English fluency 1.39 0.61 0 2 157
Subjective HH income* 2.20 0.96 1 4 157
HH income relative to others in constituency* 3.56 0.95 1 5 157
HH dependents under age 13 2.71 1.81 0 9 157
Recruited to run by party leaders 2.00 1.30 1 4 157
Spouse is politically connected 0.31 0.46 0 1 157
Relative trust in women reps index 0.00 1.00 -3.84 0.59 157
Trust women more than men to help community 3.55 0.84 1 4 157
Trust women more than men to help women 3.64 0.76 1 4 157
Women reps more informed about women’s needs 3.25 1.03 1 4 157
LC3 (subcounty) candidate 0.67 0.47 0 1 157
LC4 (municipal) candidate 0.06 0.23 0 1 157
LC5 (district) candidate 0.27 0.45 0 1 157
*The majority of the missingness for these two variables is due to the lack of a post-training survey being completed in either Kasese
or Kabarole district. In the 8 districts that do contain data for these two measures, the mean for the imputed data for ‘subjective HH
income’ is 2.15 (sd=0.91) and the mean for the imputed data for ‘relative HH income’ is 3.56 (sd=0.93).
women (ordered categorical), relative trust in women representatives to serve community
overall (ordered categorical), subjective household income (ordered categorical), subjective
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relative household income (ordered categorical), and electoral competition (the key indepen-
dent variable; continuous average margin of victory in 2011).
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APPENDIX O
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS
This section contains the regression output for five different model specifications used to
evaluate the relationship between the level of electoral competition and candidates’ represen-
tation priorities (measured as indices of client representation and women’s representation).
Model 1 is the bivariate regression; Model 2 includes the full slate of controls (the main
specification presented in the text); Model 3 includes controls plus constituency fixed effects;
Model 4 includes controls plus district fixed effects; and, Model 5 includes the original set of
controls plus four additional control variables measured at the district level.
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Table 35: Main regression of competition predicting clientelistic groups index, constituency
clustered standard errors.








Average margin of victory 0.02** 0.02* 0.09*** 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.040 0.065 0.000 0.867 0.107
Affiliated with the NRM -0.11 0.32 0.51 -0.10
(0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.29)
0.697 0.288 0.118 0.745
Spousal political networks 0.06 0.15 0.30 0.17
(0.41) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38)
0.884 0.680 0.412 0.661
Age 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.786 0.881 0.804 0.875
Candidate is married -0.20 -0.64* -0.47* -0.17
(0.25) (0.34) (0.28) (0.25)
0.414 0.074 0.100 0.505
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.27 -0.35 -0.15 -0.23
(0.30) (0.35) (0.31) (0.31)
0.368 0.332 0.625 0.462
Member of dominant ethnic group in district -0.11 0.17 -0.05 -0.23
(0.40) (0.31) (0.31) (0.40)
0.79 0.598 0.874 0.577
Education index 0.00 -0.13 -0.21 -0.12
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
0.976 0.364 0.165 0.359
Subjective HH monthly income 0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
(0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
0.609 0.814 0.873 0.918
Subjective relative HH well-being -0.13 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07
(0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.16)
0.455 0.496 0.535 0.683
HH dependents under age 13 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.12
(0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
0.202 0.316 0.135 0.247
LC5 Candidate 0.43 0.16 0.01 0.31
(0.42) (0.61) (0.46) (0.46)
0.306 0.800 0.982 0.506
District gender inequality index -0.53***
(0.18)
0.007
Share of HHs with <2 meals/day 0.53
(0.31)
0.101
Share of HHs with electricity -6.73
(4.97)
0.188
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 5.99
(3.79)
0.127
Constant -1.41 -1.54 -5.79 0.04 -7.36
(0.57) (1.42) (2.43) (1.53) (4.56)
0.020 0.291 0.027 0.978 0.120
N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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Table 36: Main regression of competition predicting clientelistic groups index, robust stan-
dard errors.








Average margin of victory 0.02** 0.02** 0.09*** 0.00 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
0.010 0.024 0.001 0.885 0.034
Affiliated with the NRM -0.11 0.32 0.51 -0.10
(0.29) (0.37) (0.38) (0.34)
0.704 0.392 0.179 0.780
Spousal political networks 0.06 0.15 0.30 0.17
(0.39) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38)
0.878 0.672 0.396 0.656
Age 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.714 0.843 0.749 0.843
Candidate is married -0.20 -0.64** -0.47* -0.17
(0.29) (0.32) (0.27) (0.29)
0.478 0.047 0.085 0.560
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.27 -0.35 -0.15 -0.23
(0.33) (0.31) (0.29) (0.34)
0.413 0.265 0.606 0.495
Member of dominant ethnic group in district -0.11 0.17 -0.05 -0.23
(0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.38)
0.767 0.612 0.879 0.556
Education index 0.00 -0.13 -0.21 -0.12
(0.13) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15)
0.974 0.429 0.191 0.417
Subjective HH monthly income 0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
(0.18) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21)
0.622 0.819 0.876 0.917
Subjective relative HH well-being -0.13 -0.14 -0.11 -0.07
(0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
0.452 0.452 0.557 0.711
HH dependents under age 13 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.12
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
0.199 0.318 0.128 0.228
LC5 Candidate 0.43 0.16 0.01 0.31
(0.41) (0.47) (0.41) (0.44)
0.287 0.740 0.980 0.473
District gender inequality index -0.53***
(0.17)
0.002
Share of HHs with <2 meals/day 0.53**
(0.26)
0.040
Share of HHs with electricity -6.73*
(3.91)
0.088
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 5.99**
(2.86)
0.038
Constant -1.41 -1.54 -5.79 0.04 -7.36
(0.48) (1.04) (2.23) (1.36) (3.22)
0.004 0.143 0.011 0.975 0.024
N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include robust standard errors.
224
Table 37: Main regression of competition predicting marginalized groups index, constituency
clustered standard errors.








Average margin of victory 0.00 0.00 -0.26*** -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.728 0.985 0.000 0.302 0.712
Affiliated with the NRM 0 0.17 0.19 0.18
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.23)
0.986 0.525 0.470 0.429
Spousal political networks -0.11 -0.11 0.02 0.02
(0.20) (0.26) (0.21) (0.21)
0.579 0.667 0.921 0.917
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.395 0.536 0.650 0.836
Candidate is married -0.25 0.11 -0.09 -0.15
(0.23) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
0.287 0.563 0.674 0.480
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.02 0.18 0.06 0.06
(0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
0.926 0.351 0.751 0.756
Member of dominant ethnic group in district 0.23 0.03 -0.05 -0.07
(0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.26)
0.440 0.919 0.848 0.795
Education index 0.30** 0.11 0.13 0.16
(0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
0.033 0.357 0.217 0.136
Subjective HH monthly income -0.16 -0.11 -0.17 -0.14
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
0.237 0.429 0.187 0.212
Subjective relative HH well-being -0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.03
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
0.590 0.973 0.697 0.759
HH dependents under age 13 0.04 0.13** 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.404 0.021 0.184 0.279
LC5 Candidate -0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.02
(0.20) (0.24) (0.22) (0.19)
0.961 0.684 0.884 0.939
District gender inequality index -0.65***
(0.07)
0.000
Share of HHs with <2 meals/day 0.03
(0.08)
0.740
Share of HHs with electricity -7.44***
(2.52)
0.007
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 3.17**
(1.17)
0.013
Constant 0.20 0.09 17.64 0.89 -0.25
(0.60) (0.87) (1.06) (0.73) (1.26)
0.741 0.916 0.000 0.235 0.846
N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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Table 38: Main regression of competition predicting marginalized groups index, robust stan-
dard errors.








Average margin of victory 0.00 0.00 -0.26*** -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.601 0.982 0.000 0.302 0.665
Affiliated with the NRM 0.00 0.17 0.19 0.18
(0.25) (0.28) (0.27) (0.24)
0.985 0.540 0.486 0.450
Spousal political networks -0.11 -0.11 0.02 0.02
(0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23)
0.625 0.652 0.926 0.922
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.351 0.476 0.629 0.829
Candidate is married -0.25 0.11 -0.09 -0.15
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22)
0.317 0.645 0.704 0.508
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.02 0.18 0.06 0.06
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
0.925 0.363 0.753 0.746
Member of dominant ethnic group in district 0.23 0.03 -0.05 -0.07
(0.26) (0.24) (0.21) (0.22)
0.383 0.894 0.802 0.748
Education index 0.30** 0.11 0.13 0.16
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
0.012 0.341 0.234 0.145
Subjective HH monthly income -0.16 -0.11 -0.17 -0.14
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
0.218 0.417 0.184 0.237
Subjective relative HH well-being -0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.03
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
0.577 0.976 0.732 0.795
HH dependents under age 13 0.04 0.13** 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
0.423 0.019 0.181 0.247
LC5 Candidate -0.01 -0.1 0.03 0.02
(0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23)
0.969 0.674 0.893 0.949
District gender inequality index -0.65***
(0.10)
0.000
Share of HHs with <2 meals/day 0.03
(0.13)
0.837
Share of HHs with electricity -7.44***
(2.39)
0.002
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 3.17*
(1.72)
0.068
Constant 0.20 0.09 17.64 0.89 -0.25
(0.39) (0.67) (1.29) (0.87) (1.71)
0.612 0.890 0.000 0.308 0.885
N 157 157 157 157 157




In this section, I evaluate the sensitivity of the results to restricting the analysis to the
subsample of observations where the candidate is fluent in English (n = 69). I also evaluate
the sensitivity of the results to an alternative specification of the indices of representation
priorities. As in the previous section, I present five different model specifications to check
the robustness of the relationship between electoral competition and constituent groups
candidates intend to prioritize. Model 1 is the bivariate regression; Model 2 includes the full
slate of controls; Model 3 includes controls plus constituency fixed effects; Model 4 includes
controls plus district fixed effects; and, Model 5 includes the original set of controls plus four
additional control variables measured at the district level. For each dependent variable of
interest, I present all results using standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
P.1 ENGLISH FLUENCY
One concern with the quality of the survey data relates to the fact that the survey was
self-administered and printed in English, yet not all women who attended the trainings were
fluent in English. The extent of the this potential barrier to generating reliable responses
to the survey questions was not clear until after implementation was completed. Workshop
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staff were instructed to help clarify any questions respondents had as to the meaning of
individual questions, translating into the relevant local language as needed. Given the length
and complexity of some of the questions, the extent to which this was sufficient to generate
high quality data is somewhat questionable. However, since the survey contained a question
regarding English fluency, it is possible to identify the respondents who self-identified as
‘fluent’ in English. By isolating the effect of competition on representation priorities for this
subset of 69 women candidates, it may be possible to arrive at more reliable estimates.
Table 39 shows the effect of competition on the level of clientelistic group priorities.
Compared to the same estimation conducted for the full sample, the coefficients in Models
1 and 2 and Models 4 and 5 are very similar – as the margin of victory increases, I observe
a significant and positive increase in the clientelistic group priorities index (Models 1 and
2), while I do not find a significant effect if district fixed effects are included (Model 4) and
note a weakly positive effect if observable district level factors are taken into account (Model
5). The coefficient for competition in Model 3 is noticeably different in this specification,
though it is not immediately obvious why this might be the case. I also observe roughly
similar results in Table 40 as for the full sample, at least in the case of the null effect of
competition on the marginalized groups index. Again, I note that Model 3 is an outlier in this
case, with strikingly different results for the full sample compared to the English-speaking
subsample.
The most notable difference between those who speak English fluently and those who do
not is in terms of the other independent variables included in the analysis. Among English-
speakers, the negative effect of being married on clientelistic representation is much more
pronounced than in the main results in Appendix O. I also observe increased precision in
some of the other control variables. As the number of household dependents under age
13 increases, there is an increase in the clientelistic index. In predicting the score on the
marginalized groups index, I also note that some of the alternative model specifications show
a positive effect of NRM membership. This suggests that limiting the sample to those who
speak English increases precision and reduces noise in the results for the control variables,
but it still yields a similar pattern with respect to the influence of the competitiveness of the
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electoral environment.
Another notable difference in the English-speaking subsample relates to the district-level
control variables in Model 5. In the subsample, none of these coefficients are significant in
predicting the clientelistic groups index, though three out of four of them are in predicting
the marginalized groups index. This contrasts with the full sample, where district-level
gender inequality is significantly and negatively related to clientelistic representation and
poverty/food scarcity is significant and positively related to the client groups index, while the
remaining two variables are insignificant. At the same time, the direction and significance of
these variables in relation to the marginalized groups index is consistent across the full sample
and the subsample. The higher gender inequality is, the lower the support for prioritizing the
marginalized groups index. The more households with electricity, the lower the support for
marginalized groups’ priorities. The more households with clean drinking water, the greater
the support for marginalized groups. Given that clean water and electricity may both be
measures of the level of development in the district, it is difficult to interpret the opposing
findings here.
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Table 39: Clientelistic groups index among candidates fluent in English.








Average margin of victory 0.02** 0.03** -0.07 0.00 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02)
0.042 0.048 0.361 0.871 0.108
Affiliated with the NRM -0.43 -0.42 -0.33 -0.51
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.43)
0.345 0.350 0.467 0.250
Spousal political networks 0.50 0.13 0.18 0.42
(0.51) (0.72) (0.53) (0.50)
0.339 0.854 0.744 0.415
Age 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
0.523 0.478 0.330 0.389
Candidate is married -0.55 -0.87 -0.76* -0.74*
(0.34) (0.51) (0.38) (0.36)
0.131 0.106 0.060 0.058
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.66 -0.43 -0.57 -0.83
(0.51) (0.81) (0.60) (0.59)
0.218 0.603 0.352 0.175
Member of dominant ethnic group in district -0.43 -0.02 -0.17 -0.23
(0.38) (0.64) (0.43) (0.46)
0.281 0.971 0.693 0.628
Subjective HH monthly income 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.17) (0.35) (0.24) (0.20)
0.537 0.997 0.997 0.898
Subjective relative HH well-being -0.11 -0.16 -0.16 -0.07
(0.28) (0.57) (0.40) (0.35)
0.706 0.776 0.695 0.834
HH dependents under age 13 0.25* 0.20 0.24 0.21
(0.14) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13)
0.099 0.255 0.110 0.143
LC5 Candidate 0.03 -0.32 -0.27 0.01
(0.45) (0.60) (0.39) (0.47)
0.943 0.597 0.500 0.984
District gender inequality index 0.01
(0.14)
0.949
Share of HHs with <2 meals/day 0.02
(0.24)
0.940
Share of HHs with electricity 2.92
(3.88)
0.462
Share of HHs with protected drinking water -3.11
(2.12)
0.159
Constant -1.67 -1.93 4.88 -0.27 -0.71
(0.69) (2.06) (6.24) (2.52) (4.79)
0.026 0.363 0.454 0.915 0.883
N 69 69 69 69 69
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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Table 40: Marginalized groups index among candidates fluent in English.








Average margin of victory -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
0.545 0.780 0.943 0.418 0.246
Affiliated with the NRM 0.11 0.59* 0.56** 0.34
(0.30) (0.28) (0.25) (0.25)
0.711 0.052 0.038 0.198
Spousal political networks 0.07 0.49 0.37 0.09
(0.34) (0.50) (0.41) (0.38)
0.833 0.347 0.380 0.810
Age 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
0.146 0.868 0.786 0.335
Candidate is married -0.35 0.07 -0.11 -0.12
(0.28) (0.40) (0.31) (0.28)
0.229 0.859 0.720 0.667
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.34 0.15 0.01 0.10
(0.26) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21)
0.214 0.516 0.980 0.633
Member of dominant ethnic group in district 0.16 -0.41 -0.20 -0.28
(0.44) (0.50) (0.38) (0.37)
0.719 0.427 0.605 0.469
Subjective HH monthly income -0.25 -0.30 -0.18 -0.18
(0.22) (0.34) (0.24) (0.19)
0.267 0.387 0.459 0.367
Subjective relative HH well-being 0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07
(0.20) (0.24) (0.19) (0.15)
0.827 0.976 0.613 0.672
HH dependents under age 13 0.10 0.16** 0.12* 0.15**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
0.149 0.04 0.097 0.036
LC5 Candidate 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.08
(0.23) (0.32) (0.22) (0.20)
0.807 0.454 0.626 0.689
District gender inequality index -0.74***
(0.26)
0.010
Share of HHs with <2 meals/day -0.06
(0.10)
0.562
Share of HHs with electricity -9.02***
(2.42)
0.002
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 4.15**
(1.56)
0.019
Constant 0.71 0.09 1.25 1.73 0.57
(0.71) (1.09) (6.26) (1.26) (2.10)
0.325 0.934 0.845 0.190 0.788
N 69 69 69 69 69
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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P.2 ALTERNATIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING INVERSE
COVARIANCE WEIGHTING
Following Anderson (2008), I also collapse multiple survey questions into a single index where
different questions help explain a common underlying concept. Known as inverse covariance
weighting (ICW), this method assumes one latent trait of interest and constructs an optimal
weighted average by weighting-up index components that have lower covariance and thus
provide more ‘new’ information.
To create the ICW indices, I first checked the correlation of the nine original variables
included in the principal component analysis of representation priorities. The results showed
a strong correlation between party agents, family/friends, and members of the same religious,
ethnic, and tribal groups. They also revealed a strong positive correlation between women
and youth/children, while ‘all people’ remained largely independent of the other measures.
Disabled or physically vulnerable did not correlate strongly with any of the other measures,
so I removed it from consideration in creating the ICW indices. I then created two indices,
grouping the variables in keeping with the high levels of correlation between them.
As in the previous section, I present five different model specifications to check the ro-
bustness of the relationship between electoral competition and constituent groups candidates
intend to prioritize. Model 1 is the bivariate regression; Model 2 includes the full slate of
controls; Model 3 includes controls plus constituency fixed effects; Model 4 includes con-
trols plus district fixed effects; and, Model 5 includes the original set of controls plus four
additional control variables measured at the district level. For each dependent variable of
interest, I present all results using standard errors clustered at the constituency level. Over-
all, the results are generally consistent with the estimation that uses the PCA indices as
the main dependent variables. This suggests that the results with respect to how the level
of electoral competition influences representation priorities is not especially sensitive to how
the index versions of the dependent variables are created.
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Table 41: ICW results for the clientelistic groups index with clustered standard errors.








Average margin of victory 0.01** 0.01* 0.12*** 0.00 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
0.039 0.065 0.000 0.510 0.072
Affiliated with the NRM -0.09 0.14 0.24 -0.12
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
0.64 0.441 0.190 0.554
Spousal political networks -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.02
(0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23)
0.937 0.872 0.674 0.938
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.929 0.744 0.702 0.830
Candidate is married 0.01 -0.31* -0.19 0.00
(0.15) (0.18) (0.14) (0.15)
0.968 0.091 0.191 0.998
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.13 -0.22 -0.07 -0.13
(0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
0.418 0.244 0.666 0.463
Member of dominant ethnic group in district -0.08 0.11 0.00 -0.09
(0.21) (0.15) (0.15) (0.22)
0.698 0.472 0.979 0.695
Education Index -0.06 -0.09 -0.14 -0.10
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
0.516 0.341 0.106 0.256
Subjective HH monthly income 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
0.28 0.737 0.681 0.700
Subjective relative HH well-being -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
0.476 0.431 0.477 0.682
HH dependents under age 13 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
0.288 0.745 0.269 0.404
LC5 Candidate 0.27 0.13 0.02 0.19
(0.22) (0.33) (0.25) (0.25)
0.244 0.699 0.948 0.444
District gender inequality index -0.17
(0.10)
0.113
Share of HHs with <2 meals/day 0.30*
(0.17)
0.087
Share of HHs with electricity -1.95
(2.73)
0.481
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 2.69
(2.08)
0.207
Constant -0.86 -0.96 -7.97 -0.19 -4.30
(0.37) (0.77) (1.31) (0.76) (2.40)
0.030 0.228 0.000 0.804 0.086
N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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Table 42: ICW results for the marginalized groups index with clustered standard errors.








Average margin of victory 0.00 0.00 -0.19*** -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.507 0.709 0.000 0.179 0.521
Affiliated with the NRM 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.15
(0.20) (0.25) (0.24) (0.19)
0.725 0.535 0.453 0.443
Spousal political networks -0.08 -0.04 0.04 0.02
(0.19) (0.21) (0.18) (0.17)
0.694 0.864 0.831 0.895
Age 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.534 0.458 0.668 0.859
Candidate is married -0.19 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12
(0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
0.367 0.733 0.715 0.554
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.15 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
0.404 0.816 0.703 0.647
Member of dominant ethnic group in district 0.20 0.09 0.05 0.00
(0.25) (0.29) (0.25) (0.23)
0.437 0.761 0.850 0.983
Education Index 0.28*** 0.12 0.13* 0.18***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
0.001 0.138 0.088 0.009
Subjective HH monthly income -0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
0.734 0.347 0.292 0.511
Subjective relative HH well-being -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07)
0.237 0.246 0.251 0.177
HH dependents under age 13 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
0.454 0.104 0.184 0.327
LC5 Candidate 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.18) (0.23) (0.20) (0.19)
0.612 0.897 0.936 0.836
District gender inequality index -0.50***
(0.08)
0.000
Share of HHs with <2 meals/day 0.26**
(0.11)
0.030
Share of HHs with electricity -7.91***
(2.15)
0.001
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 4.89***
(1.38)
0.002
Constant 0.33 0.39 14.14 0.85 -2.54
(0.52) (0.82) (1.08) (0.66) (1.64)
0.537 0.641 0.000 0.211 0.136
N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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P.3 ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES
In this section, I confirm the robustness of the main results to the inclusion of additional
control variables derived from the survey of women candidates. I again reproduce the five
different model specifications to check the robustness of the relationship between electoral
competition and constituent groups candidates intend to prioritize. Model 1 is the bivari-
ate regression; Model 2 includes the full slate of controls plus the additional set of survey
variables; Model 3 includes all controls in Model 2 plus constituency fixed effects; Model 4
includes all controls in Model 2 plus district fixed effects; and, Model 5 includes all controls
in Model 2 plus four additional control variables measured at the district level. For each
dependent variable of interest, I present all results first using standard errors clustered at
the constituency level, followed by all five models with robust standard errors. Overall, the
results are generally consistent with what I present in the main text.
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Table 43: Main regression of competition predicting clientelistic groups index.








Avg. margin of victory 2011 (continuous)
0.02** 0.02** 0.10*** 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.040 0.015 0.000 0.879 0.103
Affiliated with the NRM -0.01 0.36 0.55* -0.04
(0.24) (0.29) (0.32) (0.26)
0.955 0.227 0.098 0.863
Age 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.817 0.804 0.796 0.784
Candidate is married -0.23 -0.68* -0.53 -0.23
(0.28) (0.37) (0.32) (0.29)
0.416 0.077 0.111 0.443
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.34 -0.43 -0.22 -0.26
(0.28) (0.38) (0.32) (0.31)
0.242 0.267 0.513 0.420
Member of dominant ethnic group in district -0.15 0.19 -0.05 -0.21
(0.38) (0.29) (0.32) (0.39)
0.691 0.517 0.882 0.595
Education index -0.01 -0.13 -0.2 -0.13
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13)
0.921 0.375 0.174 0.345
Subjective HH monthly income 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23)
0.820 0.820 0.835 0.831
Subjective HH well-being relative to others in constituency -0.12 -0.13 -0.1 -0.07
(0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17)
0.525 0.534 0.570 0.714
HH dependents under age 13 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.12
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
0.188 0.365 0.161 0.257
Wouldn’t run without party leaders asking -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.03
(0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15)
0.673 0.587 0.487 0.867
Spouse has held office or served in party leadership 0.09 0.18 0.33 0.21
(0.41) (0.36) (0.36) (0.38)
0.834 0.633 0.363 0.585
Trust in women candidates index 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.13
(0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16)
0.702 0.442 0.629 0.437
Women candidates more informed than male candidates -0.16 -0.17 -0.11 -0.19
(0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20)
0.474 0.436 0.593 0.371
LC3 Candidate -0.43 -0.18 -0.01 -0.29
(0.40) (0.58) (0.44) (0.43)
0.299 0.766 0.988 0.510
District gender inequality index -0.55**
(0.21)
0.016
Share of HHs with less than 2 meals per day 0.55*
(0.31)
0.085
Share of HHs with electricity -6.96
(5.16)
0.191
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 6.02
(3.87)
0.133
Constant -1.39 -0.58 -5.71 0.66 -6.44
(0.56) (2.07) (2.88) (2.35) (5.17)
0.019 0.781 0.062 0.780 0.226
N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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Table 44: Main regression of competition predicting clientelistic groups index.








Avg. margin of victory 2011 (continuous) 0.02** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.00 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
0.010 0.008 0.001 0.887 0.048
Affiliated with the NRM -0.01 0.36 0.55 -0.04
(0.29) (0.37) (0.38) (0.34)
0.961 0.335 0.153 0.894
Age 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
0.751 0.750 0.741 0.732
Candidate is married -0.23 -0.68** -0.53* -0.23
(0.31) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32)
0.463 0.039 0.077 0.476
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.34 -0.43 -0.22 -0.26
(0.33) (0.31) (0.30) (0.34)
0.316 0.171 0.471 0.459
Member of dominant ethnic group in district -0.15 0.19 -0.05 -0.21
(0.37) (0.32) (0.34) (0.38)
0.680 0.551 0.886 0.589
Education index -0.01 -0.13 -0.2 -0.13
(0.13) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
0.918 0.428 0.207 0.421
Subjective HH monthly income 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.20) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
0.816 0.822 0.837 0.826
Subjective HH well-being relative to others in constituency -0.12 -0.13 -0.1 -0.07
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
0.517 0.502 0.592 0.732
HH dependents under age 13 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.12
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
0.193 0.352 0.147 0.239
Wouldn’t run without party leaders asking -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.03
(0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16)
0.653 0.599 0.541 0.875
Spouse has held office or served in party leadership 0.09 0.18 0.33 0.21
(0.40) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38)
0.827 0.617 0.339 0.577
Trust in women candidates index 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.13
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
0.716 0.367 0.610 0.459
Women candidates more informed than male candidates -0.16 -0.17 -0.11 -0.19
(0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
0.374 0.291 0.490 0.289
LC3 Candidate -0.43 -0.18 -0.01 -0.29
(0.40) (0.47) (0.39) (0.43)
0.288 0.711 0.986 0.498
District gender inequality index -0.55***
(0.21)
0.008
Share of HHs with less than 2 meals per day 0.55**
(0.25)
0.029
Share of HHs with electricity -6.96*
(3.97)
0.082






N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include robust standard errors.
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Table 45: Main regression of competition predicting marginalized groups index.








Avg. margin of victory 2011 (continuous) 0.00 0.00 -0.26*** -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.733 0.457 0 0.294 0.684
Affiliated with the NRM 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.2
(0.22) (0.27) (0.24) (0.21)
0.621 0.521 0.438 0.342
Age 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.289 0.637 0.688 0.855
Candidate is married -0.24 0.10 -0.09 -0.14
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
0.235 0.63 0.675 0.475
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.10 0.19 0.08 0.09
(0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21)
0.641 0.326 0.685 0.69
Member of dominant ethnic group in district 0.11 0.04 -0.05 -0.07
(0.28) (0.33) (0.28) (0.27)
0.687 0.893 0.852 0.792
Education index 0.25** 0.10 0.11 0.13
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
0.04 0.424 0.307 0.221
Subjective HH monthly income -0.19 -0.10 -0.16 -0.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12)
0.183 0.494 0.23 0.263
Subjective HH well-being relative to others in constituency -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
0.697 0.937 0.613 0.65
HH dependents under age 13 0.05 0.13** 0.07 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.341 0.019 0.205 0.291
Wouldn’t run without party leaders asking -0.20* 0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
0.1 0.712 0.915 0.913
Spouse has held office or served in party leadership -0.11 -0.10 0.01 0.01
(0.20) (0.26) (0.22) (0.22)
0.598 0.695 0.951 0.966
Trust in women candidates index -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
0.705 0.688 0.539 0.714
Women candidates more informed than male candidates 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.04
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
0.959 0.848 0.721 0.653
LC3 Candidate -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.17
(0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.20)
0.477 0.920 0.518 0.410
District gender inequality index -0.67***
(0.11)
0.000
Share of HHs with less than 2 meals per day 0.00
(0.08)
0.952
Share of HHs with electricity -7.40***
(2.52)
0.007
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 3.05**
(1.25)
0.023
Constant 0.19 0.21 17.65 0.89 -0.02
(0.59) (0.92) (1.36) (0.83) (1.37)
0.745 0.822 0.000 0.298 0.986
N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include standard errors clustered at the constituency level.
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Table 46: Main regression of competition predicting marginalized groups index.








Avg. margin of victory 2011 (continuous) 0 0 -0.26*** -0.01 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
0.608 0.428 0 0.335 0.648
Affiliated with the NRM 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.2
(0.24) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24)
0.652 0.536 0.471 0.392
Age 0.01 0.01 0 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.265 0.575 0.657 0.846
Candidate is married -0.24 0.1 -0.09 -0.14
(0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22)
0.306 0.683 0.698 0.508
Member of dominant religious group in region -0.1 0.19 0.08 0.09
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
0.63 0.34 0.69 0.675
Member of dominant ethnic group in district 0.11 0.04 -0.05 -0.07
(0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23)
0.655 0.861 0.814 0.753
Education index 0.25** 0.1 0.11 0.13
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
0.033 0.409 0.323 0.233
Subjective HH monthly income -0.19 -0.1 -0.16 -0.14
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
0.162 0.489 0.235 0.294
Subjective HH well-being relative to others in constituency -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
0.71 0.944 0.667 0.706
HH dependents under age 13 0.05 0.13** 0.07 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
0.365 0.024 0.213 0.272
Wouldn’t run without party leaders asking -0.20** 0.05 0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
0.024 0.672 0.904 0.902
Spouse has held office or served in party leadership -0.11 -0.1 0.01 0.01
(0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23)
0.647 0.681 0.953 0.968
Trust in women candidates index -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
0.677 0.714 0.563 0.721
Women candidates more informed than male candidates 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.04
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
0.956 0.834 0.71 0.631
LC3 Candidate -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.17
(0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23)
0.523 0.915 0.532 0.462
District gender inequality index -0.67***
(0.13)
0
Share of HHs with less than 2 meals per day 0
(0.13)
0.97
Share of HHs with electricity -7.40***
(2.37)
0.002
Share of HHs with protected drinking water 3.05*
(1.74)
0.083
Constant 0.19 0.21 17.65 0.89 -0.02
(0.39) (0.83) (1.45) (0.96) (1.79)
0.618 0.8 0 0.359 0.989
N 157 157 157 157 157
*p < 0.10 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 All models include robust standard errors.
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